appeal or writ error in Texas

1936Co. v. Jackson, 85 Tex. 605 , 22 S.W. 1030 , that pendency of an appeal or writ of error from a judgment deprives it of that finality of character which would otherwise make it admissible in evidence.

1936Co. v. Jackson, 85 Tex. 605 , 22 S.W. 1030 , that pendency of an appeal or writ of error from a judgment deprives it of that finality of character which would otherwise make it admissible in evidence.

1929In the case of Linn v. Arambould, 55 Tex. 611 ; the Supreme Court of this state held: “When the whole of the matter in controversy is disposed of as to all the parties, then there is a final judgment, and not before, from which an appeal or writ of error can be taken.” In the case of Havard v. Carter-Kelley Lumber Co., 162 S. W. 922 , the Texarkana Oourt of Appeals had before it for consideration the exact question we are now considering, and held that the judgment in that case, which was an action of trespass to try title and for damages for timber cut, was not a final judgment for the reason

1915In Linn v. Arambould, 55 Tex. 611 , it is held that no final judgment from which an appeal or writ of error can be prosecuted lies until all the issues as to all the parties hare been finally adjudicated in the court, and that no order or decree, which does not preclude further proceedings in the case in the court below, can be regarded as final.

1927In the case of the Texas Trunk Railway Co. v. Jackson, 85 Tex. 605 [ 22 S. W. 1030 ] Chief Justice Stayton, speaking for the court,'says: ‘We are of the opinion that an appeal or writ of error, whether prosecuted under cost or supersedeas bond, during pendency deprives a judgment of that finality of character necessary to entitle it to admission in evidence in support of the right or defense declared by it; and from this necessarily follows the insufficiency of a plea in bar based on it.’ In the case of Kreisle v. Campbell, 89 Tex. 104 [ 33 S. W. 852 ],’this question came before us upon an app

1927In the case of the Texas Trunk Railway Co. v. Jackson, 85 Tex. 605 [ 22 S. W. 1030 ] Chief Justice Stayton, speaking for the court,'says: ‘We are of the opinion that an appeal or writ of error, whether prosecuted under cost or supersedeas bond, during pendency deprives a judgment of that finality of character necessary to entitle it to admission in evidence in support of the right or defense declared by it; and from this necessarily follows the insufficiency of a plea in bar based on it.’ In the case of Kreisle v. Campbell, 89 Tex. 104 [ 33 S. W. 852 ],’this question came before us upon an app

1926Glenn v. Milam, 114 Tex. 160 , 263 S.W. 900 ; Griffin v. Wakelee, 42 Tex. 513 .

1926Glenn v. Milam, 114 Tex. 160 , 263 S.W. 900 ; Griffin v. Wakelee, 42 Tex. 513 .

1926Glenn v. Milam, 114 Tex. 160 , 263 S.W. 900 ; Griffin v. Wakelee, 42 Tex. 513 .

1925Glenn v. Milam (Tex. Sup.) 263 S. W. 900 ; Griffin v. Wakelee, 42 Tex. 513 .

2022Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227 ; In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009)(orig. proceeding); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Casillas, 487 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); see generally TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 51.016 (“In a matter subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, a person may take an appeal or writ of error to the court of appeals from the judgment or interlocutory order of a district court . . . .” [Internal citation omitted]).

2022Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227 ; In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009)(orig. proceeding); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Casillas, 487 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); see generally TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODE ANN. § 51.016 (“In a matter subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, a person may take an appeal or writ of error to the court of appeals from the judgment or interlocutory order of a district court” [Internal citation omitted]).

1968It has never been the law that one who is negligent in the matter of filing and urging a motion for new trial or in perfecting an appeal or writ of error may avoid the consequences through the medium of a bill of review.” See also, Smith v. Ferrell, 44 S.W.2d 962 (Tex.Com.App.), opinion approved; Lynn v. Hanna, 116 Tex. 652 , 296 S.W. 280 ; 34 Tex.Jur.2d Sec. 230, p. 101 et seq., and cases there cited.

1937Smith et al. v. Ferrell (Tex.Com.App.) 44 S.W.(2d) 962 ; Lindsey v. Dougherty (Tex.Civ.App.) 60 S.W.(2d) 300 .

1950Ass’n. v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 668 , this court, (Wr.

1935Ass’n v. King (Tex.Civ.App.) 52 S.W. (2d) 668 , 669: “The general rule seems to be that a party who enforces or otherwise accepts the benefits of a judgment, order, or decree cannot afterward maintain an appeal or writ of error to review the same or deny the authority which granted it. 3 C.J. § 552; Dunham v. Randall & Chambers Co., 11 Tex.Civ.App. 265 , 32 S.W. 720 ; Harper v. Foster et al.

1949The object of the new rules is ‘to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants’, Rule 1, and where this can be done without doing violence to the rules or injustice to the rights of the parties, it is the duty of the court to do so.” The court quoted with approval from the opinion of the court in the case of Shanks v. Carroll, 50 Tex. 17 , in which it was said “A failure to observe and comply with the rules prescribed by this court regulating the manner of bringing cases before it, is a valid and sufficient ground, in the discretion of the court, for th

1912As said by the Supreme Court in the case of Shanks v. Carroll, 50 Tex. 17 : “A failure to observe and comply with the rules prescribed by this court regulating the manner of bringing cases before it is a valid and sufficient ground, in the discretion of the court, for the dismissal of an appeal or writ of error, unless good cause is shown why this is not done.” This quotation is made to show that the strict and literal enforcement of the rules prescribed for this court rests in its discretion, and that it was never intended that such enforcement should be made an engine of oppression, or to fu

1936Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 107 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W. 326 .

