42 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“If the words of the rule are plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ceases and we need not venture outside the text 27 of the rule.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265 (2000)). 2017That is, “we look to [the] plain text” of the rule, and, if “the words of the rule are plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ceases and we need not venture outside the text of the rule.” Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264-65 , 757 A.2d 796 (2000) (citations omitted). | 4 | 6 |
Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . 2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . | 4 | 4 |
In re Victor B.green2 sentences2008“Generally, it is only when the words of the rule are ambiguous that we must look toward other sources to glean the intent of the rule.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). *625 Maryland Rule 4—845(b) states that “[t]he court has revisory power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” While the statement of the Rule seems simple enough, there is ambiguity in determining the scope of the court’s “revisory power” under this subsection. 2008“Generally, it is only when the words of the rule are ambiguous that we must look toward other sources to glean the intent of the rule.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). *625 Maryland Rule 4—845(b) states that “[t]he court has revisory power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” While the statement of the Rule seems simple enough, there is ambiguity in determining the scope of the court’s “revisory power” under this subsection. | 3 | 4 |
Sewell v. Sewellgreen2 sentences1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). 1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). | 3 | 3 |
Chalkley v. Chalkleygreen2 sentences1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). 1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). | 3 | 3 |
Dorf v. Skolnikgreen2 sentences1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). 1999Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63, 71 , 145 A.2d 422, 426 (1958); see, e.g., Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 117-118 , 371 A.2d 1094, 1103 (1977); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 236 Md. 329, 333 , 203 A.2d 877, 880 (1964). | 3 | 3 |
Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 396 , 849 A.2d 504, 515 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Bern–Shaw Ltd. [P’ship] v. Mayor of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277 , 297–98, 833 A.2d 502, 514 (2003)). 2022Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 396 , 849 A.2d 504, 515 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Bern–Shaw Ltd. [P’ship] v. Mayor of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277 , 297–98, 833 A.2d 502, 514 (2003)). | 2 | 2 |
Bern-Shaw Ltd. Partnership v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen2 sentences2022Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 396 , 849 A.2d 504, 515 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Bern–Shaw Ltd. [P’ship] v. Mayor of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277 , 297–98, 833 A.2d 502, 514 (2003)). 2022Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 396 , 849 A.2d 504, 515 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Bern–Shaw Ltd. [P’ship] v. Mayor of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277 , 297–98, 833 A.2d 502, 514 (2003)). | 2 | 2 |
Kucharczyk v. Stategreen2 sentences2008A contradiction is an “act of contradicting”; to contradict means to “express or assert the opposite of a statement.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 251 (3d ed. 2005); See also Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334, 338 , 201 A.2d 683, 685 (1964) (“When a witness says in one breath that a thing is so, and in the next breath that it is not so, his testimony is too inconclusive, contradictory, and uncertain to be the basis of a legal conclusion.”). 2008A contradiction is an “act of contradicting”; to contradict means to “express or assert the opposite of a statement.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 251 (3d ed. 2005); See also Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334, 338 , 201 A.2d 683, 685 (1964) (“When a witness says in one breath that a thing is so, and in the next breath that it is not so, his testimony is too inconclusive, contradictory, and uncertain to be the basis of a legal conclusion.”). | 2 | 2 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See King v. State, 400 Md. 419, 429 , 929 A.2d 169, 175 (2007) (noting that when construing a rule, we must first look to the words of the rule, giving them their ordinary and plain meaning). 2008See King v. State, 400 Md. 419, 429 , 929 A.2d 169, 175 (2007) (noting that when construing a rule, we must first look to the words of the rule, giving them their ordinary and plain meaning). | 2 | 2 |
New Jersey Ex Rel. Lennon v. Strazzellagreen2 sentences2006In Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75 , 627 A.2d at 1057 , we outlined the following standard for interpreting the rules of procedure: In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. 2006In Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75 , 627 A.2d at 1057 , we outlined the following standard for interpreting the rules of procedure: In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. | 1 | 5 |
Long v. Stategreen2 sentences2017But, if “the words of the rule are ambiguous,” then we may turn to “other sources to glean the intent of the rule.” Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445 (1996) (citation and quotation omitted). 2017But, if “the words of the rule are ambiguous,” then we may turn to “other sources to glean the intent of the rule.” Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445 (1996) (citation and quotation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Beales v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445, 447 (1996); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994); New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274 , 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 271 , 619 A.2d 105, 109 (1993). 1997Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667 , 684 A.2d 445, 447 (1996); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994); New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274 , 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 271 , 619 A.2d 105, 109 (1993). | 1 | 2 |
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gressgreen2 sentences2025In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 676 , 838 A.2d 362, 367 (2003), this Court summarized the applicable principles as follows: In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. 2025In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 676 , 838 A.2d 362, 367 (2003), this Court summarized the applicable principles as follows: In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2021In addition to the definition set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary, the Second Circuit has discussed jury nullification as “the intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge[,]” and stated that jury nullification “is, by definition, a violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court— in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to ‘render a - 36 - true verdict according to the law and the evidence.’” Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608, 614 (cleaned up). 2021See also United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 148 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]ullification—a juror’s refusal to follow the law—is a violation of the juror’s sworn oath to render a verdict according to the law and evidence.” (Citing Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-18 )). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Herbert Vedermangreen1 sentence2021See also United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 148 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]ullification—a juror’s refusal to follow the law—is a violation of the juror’s sworn oath to render a verdict according to the law and evidence.” (Citing Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-18 )). | 1 | 1 |
