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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eric Fikes v. John Cleghorn B. Cervantes Sgt. Lewis, City of Corona Police Department Officer Melendezgreen2 sentences2006(Id. at p. 358.) Significantly, the court reached this conclusion using the definition of deadly force advocated by appellant, explaining that deadly force warranting a Garner instruction is “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.’ ” (Quintanilla v. City of Downey, supra, atp. 357; accord, Fikes v. Cleghorn (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 [where deadly force was defined as “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm,’ ” instructions on deadly force properly not given as there was no evidence that use of a police 2006(Id. at p. 358.) Significantly, the court reached this conclusion using the definition of deadly force advocated by appellant, explaining that deadly force warranting a Garner instruction is “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.’ ” (Quintanilla v. City of Downey, supra, atp. 357; accord, Fikes v. Cleghorn (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 [where deadly force was defined as “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm,’ ” instructions on deadly force properly not given as there was no evidence that use of a police | 1 | 1 |
cluster 718374green2 sentences2006(Id. at p. 358.) Significantly, the court reached this conclusion using the definition of deadly force advocated by appellant, explaining that deadly force warranting a Garner instruction is “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.’ ” (Quintanilla v. City of Downey, supra, atp. 357; accord, Fikes v. Cleghorn (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 [where deadly force was defined as “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm,’ ” instructions on deadly force properly not given as there was no evidence that use of a police 2006(Id. at p. 358.) Significantly, the court reached this conclusion using the definition of deadly force advocated by appellant, explaining that deadly force warranting a Garner instruction is “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.’ ” (Quintanilla v. City of Downey, supra, atp. 357; accord, Fikes v. Cleghorn (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 [where deadly force was defined as “ ‘force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm,’ ” instructions on deadly force properly not given as there was no evidence that use of a police | 1 | 1 |
Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfieldgreen2 sentences1998Instead, the general rule has been stated as follows: *108 “An attorney representing a corporation does not become the representative of its stockholders merely because the attorney’s actions on behalf of the corporation also benefit the stockholders; as attorney for the corporation, counsel’s first duty is to the corporation.” (Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 692, 703 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 627 ].) Thus, “[e]ven where counsel for a closely held corporation treats the interests of majority shareholders and the corporation interchangeably, it is the attorney-client relat 1998Instead, the general rule has been stated as follows: *108 “An attorney representing a corporation does not become the representative of its stockholders merely because the attorney’s actions on behalf of the corporation also benefit the stockholders; as attorney for the corporation, counsel’s first duty is to the corporation.” (Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 692, 703 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 627 ].) Thus, “[e]ven where counsel for a closely held corporation treats the interests of majority shareholders and the corporation interchangeably, it is the attorney-client relat | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. 1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. | 1 | 1 |
Trammel v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982Under the Garner rule, availability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation is “subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.” (Id., at pp. 1103-1104.) The Garner court was empowered to create this new exception by rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) which provides that the rules of privilege “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” This rule provides federal courts “‘... with the flex 1982Under the Garner rule, availability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation is “subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.” (Id., at pp. 1103-1104.) The Garner court was empowered to create this new exception by rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) which provides that the rules of privilege “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” This rule provides federal courts “‘... with the flex | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goldstein v. Leesgreen2 sentences1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. 1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ayala
green
1 sentence2021A 8 violation of section 1054.1 is subject to the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280 .) We review “a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 .) Here, we need not decide whether the iPhone evidence was relevant nor whether the prosecutor improperly delayed in disclosing it, because any error in denying Garner’s motion to exclude the evidence was undoubtedly harmless: Garner received the disclo | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Verdugo
green
1 sentence2021A 8 violation of section 1054.1 is subject to the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280 .) We review “a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 .) Here, we need not decide whether the iPhone evidence was relevant nor whether the prosecutor improperly delayed in disclosing it, because any error in denying Garner’s motion to exclude the evidence was undoubtedly harmless: Garner received the disclo | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2021A 8 violation of section 1054.1 is subject to the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280 .) We review “a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 .) Here, we need not decide whether the iPhone evidence was relevant nor whether the prosecutor improperly delayed in disclosing it, because any error in denying Garner’s motion to exclude the evidence was undoubtedly harmless: Garner received the disclo 2021A 8 violation of section 1054.1 is subject to the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 .” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280 .) We review “a trial court’s ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 .) Here, we need not decide whether the iPhone evidence was relevant nor whether the prosecutor improperly delayed in disclosing it, because any error in denying Garner’s motion to exclude the evidence was undoubtedly harmless: Garner received the disclo | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Garner v. Jones
green
2 sentences2013Whether the challenge is on its face or as applied, the United States Supreme Court has held that the relevant inquiry is not whether differences exist between the prior parole system and the current system, but “whether the amended [statute] creates a significant risk of prolonging [the prisoner‟s] incarceration.” (Garner v. Jones (2000) 529 U.S. 244, 251 .) On a facial challenge, the Garner inquiry requires that this “significant risk” be “inherent in the framework” of the amended schedule. 2013Whether the challenge is on its face or as applied, the United States Supreme Court has held that the relevant inquiry is not whether differences exist between the prior parole system and the current system, but “whether the amended [statute] creates a significant risk of prolonging [the prisoner‟s] incarceration.” (Garner v. Jones (2000) 529 U.S. 244, 251 .) On a facial challenge, the Garner inquiry requires that this “significant risk” be “inherent in the framework” of the amended schedule. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Donovan v. City Of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences1998The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, even unarmed, Smith was dangerous because of the way he was operating the car.” (Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, supra, 17 F.3d at p. 950 , italics omitted.) In Donovan, where it was alleged that the officer intentionally backed his patrol car into a fleeing motorcycle, the court reasoned: “[H]owever, we *207 cannot say with any degree of assurance that ‘even today[,] if defendants did everything the plaintiffs alleged, still they did not violate the Constitution.’ [Citation.] After reviewing the cases, we are very skeptical that the intentional striki 1998The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, even unarmed, Smith was dangerous because of the way he was operating the car.” (Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, supra, 17 F.3d at p. 950 , italics omitted.) In Donovan, where it was alleged that the officer intentionally backed his patrol car into a fleeing motorcycle, the court reasoned: “[H]owever, we *207 cannot say with any degree of assurance that ‘even today[,] if defendants did everything the plaintiffs alleged, still they did not violate the Constitution.’ [Citation.] After reviewing the cases, we are very skeptical that the intentional striki | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Beard v. Ames
green
2 sentences1998(See, e.g., Beard v. Ames (1983) 96 A.D.2d 119 [ 468 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 ]; Garner v. Wolfinbarger, supra, 430 F.2d at pp. 1103-1104.) However, as we have previously discussed, California courts cannot expand upon the statutory privileges set forth in the Evidence Code by creating a shareholder exception to corporate attorney-client privilege, or adopt the federal Garner rule permitting shareholder inspection upon a showing of good cause. 1998(See, e.g., Beard v. Ames (1983) 96 A.D.2d 119 [ 468 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 ]; Garner v. Wolfinbarger, supra, 430 F.2d at pp. 1103-1104.) However, as we have previously discussed, California courts cannot expand upon the statutory privileges set forth in the Evidence Code by creating a shareholder exception to corporate attorney-client privilege, or adopt the federal Garner rule permitting shareholder inspection upon a showing of good cause. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hoiles v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. 1998(See also Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 99 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 97 ]; Hoiles, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198 ; but see Goldstein v. Lees, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [noting the Garner rule in dictum].) Thus, there is no shareholder exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in California. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.