limits doctrine (Massachusetts) · Go Syfert
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limits doctrine in Massachusetts

15 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1913–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandensegreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 1992–1994
2 sentences

1994“Because each case depends on its facts, the design of a comprehensive, all-purpose guide to the limits of the exception is not likely.” Id. at 143 , citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).

1992See id. at 813 (it is impossible “to define with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception”).

22
Ritchie v. Department of State Policegreen
massappct · 2004 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021The Court thus limits its analysis to the first and third elements of a retaliation claim. i. Protected Conduct Protected conduct encompasses efforts to “oppose[] any practices forbidden” under Chapter 151B, see G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4), and may include “complaining to management or filing an internal complaint of harassment, or meeting with co-workers to discuss how to stop sexual harassment in the workplace.” Ritchie v. Department of State Police, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 664 (2004) (quotation omitted).

11
Meley's Casegreen
mass · 1914 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003While we are mindful of the limits of the doctrine of estoppel with respect to the statutorily defined authority of an administrative agency such as the DIA, see Le-vangie’s Case, 228 Mass. 213, 217 (1917); Hayes’s Case, 348 Mass. 447, 452-453 (1965), we endorse the reviewing board’s remedy as both within the jurisdiction of the DIA and consistent with the settled proposition that c. 152 is “to be construed liberally for the protection of the injured employee.” Meley’s Case, 219 Mass. 136, 139 (1914).

11
Levangie's Casegreen
mass · 1917 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003While we are mindful of the limits of the doctrine of estoppel with respect to the statutorily defined authority of an administrative agency such as the DIA, see Le-vangie’s Case, 228 Mass. 213, 217 (1917); Hayes’s Case, 348 Mass. 447, 452-453 (1965), we endorse the reviewing board’s remedy as both within the jurisdiction of the DIA and consistent with the settled proposition that c. 152 is “to be construed liberally for the protection of the injured employee.” Meley’s Case, 219 Mass. 136, 139 (1914).

11
Hayes's Casegreen
mass · 1965 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003While we are mindful of the limits of the doctrine of estoppel with respect to the statutorily defined authority of an administrative agency such as the DIA, see Le-vangie’s Case, 228 Mass. 213, 217 (1917); Hayes’s Case, 348 Mass. 447, 452-453 (1965), we endorse the reviewing board’s remedy as both within the jurisdiction of the DIA and consistent with the settled proposition that c. 152 is “to be construed liberally for the protection of the injured employee.” Meley’s Case, 219 Mass. 136, 139 (1914).

11
Hepner's Casegreen
massappct · 1990 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Hepner’s Case, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 212 (1990).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

CaseCitedYears
Kilbourn v. Thompson green
· 1881
1 sentence

2025Id.

12025–2025
In Re Rusconi green
mass · 1960
1 sentence

2004For example, in Rusconi, petitioner, 341 Mass. 167 (1960), some members of the Rusconi family objected to a petition by other family members to change their surname to Bryan.

12004–2004
Pandey v. Pudlo green
mass · 1993
1 sentence

1994For the limits of such a waiver in the context of foreclosure of personal property, see Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Chase, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 269-271 , S.C., 416 Mass. 1008 (1993). (c) Application of the Uniform Commercial Code.

11994–1994
Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Chase green
massappct · 1993
1 sentence

1994For the limits of such a waiver in the context of foreclosure of personal property, see Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Chase, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 269-271 , S.C., 416 Mass. 1008 (1993). (c) Application of the Uniform Commercial Code.

11994–1994
Whitney v. City of Worcester green
mass · 1977
1 sentence

1994In Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1977) (which preceded but anticipated enactment of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act), we identified certain considerations as potentially helpful in defining discretionary functions.

11994–1994
Terry v. Ohio green
scotus · 1968
1 sentence

1991In this case we are asked, once again, to consider the limits of the privilege, first set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for the police to stop a person to investigate his conduct absent probable cause to believe that he was engaged in unlawful activities.

