19 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Golchin v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2017Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013) (“We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their plain meaning, . . . giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . . considering] ‘what an objectively reasonably insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered’ . . .” [citation omitted]). 2017Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013) ("We interpret the words of the standard policy 2 in light of their plain meaning, . . . giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . . consider[ing] 'what an objectively reasonably insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered' . . ." [citation omitted]). | 4 | 4 |
Elena Given v. Commerce Insurancegreen2 sentences2013Co., 440 Mass. 207, 209 (2003). “[B]ecause the approved wording of the standard policy is controlled by the Commissioner of Insurance and not by any insurer (see G. 2011Co., 440 Mass. 207, 209 (2003), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Dyergreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 749 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Da Costa v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 749 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' Insolvency Fundgreen1 sentence2003We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their plain meaning, see Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 280 (1997), giving full effect to the document as a whole. | 1 | 1 |
Francesco G. Campiti v. Michael A. Walonisgreen1 sentence2000See Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979); Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F. Supp. 263, 269-270 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fishman & McKenna, Wiretapping & Eavesdropping, §§ 2.29-2.30, 2.33; Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 3.2(f)(1), at 3-59 (2d ed. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Abel v. Bonfantigreen1 sentence2000See Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979); Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F. Supp. 263, 269-270 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fishman & McKenna, Wiretapping & Eavesdropping, §§ 2.29-2.30, 2.33; Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 3.2(f)(1), at 3-59 (2d ed. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Murphy Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commissiongreen1 sentence1978Compare Murphy Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commn., 364 Mass. 454, 466-467 (1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Dowell v. Utahgreen1 sentence1978Compare Murphy Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commn., 364 Mass. 454, 466-467 (1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Underwoodgreen1 sentence1974See Commonwealth v. Underwood, 358 Mass. 506, 513 (1970). (g) Interference with witness. | 1 | 1 |
Minot v. Painegreen1 sentence1947In that case, after elaborate consideration, it was settled as the law of this Commonwealth that “the remoteness of an appointment, made in the exercise of a power to appoint by will alone, so far as affected by the rule against perpetuities must be measured from the time of the creation and not the exercise of the power” (230 Mass, at page 523), but that “the words of the rule are satisfied if it appears that in-the light of facts as to relationship and longevity existent when the appointment is exercised, the estates created in truth will vest and take effect within the period limited by the | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dowgreen1 sentence1928Commonwealth v. Dow, 217 Mass. 473, 482, 483 . | 1 | 1 |
Morse v. Brackettgreen1 sentence1870See 98 Mass. 205, 210 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Golchin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2013“We interpret the words of the standard policy in light of their plain meaning, . . . giving full effect to the document as a whole[,] . . . considering] ‘what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered’ . . . [and] interpreting] the provision of the standard policy in a manner consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme that governs such policies.” Golchin I, 460 Mass. at 225 , citing Given v. Commerce Ins. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Central Trust Co. v. Rudnick
green
1 sentence1973The particular words of clause 25 are not entitled to special emphasis, “but they must be given such effect as a fair construction of the entire contract shows the parties intended they should have.” Central Trust Co. v. Rudnick, 310 Mass. 239, 244 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate & House of Representatives
green
1 sentence1943The words of this clause “mean that the opinions can be required only when ‘such questions of law are necessary to be determined by the body making the inquiry, in the exercise of the legislative or executive power entrusted to it by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth.’ Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 566 . ‘By a solemn occasion, the Constitution means some serious and unusual exigency. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Answer of the Justices to the House of Representatives
green
1 sentence1943It has been held to be such an exigency when . . . either branch of the Legislature, having some action in view, has serious doubts as to their power and authority to take such action, under the Constitution, or under existing statutes.’ Answer of the Justices, 148 Mass. 623, 625-626 .” Answer of the Justices, 290 Mass. 601, 602 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Answer of the Justices to the Senate
green
1 sentence1943It has been held to be such an exigency when . . . either branch of the Legislature, having some action in view, has serious doubts as to their power and authority to take such action, under the Constitution, or under existing statutes.’ Answer of the Justices, 148 Mass. 623, 625-626 .” Answer of the Justices, 290 Mass. 601, 602 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Underwood v. Hossack
neutral
1 sentence1936Underwood v. Hossack, 38 Ill. 208, 214 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Blanchard
green
1 sentence1927Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Blanchard, 196 Mass. 35, 38 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Bloomer v. McQuewan
green
1 sentence1866Simpson v. Wilson, lb. 709, That section of the act of 1836 provided indeed that “ the benefit of such renewal shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to use the thing patented, to the extent of their respective interest therein.” But the decision did not rest upon the words of that clause alone, and is not restricted to the case of a party using a machine which he obtained from the patentee himself, as is shown by the judgment in Bloomer v. McQhewan, 14 How. 539 , in which it was held that the private act of congress of 1845, c. 27, (6 U. S, Sts. at Large, 936,) by which the same | 1 | 1866–1866 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.