Degren v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 418 , 722 A.2d 887, 895-96 (1999). 2001See Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 418 , 722 A.2d 887, 895-96 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mustafa v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marsheck v. Board of Trustees
green
2 sentences2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . 2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . | 4 | 2000–2010 |
Huffman v. State
green
2 sentences2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . 2010See Adamson, 359 Md. at 250-51 , 753 A.2d at 507-08 ; Marsheck, 358 Md. at 402-03 , 749 A.2d at 779 ; Huffman, 356 Md. at 628 , 741 A.2d at 1091 . | 4 | 2000–2010 |
Zetty v. Piatt
green
1 sentence2024“If the words of the rule are plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ceases and we need not venture outside the text 27 of the rule.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265 (2000)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Barbre v. Pope
green
2 sentences2011Barbre, 402 Md. at 172-73 , 935 A.2d 699 . 2011Barbre, 402 Md. at 172-73 , 935 A.2d 699 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Fezell
green
2 sentences2009In the case at bar, Respondent (in the words of the hearing judge) “was honest with his client about his mistakes^] urged her to hire independent counsel to pursue a malpractice elaim[, and] [u]pon reaching a settlement, ... compensated Ms. Abarza from his personal resources without resort to his malpractice carrier.” In Fezell , this Court imposed a sixty day suspension on an attorney who (1) failed to keep a domestic relations client informed of the status of her case, (2) failed to obtain an uncontested divorce for the client within a period of four years, and (3) “resisted the efforts of t 2009In the case at bar, Respondent (in the words of the hearing judge) “was honest with his client about his mistakes^] urged her to hire independent counsel to pursue a malpractice elaim[, and] [u]pon reaching a settlement, ... compensated Ms. Abarza from his personal resources without resort to his malpractice carrier.” In Fezell , this Court imposed a sixty day suspension on an attorney who (1) failed to keep a domestic relations client informed of the status of her case, (2) failed to obtain an uncontested divorce for the client within a period of four years, and (3) “resisted the efforts of t | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Elmendorf
green
2 sentences2009Had Respondent not made (in the words of the hearing judge) “a principled effort to ensure that Ms. Abarza was fairly and fully compensated[,]” we would have sustained the Commission’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the negligent handling of Ms. Abarza’s case was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. 1 In light of the hearing judge’s non-clearly erroneous factual findings, however, each of the other exceptions is hereby overruled. 2 The Sanction In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353 , 946 A.2d 542 (2008), this Court stated: We have made clear so many 2009Had Respondent not made (in the words of the hearing judge) “a principled effort to ensure that Ms. Abarza was fairly and fully compensated[,]” we would have sustained the Commission’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the negligent handling of Ms. Abarza’s case was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. 1 In light of the hearing judge’s non-clearly erroneous factual findings, however, each of the other exceptions is hereby overruled. 2 The Sanction In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353 , 946 A.2d 542 (2008), this Court stated: We have made clear so many | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Knox v. State
green
2 sentences2009Knox, 404 Md. at 85 , 945 A.2d 638 . 2009Knox, 404 Md. at 85 , 945 A.2d 638 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gray v. State
green
2 sentences2007Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 376 , 879 A.2d 1064 (2005). 2007Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 376 , 879 A.2d 1064 (2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lerman v. Heeman
green
2 sentences2000When the language is ambiguous, we may look to the intent behind the statute or rule, but “our mission is to give the rule a reasonable interpretation in tune with logic and common sense.” Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 443 , 701 A.2d 426 (1997) (interpreting Md. 2000When the language is ambiguous, we may look to the intent behind the statute or rule, but “our mission is to give the rule a reasonable interpretation in tune with logic and common sense.” Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 443 , 701 A.2d 426 (1997) (interpreting Md. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Davis v. Davis
green
2 sentences1999In Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), Judge Digges said for the Court: The words of the rule itself make plain that an appellate court cannot set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this is so even when the chancellor has not seen or heard the witnesses. 1999In Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), Judge Digges said for the Court: The words of the rule itself make plain that an appellate court cannot set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this is so even when the chancellor has not seen or heard the witnesses. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Flannigan v. Bailar
green
1 sentence1999In Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), Judge Digges said for the Court: The words of the rule itself make plain that an appellate court cannot set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this is so even when the chancellor has not seen or heard the witnesses. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Fortuna Corp. v. Wilkerson
green
1 sentence1999In Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), Judge Digges said for the Court: The words of the rule itself make plain that an appellate court cannot set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this is so even when the chancellor has not seen or heard the witnesses. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bergen v. United States
green
1 sentence1999In Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A.2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 , 98 S.Ct. 430 , 54 L.Ed.2d 299 (1977), Judge Digges said for the Court: The words of the rule itself make plain that an appellate court cannot set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this is so even when the chancellor has not seen or heard the witnesses. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Comptroller of the Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Stefanowicz Corp. v. Harris green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. State Department of Assessment & Taxation green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Schlotzhauer v. Kummer green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Clark v. Carroll neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Freeman v. . Coit neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Roseboom v. . Roseboom green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Doe, on the demise of Chamberlain v. Owings neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Beall's Lessee v. Holmes neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.