appeal or writ error in Pennsylvania

1962In the words of former Justice (later Chief Justice) Horace Stern, “It is elementary that [mandamus] cannot be used to control the exercise of discretion or judgment on the part of a public official or an administrative or judicial tribunal; nor to review or compel the undoing of action taken by such an official or tribunal in good faith and in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, even though, in fact, the decision rendered may have been wrong; nor to influence or coerce a particular determination of the issue involved; nor to perform the function of an appeal or writ of error even though

1948The writ cannot be used “to perform the function of an appeal or writ of error even though no appeal or writ of error be permitted by law”: Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb et al., 357 Pa. 514, 520 .

1951In Caldwell v. Fairley, Director, et al., 363 Pa. 213 -14 (1949), the Supreme Court approved the following language: “ ‘While a writ of mandamus may compel action where a right is clear, it cannot be treated as an appeal or writ of error to review the discretionary acts of subordinate tribunals.’ Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82 ; Credo v. Pittsburg, 355 Pa. 369 .

1946Appellant was thus afforded his full rights as set forth in the Raffel case, supra. The trial judge would have erred, if he had heard the case de novo: “While a writ of mandamus. may compel action where the right is clear, it cannot be treated as an appeal or writ of error to review the discretionary acts of subordinate tribunals” : Homan, Appellant, v. Mackey et al., 295 Pa. 82, 86 , 144 A. 897, 898 .

1963Johnson v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451 ; Commonwealth ex rel.

1963Johnson v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451 (1961); Commonwealth ex rel.

1967It is not the function of a writ of man- damns to serve as an appeal or writ of error: Caldwell v. Fairley, 363 Pa. 213, 214 .

1951In Caldwell v. Fairley, Director, et al., 363 Pa. 213 -14 (1949), the Supreme Court approved the following language: “ ‘While a writ of mandamus may compel action where a right is clear, it cannot be treated as an appeal or writ of error to review the discretionary acts of subordinate tribunals.’ Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82 ; Credo v. Pittsburg, 355 Pa. 369 .

2022This Court expressly held in Wolfe that “a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not a proper basis for habeas corpus relief.” Wolfe, 605 A.2d at 1274 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

1995Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Commonwealth Insurance Department, 512 Pa. 217 , 516 A.2d 647 , appeal denied 512 Pa. 234 , 516 A.2d 656 (1986).

1995Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Commonwealth Insurance Department, 512 Pa. 217 , 516 A.2d 647 , appeal denied 512 Pa. 234 , 516 A.2d 656 (1986).

1986Land Holding Corp. v. Board of Finance and Review, 388 Pa. 61 , 130 A.2d 700 (1957); see also, Kaufman Constr.

1986Land Holding Corp. v. Board of Finance and Review, 388 Pa. 61 , 130 A.2d 700 (1957); see also, Kaufman Constr.

1972If the provisions of a judgment, order, or decree, are mutually interdependent, so that the acceptance of benefits therefrom is inconsistent with the alleged invalidity in other portions, a party cannot avail himself of that portion which is favorable to him, and accept its benefits, and afterward prosecute an appeal to reverse in the appellate court such portions as are unfavorable to him; and this rule is not affected by the fact that appellant executes a supersedeas bond to satisfy the part of the judgment against him, if affirmed, or by the fact that the benefits accepted are small as comp

1963Corbin v. Banmiller, 391 Pa. 265 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel.

1951In Caldwell v. Fairley, Director, et al., 363 Pa. 213 -14 (1949), the Supreme Court approved the following language: “ ‘While a writ of mandamus may compel action where a right is clear, it cannot be treated as an appeal or writ of error to review the discretionary acts of subordinate tribunals.’ Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82 ; Credo v. Pittsburg, 355 Pa. 369 .

1951Our obligation here, and the limit of our authority here, is to review the record and determine whether the dismissal was according to law. ‘If there is admissible evidence. the_ weight of which the court is without authority to consider, to move the deliberative powers of the Commission, without manifestly abusing its discretion, in sustaining or reversing the action of the Director then the petition should be refused; if not, it should be granted.’ Raffel v. Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 243 .” The question proposed by the city is that the civil service commission’s order was without legal effect beca

1950Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82 , 144 A. 897 ; Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, supra, 357 Pa. 514 , 55 A. 2d 534 .” And in Tanenbaum v. D’ Ascenzo, supra ( 356 Pa. 260 (1947))’, the court said: “Mandamus is a remedy of great antiquity.

1950Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82 , 144 A. 897 ; Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, supra, 357 Pa. 514 , 55 A. 2d 534 .” And in Tanenbaum v. D’ Ascenzo, supra ( 356 Pa. 260 (1947))’, the court said: “Mandamus is a remedy of great antiquity.

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1947Order reversed, and record remanded with direction to quash the writ of alternative mandamus. 1 The Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, provided that in cases of an appeal to the Superior or Supreme Court the testimony taken in the lower court should be filed in the proceedings and reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken should not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below. 2 Examples: Commonwealt

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1943Pabst v. Circuit Court, 199 N. W. 213 , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after quoting the foregoing, said: “Those principles have been affirmed in a number of cases since that time.” In State ex rel.

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1943In other words, the writ cannot be made to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.” In State v. Duffy, 114 Ohio St. 702 , 152 N. E. 656, 657 , the Supreme Court of Ohio said: “The proper function of the ‘writ of prohibition’ is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” In Ex Parte Jones, 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134, 137 , 77 A.L.R. 235 , the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: “Writ of ‘prohibition’ only lies to prevent encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on part of inferior tribunal or to prevent great outrage on general p

1934Co. v. De Wolf, 33 Pa. St. 45; Bank v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433 .” In Wood Company v. Berry Company, 4 Dist R. 141, it was held: “The question has been discussed and has been decided both in this country and in England.