words rule in Pennsylvania

2007Hines, 607 A.2d at 303 (quoting Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa.Super. 85 , 556 A.2d 441 , 443 n. 2 (1989)).

1992However, regarding application of Rule 126, we are in agreement with the Superior Court that: [i]n interpreting the rules of procedure in light of Rule 126, we also remain mindful of Pa.R.C.P. 127(b), which states ‘[w]hen the words of a rule are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded *194 under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’ Thus, although the rules are to be liberally construed, a party seeking redress cannot substantially deviate from the clear mandates of the rules for filing an appeal from an arbitration award; Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa.Superior Ct

1933So, also, as is stated in that case at pages 292-3: “In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: ‘The words of that clause would, if taken alone, bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential provisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.’ To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed

1933In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: “The words of that clause would, if taken alone, *293 bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential pi'ovisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.” To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed but a necessary conclusion from the maxim ex a

1933So, also, as is stated in that case at pages 292-3: “In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: ‘The words of that clause would, if taken alone, bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential provisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.’ To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed

1933In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: “The words of that clause would, if taken alone, *293 bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential pi'ovisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.” To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed but a necessary conclusion from the maxim ex a

1933So, also, as is stated in that case at pages 292-3: “In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: ‘The words of that clause would, if taken alone, bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential provisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.’ To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed

1933In Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402, 412 , we said: “The words of that clause would, if taken alone, *293 bear the construction placed upon them, but the parties did not place them alone, but connected them with other essential pi'ovisions, and we must read them as they wrote them, and give them the effect, but no more than the effect, which they intended they should have.” To the same effect are Saltsburg Gas Co. v. Saltsburg Boro., 138 Pa. 250, 254 , and Berkley v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 418, 422 ; and it is indeed but a necessary conclusion from the maxim ex a

1929But we must not lose sight of the main object of the statute, which was to relieve from imprisonment in all cases where no offense appears, except that of omitting to pay money due on a contract”: Scott v. The Jailer, supra, page 238.

1883He said the ruling was concurred in by all the judges of the court, except one who was absent: Scott’s Case, 1 Grant 237 ; 2 Phila. 153 .

1903The contention of the plaintiff is that Hopkins must pay, becaus.e a covenant to protect it is found in the following words of the clause quoted: ‘ And all damages direct or consequential and claims therefor, resulting from the mining and removal of said coal, in the doing of any and all the matters and things hereinbefore described, are hereby waived and relinquished by the said party of the first part but, even if it be true that such covenant is there found, the concluding words, ‘ provided the party of the second part takes all ordinary precautions usually taken in mining and removing coal

1901The contention of the plaintiff is that Hopkins must pay, because a covenant to protect it is found in the following words of the clause quoted: “And all damages direct or consequential and claims therefor, resulting from the mining and removal of said coal, in the doing of any and all the matters and things hereinbefore described, are hereby waived and relinquished by the said party of the first part; ” but, even if it be true that such covenant is there found, the concluding words, “ provided the party of the second part takes all ordinary precautions usually taken in mining and removing coa

2026Id. (c)(1-7).

2022See, e.g., Estate of Benyo, 233 A.3d at 782, Commonwealth by Shapiro, 194 A.3d at 1027 ; Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1267 ; Roethlein, 81 A.3d at 822 .

2022See, e.g., Estate of Benyo, 233 A.3d at 782, Commonwealth by Shapiro, 194 A.3d at 1027 ; Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1267 ; Roethlein, 81 A.3d at 822 .

2022Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 518 (Pa. Super. 2016) (case citations and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 161 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2016). 20 We recognize that while the filing of a post-sentence motion is optional, a defendant is required to file such a motion when challenging the verdict on weight of the evidence grounds or when the challenge involves the discretionary aspects of sentence in order to preserve such issues for appellate review.

2020The Court continued, “‘the very words of the rule ― ‘interest of justice’ ― mandate the broadest inquiry into the nature of the challenged proceeding.” Id. (quoting United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 304 (E.D.

2020If “the words of a rule are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id.

2018Tillery v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 156 A.3d 1233, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 172 A.3d 592 (Pa. 2017) (case citation omitted).

2016No. 127(b). ‘When the words of a rule are clear and free, from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id.

2013Knoebel Sons, t/a Knoebel’s Grove, 566 Pa. 593 , 782 A.2d 996, 998 (2001) citing Pa.R.C.P. -127 (“When the words of a rule [of civil procedure] are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).

2011Furthermore, "a note to a rule or an explanatory comment is not a part of the rule, but may be used in construing the rule." Boatin, supra at 427 , citing Pa.R.C.P. 129(e).