exact same claim in Texas

2024See id. at *2-4. 1 Ulloa Montejo argues in his appellate brief that the trial judge held a hearing and heard testimony on an identical claim in another case in a different county and that the hearing in the other case “likely informed her denial in this case.” Similarly, Ulloa Montejo argues in his April 11, 2024 response to our April 9, 2024 order that the trial court’s “order is appealable because . . . the lower court has previously considered the merits of the exact same claim dozens of times in other Operation Lone Star cases.” We, however, “may not consider factual assertions that are ou

2024See id. at *2-4. 1 Cordova Juarez argues in his appellate brief that the trial judge held a hearing and heard testimony on an identical claim in another case in a different county and that the hearing in the other case “likely informed her denial in this case.” Similarly, Cordova Juarez argues in his April 11, 2024 response to our April 9, 2024 order that the trial court’s “order is appealable because . . . the lower court has previously considered the merits of the exact same claim dozens of times in other Operation Lone Star cases.” We, however, “may not consider factual assertions that are

2024See id. at *2-4. 1 Cordova Juarez argues in his appellate brief that the trial judge held a hearing and heard testimony on an identical claim in another case in a different county and that the hearing in the other case “likely informed her denial in this case.” Similarly, Cordova Juarez argues in his April 11, 2024 response to our April 9, 2024 order that the trial court’s “order is appealable because . . . the lower court has previously considered the merits of the exact same claim dozens of times in other Operation Lone Star cases.” We, however, “may not consider factual assertions that are

2024See id. at *2-4. 1 Ulloa Montejo argues in his appellate brief that the trial judge held a hearing and heard testimony on an identical claim in another case in a different county and that the hearing in the other case “likely informed her denial in this case.” Similarly, Ulloa Montejo argues in his April 11, 2024 response to our April 9, 2024 order that the trial court’s “order is appealable because . . . the lower court has previously considered the merits of the exact same claim dozens of times in other Operation Lone Star cases.” We, however, “may not consider factual assertions that are ou

2024Nor may we consider evidence from the record of another case, unless we take judicial notice of our own records from “the same or related proceedings involving same or nearly same parties.” Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

2024Nor may we consider evidence from the record of another case, unless we take judicial notice of our own records from “the same or related proceedings involving same or nearly same parties.” Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

2025Avila v. State, 15 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting TEX.

2015Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, – S.W.3d –, –, 2015 WL 3976101, *3 (Tex., June 26, 2015). -9- B.

2012Counsel then made a separate request “under 38.23” for the exact same instruction, contending that there was a genuine dispute about the material fact of custody; the trial court denied the request to include this instruction. 6 *582 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an appellant invites error in a jury-charge, and thus may be “estopped” to claim error on appeal, when the appellant (1) affirmatively declines the instruction that the appellant may be entitled to, and the trial court does not give the instruction, see Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 505-06 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) and Prys

2012Reasonable Doubt Anderson complains of the following instruction: “It is not required that the prosecution proves guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecutor’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt.” In Ruiz v. State, this Court stated that the exact same instruction as the complained-of instruction is not a definition of “reasonable doubt” and “does not run afoul of the court of criminal appeals precedent in Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2012Counsel then made a separate request “under 38.23” for the exact same instruction, contending that there was a genuine dispute about the material fact of custody; the trial court denied the request to include this instruction. 6 *582 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an appellant invites error in a jury-charge, and thus may be “estopped” to claim error on appeal, when the appellant (1) affirmatively declines the instruction that the appellant may be entitled to, and the trial court does not give the instruction, see Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 505-06 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) and Prys

2012Counsel then made a separate request “under 38.23” for the exact same instruction, contending that there was a genuine dispute about the material fact of custody; the trial court denied the request to include this instruction. 6 *582 The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an appellant invites error in a jury-charge, and thus may be “estopped” to claim error on appeal, when the appellant (1) affirmatively declines the instruction that the appellant may be entitled to, and the trial court does not give the instruction, see Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 505-06 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) and Prys

2011Upon close reading, it appears to me that Oppenheimer was a case neither of double jeopardy nor issue preclusion, but rather common-law claim preclusion. [49] See Watkins, 73 S.W.3d, at 274 ("this type of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel claim" (emphasis added)). [50] 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) [51] 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [52] Monge, 524 U.S., at 724 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [53] Id., at 725 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [54] Id., at 726 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [55] Id., at 728-29 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [56] Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 468-69 , 120 S.Ct. 234

2011Upon close reading, it appears to me that Oppenheimer was a case neither of double jeopardy nor issue preclusion, but rather common-law claim preclusion. [49] See Watkins, 73 S.W.3d, at 274 ("this type of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel claim" (emphasis added)). [50] 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) [51] 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [52] Monge, 524 U.S., at 724 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [53] Id., at 725 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [54] Id., at 726 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [55] Id., at 728-29 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 . [56] Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 468-69 , 120 S.Ct. 234

2003See id. ' 1.502(b).

1981Under the following authorities, we are of the opinion that this was error of such moment as requires a reversal of the judgement. [Citations omitted].” 3 Thirty two years later the exact same error appeared in charges from the same trial court in two separate cases: Gooden v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 347 , 145 S.W.2d 177 (1940) and Gooden v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 351 , 145 S.W.2d 179 (1940).

1981Under the following authorities, we are of the opinion that this was error of such moment as requires a reversal of the judgement. [Citations omitted].” 3 Thirty two years later the exact same error appeared in charges from the same trial court in two separate cases: Gooden v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 347 , 145 S.W.2d 177 (1940) and Gooden v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 351 , 145 S.W.2d 179 (1940).