evidence was harmless error in California

2026(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) There was no evidence that a third party committed the shooting, whereas there was substantial evidence defendant did.

2010I will never get the entire full function of my right arm back.” Shahbakhti’s testimony that he was permanently disabled and never would regain the full function of his arm was relevant to the allegation of infliction *732 of great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7.) The sole aspect of this testimony that was irrelevant at the guilt phase was the statement that “I still see a psychiatrist because of post-traumatic disorder, which is anxiety . . . .” The admission of this evidence was harmless error, however, because it is not “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, “We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, “We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, "We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, “We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, "We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.

1971The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded to the district court and stated, “We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 242 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1166 ].) The court made a similar ruling in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S

2022We review the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence under the standard stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , whether it is “reasonably probable that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” (People v. Harris (2005) 17 37 Cal.4th 310, 336 .) In highlighting the evidence supporting the criminal threat charge based on defendant’s text messages, the prosecutor only referred to text messages that defendant sent directly to Maria E., including the photo of guns (which the prosecutor called “the most clear, an unquestionable threat that was sent by the defendant,” as well as t

2020(See Mitchell, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1313 , citing People v. Haugland (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 248 [search of weapon in briefcase].) This is problematic, as “[i]t is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 ; see also Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 31 [“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no”].) We need not ultimately resolve the propriety of Weber’s searc

2020“Admission of unlawfully seized evidence is not reversible per se, but rather is subject to harmless error analysis.” 6 (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1036 .) The Penal Code proscribes, other than in self-defense, “draw[ing] or exhibit[ing]” in the presence of another person “any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, or . . . in any manner, unlawfully us[ing] a firearm in any fight or quarrel.” (§ 417, subd. (a)(2).) There was no real dispute that Chen drew his shotgun in a threatening manner here.

2020(See Mitchell, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1313 , citing People v. Haugland (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 248 [search of weapon in briefcase].) This is problematic, as “[i]t is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 ; see also Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 31 [“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no”].) We need not ultimately resolve the propriety of Weber’s searc

2020(See Mitchell, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1313 , citing People v. Haugland (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 248 [search of weapon in briefcase].) This is problematic, as “[i]t is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 ; see also Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 31 [“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no”].) We need not ultimately resolve the propriety of Weber’s searc