appeal or writ error in Kansas

2025In reaching its conclusion, the Cybertron panel quoted the following language from McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93, 103 , 679 P.2d 682 (1984): "'"A party who enforces payment or satisfaction of a judgment or decree in his favor, by suing out execution or otherwise, generally waives his right to bring or prosecute an appeal or writ of error, although the execution was ordered under a misapprehension, for which appellee was not responsible.

2025In reaching its conclusion, the Cybertron panel quoted the following language from McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93, 103 , 679 P.2d 682 (1984): "'"A party who enforces payment or satisfaction of a judgment or decree in his favor, by suing out execution or otherwise, generally waives his right to bring or prosecute an appeal or writ of error, although the execution was ordered under a misapprehension, for which appellee was not responsible.

1930In many states this rule has been expressly declared by statutes allowing an appeal to be taken by any ■‘party aggrieved,’ or any ‘person aggrieved,’ or from an order ‘affecting a substantial right.’ A party, therefore, cannot appeal from a decision which is correct so far as his interests are concerned, or which does not affect his interests, however erroneous and prejudicial it may be to the rights and interests of some other party or person, unless he is the legal representative of such other person.” In Craft v. Bent, 8 Kan. 328 , it was held: “Only a party affected by error in a decree ca

1930In many states this rule has been expressly declared by statutes allowing an appeal to be taken by any ■‘party aggrieved,’ or any ‘person aggrieved,’ or from an order ‘affecting a substantial right.’ A party, therefore, cannot appeal from a decision which is correct so far as his interests are concerned, or which does not affect his interests, however erroneous and prejudicial it may be to the rights and interests of some other party or person, unless he is the legal representative of such other person.” In Craft v. Bent, 8 Kan. 328 , it was held: “Only a party affected by error in a decree ca

1930In many states this rule has been expressly declared by statutes allowing an appeal to be taken by any ■‘party aggrieved,’ or any ‘person aggrieved,’ or from an order ‘affecting a substantial right.’ A party, therefore, cannot appeal from a decision which is correct so far as his interests are concerned, or which does not affect his interests, however erroneous and prejudicial it may be to the rights and interests of some other party or person, unless he is the legal representative of such other person.” In Craft v. Bent, 8 Kan. 328 , it was held: “Only a party affected by error in a decree ca

1930In many states this rule has been expressly declared by statutes allowing an appeal to be taken by any ■‘party aggrieved,’ or any ‘person aggrieved,’ or from an order ‘affecting a substantial right.’ A party, therefore, cannot appeal from a decision which is correct so far as his interests are concerned, or which does not affect his interests, however erroneous and prejudicial it may be to the rights and interests of some other party or person, unless he is the legal representative of such other person.” In Craft v. Bent, 8 Kan. 328 , it was held: “Only a party affected by error in a decree ca

1919Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715 .] Under such statutes giving an attorney a lien, it is held that he has a property right in the judgment or such interest therein as entitles him to oppose a motion to dismiss; and where it appears that the litigation is such that it would, if successful, result in a judgment on which counsel would have a lien for fees earned in the case, the plaintiff cannot, over the attorneys objection, withdraw the appeal or writ of error. [Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862 ; Kimbrough v. Pitts, 63 Ga. 496 ; Richmond County v. Richmond County Reformatory Institut

1919Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715 .] Under such statutes giving an attorney a lien, it is held that he has a property right in the judgment or such interest therein as entitles him to oppose a motion to dismiss; and where it appears that the litigation is such that it would, if successful, result in a judgment on which counsel would have a lien for fees earned in the case, the plaintiff cannot, over the attorneys objection, withdraw the appeal or writ of error. [Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862 ; Kimbrough v. Pitts, 63 Ga. 496 ; Richmond County v. Richmond County Reformatory Institut

1919Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715 .] Under such statutes giving an attorney a lien, it is held that he has a property right in the judgment or such interest therein as entitles him to oppose a motion to dismiss; and where it appears that the litigation is such that it would, if successful, result in a judgment on which counsel would have a lien for fees earned in the case, the plaintiff cannot, over the attorneys objection, withdraw the appeal or writ of error. [Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862 ; Kimbrough v. Pitts, 63 Ga. 496 ; Richmond County v. Richmond County Reformatory Institut

1919Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715 .] Under such statutes giving an attorney a lien, it is held that he has a property right in the judgment or such interest therein as entitles him to oppose a motion to dismiss; and where it appears that the litigation is such that it would, if successful, result in a judgment on which counsel would have a lien for fees earned in the case, the plaintiff cannot, over the attorneys objection, withdraw the appeal or writ of error. [Walker v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 114 Ga. 862 ; Kimbrough v. Pitts, 63 Ga. 496 ; Richmond County v. Richmond County Reformatory Institut

1917J. 1265 this language is used: “It is a rule of general application, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, that when an appeal or writ of error is perfected all power of the court appealed from to change its judgment or modify its orders ceases to exist until the cause or some part of it is remanded by the appellate court, subject to the rule that during the trial term that court has 'the right to set aside, vacate or modify its judgment, and of this power it is not divested by the appeal.” The same rule is found in 2 Cyc. 975, 976, and is supported by Legere v. State, 111 Tenn. 368 ; M

1902Reed, v. Jones, 2 Wash. 662 , 27 Pac. 452 , 26 Am.

1902Reed, v. Jones, 2 Wash. 662 , 27 Pac. 452 , 26 Am.