limits claim in Maine

2022Cf. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283, 1285 (Me. 1987) (son found a severed leg in his father’s belongings); Bolton v. Caine, 584 A.2d 615, 616, 618 (Me. 1990) (patient was misinformed about critical x-ray findings); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 802, 807 (Me. 1986) (patient’s therapist was sexually involved with the patient’s companion).7 7 Although we have on occasion distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” victims in order to define the limits of a claim for NIED, see Michaud v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 1998 ME 213, ¶ 16 , 715 A.2d 955 ; Champagne v. Mid-Ma

2022Cf. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283, 1285 (Me. 1987) (son found a severed leg in his father’s belongings); Bolton v. Caine, 584 A.2d 615, 616, 618 (Me. 1990) (patient was misinformed about critical x-ray findings); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 802, 807 (Me. 1986) (patient’s therapist was sexually involved with the patient’s companion).7 7 Although we have on occasion distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” victims in order to define the limits of a claim for NIED, see Michaud v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 1998 ME 213, ¶ 16 , 715 A.2d 955 ; Champagne v. Mid-Ma

2022Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 6 , 711 A.2d 842 ; Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Me. 1992), that characterization was an attempt to distinguish cases where the plaintiff experiences harm directly due to the defendant’s negligence from those where the plaintiff’s harm results from witnessing harm to a third person—i.e., bystander cases, see Cameron, 610 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Me. 1992).

2022Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 6 , 711 A.2d 842 ; Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Me. 1992), that characterization was an attempt to distinguish cases where the plaintiff experiences harm directly due to the defendant’s negligence from those where the plaintiff’s harm results from witnessing harm to a third person—i.e., bystander cases, see Cameron, 610 A.2d 279, 280-81 (Me. 1992).

2020In addition, consistent with Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, the court has also considered two official public documents-its January 21, 2020 order denying Barth's SOB appeal and the ZBA's May 24, 2018 decision. 2004 ME 20, n 8-10 , 843 A.2d 43 (holding that court may rely on extra-pleading materials that are "official public documents" in deciding a motion to dismiss). 2 under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." See Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp., 2011 ME 46 , ,r 16, 17 A.3d 123 (articulating the motion to dismiss standard).

2020In addition, consistent with Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, the court has also considered two official public documents-its January 21, 2020 order denying Barth's SOB appeal and the ZBA's May 24, 2018 decision. 2004 ME 20, n 8-10 , 843 A.2d 43 (holding that court may rely on extra-pleading materials that are "official public documents" in deciding a motion to dismiss). 2 under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." See Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp., 2011 ME 46 , ,r 16, 17 A.3d 123 (articulating the motion to dismiss standard).

2020In addition, consistent with Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, the court has also considered two official public documents-its January 21, 2020 order denying Barth's SOB appeal and the ZBA's May 24, 2018 decision. 2004 ME 20, n 8-10 , 843 A.2d 43 (holding that court may rely on extra-pleading materials that are "official public documents" in deciding a motion to dismiss). 2 under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." See Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp., 2011 ME 46 , ,r 16, 17 A.3d 123 (articulating the motion to dismiss standard).

2020In addition, consistent with Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, the court has also considered two official public documents-its January 21, 2020 order denying Barth's SOB appeal and the ZBA's May 24, 2018 decision. 2004 ME 20, n 8-10 , 843 A.2d 43 (holding that court may rely on extra-pleading materials that are "official public documents" in deciding a motion to dismiss). 2 under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." See Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp., 2011 ME 46 , ,r 16, 17 A.3d 123 (articulating the motion to dismiss standard).

2000Consequently, the testimony beyond the limits of the rule was inadmissible and should have been excluded. [¶ 25] The court’s error, however, was harmless, because much of what the father testified to was brought out by other witnesses, see State v. Collins, 456 A.2d 362, 365 (Me.1983), and it is “highly probable” that, in the circumstances of this case, the remaining inadmissible evidence would not have “affected the factfinder’s judgment,” see State v. Jordan, 1997 ME 101, ¶ 8 , 694 A.2d 929, 931 .

2000Consequently, the testimony beyond the limits of the rule was inadmissible and should have been excluded. [¶ 25] The court’s error, however, was harmless, because much of what the father testified to was brought out by other witnesses, see State v. Collins, 456 A.2d 362, 365 (Me.1983), and it is “highly probable” that, in the circumstances of this case, the remaining inadmissible evidence would not have “affected the factfinder’s judgment,” see State v. Jordan, 1997 ME 101, ¶ 8 , 694 A.2d 929, 931 .

1981According to Carter's affidavit, McCrillis said that one of the four base pieces of the Jolly Green Giant had been and still remained missing as of the time of the affidavit. [2] Cf. United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1979) (employee lacked standing to suppress evidence seized from his employer's warehouse in a case where the employee was absent during the search, had no financial interest in the employer company or in the premises, had no area of the warehouse set aside for his own use, and had no right to exclude persons from the premises). [3] The limits on the doctrine are imp

1974We specified in Poulin, supra, the proper limits of inquiry in such proceedings, as follows: “The issue of guilt or innocence of the accused is not before the Court on ha-beas corpus. [Citation omitted.] The Court, in this petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus, is limited to inquiry as to whether the petitioner stands charged with crime in the demanding state, whether the petitioner is in fact the person charged with this crime, whether he was present in the demanding State at the time of the crime, left and was found in the asylum state and whether the warrants of arrest and of requisition wi

1974We specified in Poulin, supra, the proper limits of inquiry in such proceedings, as follows: “The issue of guilt or innocence of the accused is not before the Court on ha-beas corpus. [Citation omitted.] The Court, in this petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus, is limited to inquiry as to whether the petitioner stands charged with crime in the demanding state, whether the petitioner is in fact the person charged with this crime, whether he was present in the demanding State at the time of the crime, left and was found in the asylum state and whether the warrants of arrest and of requisition wi

1952In our opinion the hereinafter quoted portions of the charge of the presiding justice come within the limits of the exception to the rule referred to in Roberts, Admr. v. Neil, supra, and Cox v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, supra. The presiding justice, in charging the jury in respect to the capias or attachment writ which was served as a capias, said: “This writ, and I am now speaking of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, the original writ, commands the officer to attach the estate of Stanwood Davis of Freeport to the value of $200, and for want thereof to take the body of the. defendant.

1952In our opinion the hereinafter quoted portions of the charge of the presiding justice come within the limits of the exception to the rule referred to in Roberts, Admr. v. Neil, supra, and Cox v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, supra. The presiding justice, in charging the jury in respect to the capias or attachment writ which was served as a capias, said: “This writ, and I am now speaking of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, the original writ, commands the officer to attach the estate of Stanwood Davis of Freeport to the value of $200, and for want thereof to take the body of the. defendant.

1941On the other hand it is not expected, that the laboring party should be subjected to any other loss, where his inability arises from the visitation of Providence.” The limits of the principle, that a breach of contract may result from a direct and sole cause for which neither party is responsible so that a right of action to recover damages does not arise from the breach, within which principle the implied understanding rule clearly falls, were aptly phrased by the Utah Court in McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah, 239 , 60 P., 1100, 1102 , reported and annotated in 50 L.

1941On the other hand it is not expected, that the laboring party should be subjected to any other loss, where his inability arises from the visitation of Providence.” The limits of the principle, that a breach of contract may result from a direct and sole cause for which neither party is responsible so that a right of action to recover damages does not arise from the breach, within which principle the implied understanding rule clearly falls, were aptly phrased by the Utah Court in McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah, 239 , 60 P., 1100, 1102 , reported and annotated in 50 L.