exact same standard in California

2025As we now explain, our California Supreme Court rejected his first argument in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), we follow other Courts of Appeal rejecting the second argument, and we reject his third argument because Denem’s jury found the special circumstance allegation true under subdivision (a)(17) of section 190.2, not subdivision (d).

2025(Briscoe, at pp. 485-486.) On appeal, the defendant claimed that “section 3051 violates equal protection by excluding youth offenders sentenced for special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (d)—which applies to nonkiller participants in specified felony offenses during which a murder occurred—while including those convicted of nonspecial circumstance first degree felony murder for the same specified felony offenses per the exact same standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 485, italics added.) The Briscoe court noted that the L

1986On page 571 Calhoun holds: “It is, however, well established a restitution order resulting from a criminal conviction is not a ‘debt.’ In People v. Washburn (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 621 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 822 ], the defendant made the exact same claim Calhoun makes here.

1986On page 571 Calhoun holds: “It is, however, well established a restitution order resulting from a criminal conviction is not a ‘debt.’ In People v. Washburn (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 621 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 822 ], the defendant made the exact same claim Calhoun makes here.

2024The two following paragraphs are added under section III.B., “Equal Protection Analysis,” before the last paragraph that begins with the sentence, “The People offer no other reason for section 3051 to exclude section 190.2, subdivision (d) offenders from a parole opportunity provided to section 189, subdivision (e)(3) offenders convicted under the exact same standard.” After conceding that sections 189, subdivision (e)(3) and 190.2, subdivision (d) employ the same standard, the Attorney General then argued in a petition for rehearing that the felony-murder special circumstance requires “an ind

2024The two following paragraphs are added under section III.B., “Equal Protection Analysis,” before the last paragraph that begins with the sentence, “The People offer no other reason for section 3051 to exclude section 190.2, subdivision (d) offenders from a parole opportunity provided to section 189, subdivision (e)(3) offenders convicted under the exact same standard.” After conceding that sections 189, subdivision (e)(3) and 190.2, subdivision (d) employ the same standard, the Attorney General then argued in a petition for rehearing that the felony-murder special circumstance requires “an ind

2012Indeed, this case corroborates this observation.” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 790 .) The trial court in this case believed that “the instruction given in Williams , CALJIC 9.00, is the exact same instruction that I gave” and was “concerned that this jury might have been misled by my instructions to the extent that they may be thinking or they may be finding that the act of driving recklessly, that is speeding, or assuming every inference in favor of the People’s evidence, racing, that the defendant could be convicted of this crime based on the recklessness.” The court also stated its be

2004(Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219 , 85 P.3d at p. 14 .) Likewise, in affirming the juvenile court's finding that Paul's presumption is weightier, the majority weighs the exact same factors, restated almost verbatim.

2004(Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219 , 85 P.3d at p. 14 .) Likewise, in affirming the juvenile court's finding that Paul's presumption is weightier, the majority weighs the exact same factors, restated almost verbatim.

1996(See Yorba, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1025 .) Harmor testified unequivocally that he performed the exact same test in the present case that he performed in Yorba—the same method of working the cells together was used in both cases.