1936Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 107 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W. 326 .

1935Laird v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 276 ; Focke v. Sterling, 18 Tex. Civ.

1922Laird v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 276 ; Focke v. Sterling, 18 Tex. Civ.

1935Laird v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 276 ; Focke v. Sterling, 18 Tex. Civ.

1922Laird v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 276 ; Focke v. Sterling, 18 Tex. Civ.

1932S. 1925, art. 2267, provides that the appeal or writ of error, as the case may bo, “shall be held to be perfected” when the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has “been filed.” Vineyard v. McCombs, 100 Tex. 318 , 99 S. W. 544 .

1932S. 1925, art. 2267, provides that the appeal or writ of error, as the case may bo, “shall be held to be perfected” when the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has “been filed.” Vineyard v. McCombs, 100 Tex. 318 , 99 S. W. 544 .

1933Our Supreme Court in the ease of Wells v. Littlefield, 62 Tex. 28 , had the following to say relative to its power to issue writs for the purpose of enforcing its jurisdiction: “So soon as the jurisdiction attaches under an appeal or writ of error, this court has full control of the cause, and can make such orders concerning it as may be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties and enforce its mandates.

1926In Wells v. Littlefield, 62 Tex. 28 , the Supreme Court said: “So soon as the jurisdiction attaches under an appeal or writ of error, this court has full control of the cause, and can make such orders concerning it as may be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties and enforce .its mandates.

1933If the judgment below is affirmed,'or reversed and rendered or reformed, this court can see that the party in whose favor its decision has been given has the benefit of all proceedings below necessary to enforce its judgment.” The same court in Milam County Oil & Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S. W. 577, 578 , used this language: “A valid judgment should be effective to secure the benefits that it decrees; and its active office therefore continues for the full accomplishment of that result.

1933If the judgment below is affirmed,'or reversed and rendered or reformed, this court can see that the party in whose favor its decision has been given has the benefit of all proceedings below necessary to enforce its judgment.” The same court in Milam County Oil & Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S. W. 577, 578 , used this language: “A valid judgment should be effective to secure the benefits that it decrees; and its active office therefore continues for the full accomplishment of that result.

1931This proposition has clear recognition by our Supreme Court in such cases as Trent v. Rhomberg, 66 Tex. 249 , 18 S. W. 510 ; Wooldridge v. Rawlings, 14 S. W. 667 , and Michael v. Ball, 8 Tex. Civ.

1894Trent v. Rhomberg, 66 Texas, 249 ; Blair v. Sanborn, 82 Texas, 686 ; Cattle Co. v. Ansley, 24 S. W.

1925U. S. v. Hodge, 6 How. 279 , 12 L.

1925U. S. v. Hodge, 6 How. 279 , 12 L.

1925In Owen v. Terrell, 21 N. M. 647, 157 P. 672 , the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the pendency of a motion, not necessary to the perfecting of an appeal or writ of error, will in no wise invalidate the appeal or writ of error; but the perfecting of the appeal or writ of error, while such motion Is pending and undisposed of, will be considered as an abandonment of the pending motion in the trial court.

1923In Owen v. Terrell, 21 N. M. 647, 157 Pac. 672 , the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the pendency of a motion, not necesary to the perfecting of an appeal or writ of error, will in no wise invalidate the appeal or writ of error; but the perfecting of the appeal or writ of error, while such motion is pending and undisposed of, will be considered as an abandonment of the pending motion in the trial court.

1925Magee v. Chadoin, 44 Tex. 488 ; Green v. Marten, 43 Tex, 663; Railway Co. v. Lacy, 7 Tex. Civ.

1920Magee v. Chadoin, 44 Tex. 488 ; Green v. Marten, 43 Tex. 653 ; Railway Co. v. Lacy, 7 Tex. Civ.

1925Magee v. Chadoin, 44 Tex. 488 ; Green v. Marten, 43 Tex, 663; Railway Co. v. Lacy, 7 Tex. Civ.

1920Magee v. Chadoin, 44 Tex. 488 ; Green v. Marten, 43 Tex. 653 ; Railway Co. v. Lacy, 7 Tex. Civ.

1919App. 67 , 121 S. W. 715 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wofford, 32 Tex. Civ.

1913App. 427 , 72 S. W. 620 , 74 S. W. 943 . [2] It is also well settled that, when the obligee in an appeal or writ of error bond is dead at the time of its execution, such bond is a nullity, and can confer no jurisdiction upon the appellate court.

1919As stated by Judge Hendricks in First National Bank of Wellington v. Hix, 156 S. W. 535 : “This matter is controlled by the decision in the case of Laughlin v. Dabney, 86 Tex. 120 , 24 S. W. 259 , by the Supreme Court, holding that ‘the appellee, or defendant in error, as the case may be, must file his certificate at the term of the court to which the appeal or writ of error is returnable.’ ” Chambers v. Grisham, 155 S. W. 959 ; Holland v. Brown & McFarland, 152 S. W. 1195 ; Thorn v. Lanier, 57 Tex. Civ.

1919As stated by Judge Hendricks in First National Bank of Wellington v. Hix, 156 S. W. 535 : “This matter is controlled by the decision in the case of Laughlin v. Dabney, 86 Tex. 120 , 24 S. W. 259 , by the Supreme Court, holding that ‘the appellee, or defendant in error, as the case may be, must file his certificate at the term of the court to which the appeal or writ of error is returnable.’ ” Chambers v. Grisham, 155 S. W. 959 ; Holland v. Brown & McFarland, 152 S. W. 1195 ; Thorn v. Lanier, 57 Tex. Civ.