words warning in Illinois

2012Petersen Bros., 57 Ill.

1999Plastics, Inc. v. Ullo, 57 Ill.

1944The ‘utmost possible care, ’ and ‘ slightest neglect, ’ are superlative terms, unsafe and improper to be indulged in, as expressive of the requirements of the law, while it requires, at the same time, the highest degree of the .one, and charges for slight neglect.” In the Shaw case the Supreme Court said (539): “The words in the instruction that are complained of are ‘slightest negligence.’ Practically the same instruction, with the same words complained of, was before this court in the case of Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Byrum, 153 Ill. 131 , and cases cited on page 135, and the giving

1906That part of the instruction objected to is as follows: “While the carrier is not an insurer for the absolute safety of the passenger, he does, however, in legal contemplation, undertake to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of its road to secure the safety of the passenger, and is responsible for the slightest negligence resulting in injury to the passenger, provided the passenger is at the time of the injury exercising ordinary care and caution for his own safety.” The words in the instruction that are complained of are “slightest negligence.” Practic

2019Id.

2019Id.

1978(Ariola v. Nigro (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 200 , 148 N.E.2d 787 .) Traditionally, unless the circuit court order incorporates the words of the rule, no appeal is permissible, and the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the entire cause, including the power to revise any or all judgments at any time prior to entry of a judgment adjudicating all claims.

1978(Ariola v. Nigro (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 200 , 148 N.E.2d 787 .) Traditionally, unless the circuit court order incorporates the words of the rule, no appeal is permissible, and the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the entire cause, including the power to revise any or all judgments at any time prior to entry of a judgment adjudicating all claims.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1945In People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 , this court held that it' is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning when the record recites the defendant was admonished as to the consequences of his plea.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1945(People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41 ; People v. DeRosa, 362 Ill. 161 .) It is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning, when the record recites he was admonished as to the consequences of his plea.

1945(People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41 ; People v. DeRosa, 362 Ill. 161 .) It is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning, when the record recites he was admonished as to the consequences of his plea.

1945In People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41 , we said, “In the absence of an affirmative showing in the record to the contrary, it will be presumed that the couff discharged its duty .to the defendant in all respects.” (People v. Gerke, 332 Ill. 583 .) We hold that the trial court fully performed its duty in advising the accused of the consequences of the plea of guilty as required by section 4 of division XIII of the Criminal Code.

1945(People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354 .) Plaintiff in error is not permitted by the mere filing of a brief and argument to dispute matters of record certified to this court as being correct.

1944(People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354 ; People v. Harney, 276 Ill. 236 .) When the record recites that the defendant was admonished as to the consequences of his plea, it will be presumed, in support of such recital, that the court discharged its duty.

1944(People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354 ; People v. Harney, 276 Ill. 236 .) When the record recites that the defendant was admonished as to the consequences of his plea, it will be presumed, in support of such recital, that the court discharged its duty.

1935(People v. Harney, 276 Ill. 236 .) When the record recites that the defendant was admonished as to the consequences of the plea, it will be presumed, in support of such recital, that the court discharged its duty.

1995As these principles demonstrate, the rule of stare decisis is not "so static that it deprives the court of all power to develop the law. ( Alvis [v. Ribar (1981)], 85 Ill.2d [1,] 24 [ 52 Ill.Dec. 23 , 421 N.E.2d 886 .)] * * * [T]he maintenance of stability in our legal concepts does not and should not occupy a preeminent position over the judiciary's obligation to reconsider legal rules that have become inequitable in light of the changing needs of our society.

1995Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting the words and analysis of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the past.’ 20 Ill. 2d at 429 .” Cravens, 223 Ill.

1995Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting the words and analysis of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the past.' 20 Ill.2d at 429 [ 170 N.E.2d 881 .]" Cravens, 223 Ill.App.3d at 1074 , 166 Ill.Dec. 409 , 586 N.E.2d 367 .

1993(People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349 , 562 N.E.2d 958 .) For a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, he must have the ability to understand the words in the warnings, and at a minimum, he must understand basically what those rights encompass and what their waiver will entail.

1993(People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349 , 562 N.E.2d 958 .) For a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, he must have the ability to understand the words in the warnings, and at a minimum, he must understand basically what those rights encompass and what their waiver will entail.

1992(Hester, 131 Ill. 2d at 100 .) Whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends on how a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.

1979In People v. Griggs (1977), 51 Ill.

1979There is no doubt that the words of that instruction were lifted verbatim from the opinion of the supreme court in People v. Hickman (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 89, 94 , 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 , where that language defined the extent or scope of a crime itself which lead to the application, in that case, of the felony murder rule.

1979There is no doubt that the words of that instruction were lifted verbatim from the opinion of the supreme court in People v. Hickman (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 89, 94 , 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 , where that language defined the extent or scope of a crime itself which lead to the application, in that case, of the felony murder rule.

1978Haleu v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc. (1966), 67 Ill.

1958Section 50 (2) of the Civil Practice Act . . . does not apply to the circumstances of this proceeding.” As stated by Mr. Justice Clark in Republic of Italy v. De Angelis, 206 F.2d 121 , at p. 132: “. . . while the judge did not make a finding of finality in the very words of the rule, he did so in substantial effect. . . .

1947(People v. Farris, 392 Ill. 267 ; People v. Williams, 383 Ill. 348 .) Defendant agrees that the recital in the record raises the presumption that the court discharged its duty, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549 ,) and admits that the presumption can only be overcome by other matters appearing of record.

1947(People v. Farris, 392 Ill. 267 ; People v. Williams, 383 Ill. 348 .) Defendant agrees that the recital in the record raises the presumption that the court discharged its duty, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549 ,) and admits that the presumption can only be overcome by other matters appearing of record.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1947(People v. Farris, 392 Ill. 267 ; People v. Williams, 383 Ill. 348 .) Defendant agrees that the recital in the record raises the presumption that the court discharged its duty, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549 ,) and admits that the presumption can only be overcome by other matters appearing of record.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1947(People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218 ; People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235 ; People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366 .) Defendant concedes that the recital, standing alone, shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, (People v. Fuhs, 390 Ill. 67 ; People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Collins, 353 Ill. 468 ,) and that it is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning.

1945In People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41 , we said, “In the absence of an affirmative showing in the record to the contrary, it will be presumed that the couff discharged its duty .to the defendant in all respects.” (People v. Gerke, 332 Ill. 583 .) We hold that the trial court fully performed its duty in advising the accused of the consequences of the plea of guilty as required by section 4 of division XIII of the Criminal Code.

1945(People v. Childers, 386 Ill. 312 ; People v. Corbett, 387 Ill. 41 ; People v. DeRosa, 362 Ill. 161 .) It is not necessary for the record to show the particular words of warning, when the record recites he was admonished as to the consequences of his plea.

1934In Ogden v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 556 , which was a suit instituted for the purpose of obtaining a decree permitting appellee to redeem certain premises from a foreclosure sale, the court said: “Appellant insists that by the strict letter of the written contract, appellee only had an option to purchase the property within nine months, which she did not exercise, and that thereafter she had no further rights in the premises.