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11 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1904–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vreeland v. Byrnegreen2 sentences2015There, “a literal adherence to the words of the clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people can be assured fulfillment.” Id. at 305 , 370 A.2d 825 . 2015There, “a literal adherence to the words of the clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people can be assured fulfillment.” Id. at 305 , 370 A.2d 825 . | 1 | 3 |
DiProspero v. Penngreen1 sentence2019The words of the rule must be "ascribe[d] . . . their ordinary meaning and significance . . . in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Atlantic City Racing Ass'n v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences1999Where in the one case the underlying spirit, intent and purpose of the Article must be sought and applied as it may have relevance to the problems of the day, in the other a literal adherence to the words of the clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people can be assured fulfillment. [ Id. at 544-46, 489 A. 2d 165 (citations omitted).] As previously indicated, the Casino Amendment must be read literally and restrictively. 1999Where in the one case the underlying spirit, intent and purpose of the Article must be sought and applied as it may have relevance to the problems of the day, in the other a literal adherence to the words of the clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people can be assured fulfillment. [Id. at 544-46, 489 A.2d 165 (citations omitted).] As previously indicated, the Casino Amendment must be read literally and restrictively. | 1 | 1 |
Lloyd v. Vermeulengreen2 sentences1991So it is that the Court sometimes rejects a literal and grammatical reading of the State Constitution for reasons noted by Justice Jacobs in Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 206, 125 A.2d 393 (1956): “[Sjince words are inexact tools at best, resort may freely be had to the pertinent constitutional and legislative history for aid in ascertaining the true sense and meaning of the language used.” The polestar of constitutional construction is always the intent and purpose of the particular provision. 1991So it is that the Court sometimes rejects a literal and grammatical reading of the State Constitution for reasons noted by Justice Jacobs in Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 206, 125 A.2d 393 (1956): “[Sjince words are inexact tools at best, resort may freely be had to the pertinent constitutional and legislative history for aid in ascertaining the true sense and meaning of the language used.” The polestar of constitutional construction is always the intent and purpose of the particular provision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gil v. Clara Maass Medical Center
green
1 sentence2025"Even absent a true conflict, specific words will limit the meaning of general words if it appears from the whole agreement that the parties' purpose was directed solely toward the matter to which the specific words or clause relate." Gil, 450 N.J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2007Even though this Court in Brown, supra, read the language of our rule to “suggest[] that the right to remain silent might exist only in the face of a compulsion to speak,” that result does not follow from the words of our privilege. 118 N.J. at 612 , 573 A.2d 886 . 2007Even though this Court in Brown, supra, read the language of our rule to “suggest[] that the right to remain silent might exist only in the face of a compulsion to speak,” that result does not follow from the words of our privilege. 118 N.J. at 612 , 573 A.2d 886 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Stanton
green
2 sentences2007Accordingly, not only is this Court free to chart its own course, but it is our duty to do so “when our state’s interests are not advanced by federal precedent.” State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 118 , 820 A.2d 637 (2003) (Albín, J., dissenting) (“In interpreting our State Constitution, particularly [if the provision is textually different], a decision of the United States Supreme Court is persuasive authority only if it can persuade by force of reason, logic, and historical interpretation.”). 2007Accordingly, not only is this Court free to chart its own course, but it is our duty to do so “when our state’s interests are not advanced by federal precedent.” State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 118 , 820 A.2d 637 (2003) (Albín, J., dissenting) (“In interpreting our State Constitution, particularly [if the provision is textually different], a decision of the United States Supreme Court is persuasive authority only if it can persuade by force of reason, logic, and historical interpretation.”). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Butler
green
1 sentence1983As is observed in State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220 (1982): As a general rule of statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Stivali v. Space
green
1 sentence1956Interrogatory No. 29 would appear to fall within the broad frame of reference of R.R. 4:23-9, which permits inquiry into the identity and location of "persons having knowledge of relevant facts." An interrogatory was propounded in the words of the rule in Stavili v. Space, 9 N.J. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Evens v. Griscom
green
1 sentence1953The inquiry is not what the testator intended to have done, "but what the words of the clause mean, after applying to it the established rules of construction." Evens v. Griscom, 42 N.J.L. 579 ( E. & A. 1880), Beasley, C.J., for the Court of Errors and Appeals. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Lang v. Eagle Fire Co.
green
1 sentence1904The view of the court in that case was afterwards applied to the words in the standard policy in the case of Lang v. Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 43 . | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.