11991–1991
Hacker v. Nitschke green
mass · 1942
1 sentence

1966The opinion states with reference to Ingalls v. Hobbs that “Knowlton, J., care fully defined the limits of the exception which it made to the doctrine of caveat emptor which is ordinarily applicable to a lessee of real estate.” It cited with approval Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754 , 156 in which it was held that Ingalls v. Hobbs “is a departure from the general rule and should be confined within narrow limits.” The opinion concluded that “The house was fit for habitation when the plaintiff took possession.

11966–1966
Stumpf v. Leland green
mass · 1922
1 sentence

1961Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 348 , citing Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168 .

11961–1961
Bolieau v. Traiser green
mass · 1925
1 sentence

1961Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 348 , citing Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168 .

11961–1961
Commonwealth v. O'Rourke green
mass · 1942
1 sentence

1960Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 222 .

11960–1960
Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. green
mass · 1942
1 sentence

1954Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 516 ; McCabe v. Boston Consolidated Gas Company, 314 Mass. 493, 496 ; Hamson v. Standard Grocery Company, 328 Mass. 263 .

11954–1954
McCabe v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co. green
mass · 1943
1 sentence

1954Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 516 ; McCabe v. Boston Consolidated Gas Company, 314 Mass. 493, 496 ; Hamson v. Standard Grocery Company, 328 Mass. 263 .

11954–1954
Carter v. Yardley & Co. green
mass · 1946
1 sentence

1954St. 215), such as some negligence or fault of another, whereby the manufacturer’s negligence ceases to be the proximate cause of the injury.” In addition to illustrating the limits to the principle, the Court, in Carter v. Yardley, 319 Mass. 92 made it clear that the plaintiff in these cases still has the burden to prove negligence against the defendant.

11954–1954
Hamson v. Standard Grocery Co. green
mass · 1952
1 sentence

1954Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 516 ; McCabe v. Boston Consolidated Gas Company, 314 Mass. 493, 496 ; Hamson v. Standard Grocery Company, 328 Mass. 263 .

11954–1954
Weiner v. D. A. Schulte, Inc. green
mass · 1931
1 sentence

1932A. Schulte, Inc. 275 Mass. 379, 385 , and Hirrel v. Lacey, 274 Mass. 431, 436 .

11932–1932
Hirrel v. Lacey green
mass · 1931
1 sentence

1932A. Schulte, Inc. 275 Mass. 379, 385 , and Hirrel v. Lacey, 274 Mass. 431, 436 .

11932–1932
Warren v. Pazolt green
· 1909
1 sentence

1914In addition to Knox v. Mackinnon, ubi supra, see in this connnection Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328 .

11914–1914
Mabardy v. McHugh green
mass · 1909
1 sentence

1913Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148 .

11913–1913

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 53 (1890–2025) TX 50 (1916–2026) NY 31 (1851–1989) MS 25 (1977–2023) PA 22 (1885–2023) FL 21 (1948–2020) IL 20 (1905–2023) CO 17 (1893–2024) MA 15 (1913–2025) MO 13 (1886–2006) OH 13 (1931–2021) MD 12 (1967–2026) NJ 10 (1889–2006) WA 9 (1901–2022) MI 9 (1970–2021) MN 8 (1885–2023) NC 8 (1909–2021) KS 8 (1923–1990) ME 7 (1941–2022) OR 7 (1960–2007) WV 7 (1912–2023) IN 7 (1901–1995) GA 7 (1900–2010) OK 7 (1903–2009) UT 7 (1951–2024) MT 7 (1895–2007) TN 6 (1926–2021) VT 6 (1902–2025) RI 5 (1907–2007) AR 5 (1907–2007) AL 5 (1914–2004) ID 5 (1906–1989) IA 4 (1980–2018) CT 4 (1993–2001) AK 4 (1969–2025) WY 4 (1901–1923) AZ 4 (1976–2018) KY 4 (1930–1985) SD 3 (1909–2005) SC 3 (1989–2025) DC 3 (1978–1993) VA 2 (1932–1999) NV 2 (1958–1983) NE 2 (1935–1982) VI 2 (2012–2024) NH 2 (1932–1993) LA 2 (1975–2017) ND 2 (1942–2017) WI 2 (2011–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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