appeal or writ error in Arizona

1913Bogan v. Pignataro, 3 Ariz. 383 , 29 Pac. 652 .

1899In History Co. v. Dougherty, 3 Ariz. 387, 29 Pac. 649 , the court construed paragraphs 593 and 846 in pari materia, as follows: “Our construction of the statute on the subject of appeals, then, is that an appeal from'the final judgment of the district court in all civil cases is allowed; that, upon such appeal from a final judgment, this court may review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment,—orders granting or refusing new trials, sustaining or overruling demurrers, or affecting any substantial rights of the parties,—and may render such judgment o

1913Bogan v. Pignataro, 3 Ariz. 383 , 29 Pac. 652 .

1899In History Co. v. Dougherty, 3 Ariz. 387, 29 Pac. 649 , the court construed paragraphs 593 and 846 in pari materia, as follows: “Our construction of the statute on the subject of appeals, then, is that an appeal from'the final judgment of the district court in all civil cases is allowed; that, upon such appeal from a final judgment, this court may review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment,—orders granting or refusing new trials, sustaining or overruling demurrers, or affecting any substantial rights of the parties,—and may render such judgment o

1899In History Co. v. Dougherty, 3 Ariz. 387, 29 Pac. 649 , the court construed paragraphs 593 and 846 in pari materia, as follows: “Our construction of the statute on the subject of appeals, then, is that an appeal from'the final judgment of the district court in all civil cases is allowed; that, upon such appeal from a final judgment, this court may review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment,—orders granting or refusing new trials, sustaining or overruling demurrers, or affecting any substantial rights of the parties,—and may render such judgment o

1899In History Co. v. Dougherty, 3 Ariz. 387, 29 Pac. 649 , the court construed paragraphs 593 and 846 in pari materia, as follows: “Our construction of the statute on the subject of appeals, then, is that an appeal from'the final judgment of the district court in all civil cases is allowed; that, upon such appeal from a final judgment, this court may review any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment,—orders granting or refusing new trials, sustaining or overruling demurrers, or affecting any substantial rights of the parties,—and may render such judgment o

1982Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. 7 Ariz. at 93 , 60 P. at 894 .„ The issue was similarly resolved in the more recent case of Rosenberg v. Arizona Board of Regents: [Fjacts must appear from an examination of appellant’s third count which would indicate that she did not have an adequate remedy at law.

1982Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. 7 Ariz. at 93 , 60 P. at 894 .

1963The court said [ 201 P. 1028 ]: “'While there are cases to the contrary, the weight of authority is to the effect that an appeal or writ of error will be dismissed when there has been a voluntary payment by the defendant of the fine imposed.’ “The court in such case further held that after the satisfaction of a judgment, there was nothing on which a judgment of the appellate court could act effectively; that if a judgment be reversed the defendant could not recover a fine paid; that the matter became moot; and that a satisfaction of a judgment by the voluntary payment of a fine constituted a w

1963The court said [ 201 P. 1028 ]: “'While there are cases to the contrary, the weight of authority is to the effect that an appeal or writ of error will be dismissed when there has been a voluntary payment by the defendant of the fine imposed.’ “The court in such case further held that after the satisfaction of a judgment, there was nothing on which a judgment of the appellate court could act effectively; that if a judgment be reversed the defendant could not recover a fine paid; that the matter became moot; and that a satisfaction of a judgment by the voluntary payment of a fine constituted a w

1919Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any pláin, speedy, and adequate remedy.” See, also, Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 , 41 Pac. 278 ; Valentine v. Police Court, 141 Cal. 615 , 75 Pac. 336 .

1919Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any pláin, speedy, and adequate remedy.” See, also, Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 , 41 Pac. 278 ; Valentine v. Police Court, 141 Cal. 615 , 75 Pac. 336 .

1919Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any pláin, speedy, and adequate remedy.” See, also, Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 , 41 Pac. 278 ; Valentine v. Police Court, 141 Cal. 615 , 75 Pac. 336 .

1919Our statute is framed with this idea of the province of the writ, and provides that it may issue when there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any pláin, speedy, and adequate remedy.” See, also, Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 , 41 Pac. 278 ; Valentine v. Police Court, 141 Cal. 615 , 75 Pac. 336 .