Sierra motion in California

2024Mar did not by his conduct assent to an implied-in- fact agreement to arbitrate “California law permits employers to implement policies that may become unilateral implied-in-fact contracts when employees accept them by continuing their employment.” (Asmus v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Asmus); accord, Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 .) It is the performance by the employee in continuing to work for the employer that constitutes the employee’s acceptance of the unilateral implied-in-fact contract.

2024Mar did not by his conduct assent to an implied-in- fact agreement to arbitrate “California law permits employers to implement policies that may become unilateral implied-in-fact contracts when employees accept them by continuing their employment.” (Asmus v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Asmus); accord, Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 .) It is the performance by the employee in continuing to work for the employer that constitutes the employee’s acceptance of the unilateral implied-in-fact contract.

2024(South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 329 (South of Market), quoting Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 275 ; see also Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 530 [evaluating the legal adequacy of an EIR, “a court presumes a public agency’s decision to certify the EIR is correct, thereby imposing on a party challenging it the burden of establishing otherwise”].) The California Supreme Court decisions applying the abuse of discretion standard of review in CEQA challenges have “ar

2024(American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013) 570 U.S. 228, 233 [“arbitration is a matter of contract”]; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (U.S.), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle) [“‘“A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”’”]; Trinity v. Life Ins.

2024Mar did not by his conduct assent to an implied-in- fact agreement to arbitrate “California law permits employers to implement policies that may become unilateral implied-in-fact contracts when employees accept them by continuing their employment.” (Asmus v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Asmus); accord, Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 .) It is the performance by the employee in continuing to work for the employer that constitutes the employee’s acceptance of the unilateral implied-in-fact contract.

2024(See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 [noting that “‘neither Asmus nor DiGiacinto . . . addressed whether an arbitration agreement existed between an employer and employee’”]; Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 [same]; Mitri v. Arnel Management Co., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171 [same].) Here, the Sierra defendants rely on Mar’s conduct in remaining employed at Sierra as evidence of his assent to the arbitration agreement.

2024(Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC v Regents of University of California (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 779 , 790, fn. 4.) We also grant in part Sierra’s motion to strike those portions of the Respondent’s brief that refer to or rely upon a document that was not part of the administrative record. 16 A. CEQA Principles and Standard of Review12 The EIR is the “ ‘heart of CEQA.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel Heights).) A plaintiff challenging an agency’s certification of an EIR bears the burden of overcoming the presumpt

2024(South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 329 (South of Market), quoting Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 275 ; see also Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 530 [evaluating the legal adequacy of an EIR, “a court presumes a public agency’s decision to certify the EIR is correct, thereby imposing on a party challenging it the burden of establishing otherwise”].) The California Supreme Court decisions applying the abuse of discretion standard of review in CEQA challenges have “ar

2024(American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013) 570 U.S. 228, 233 [“arbitration is a matter of contract”]; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (U.S.), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle) [“‘“A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”’”]; Trinity v. Life Ins.

2024(See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 [noting that “‘neither Asmus nor DiGiacinto . . . addressed whether an arbitration agreement existed between an employer and employee’”]; Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 [same]; Mitri v. Arnel Management Co., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171 [same].) Here, the Sierra defendants rely on Mar’s conduct in remaining employed at Sierra as evidence of his assent to the arbitration agreement.

2024(See Villareal v. LAD-T, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 446 , 452, fn. 2 [treating petition to compel arbitration filed in existing action as motion to compel arbitration]; Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758, 772 [“There is an ‘analytic distinction’ between a motion (or petition) to compel arbitration filed within an existing action, as here, and a petition to compel arbitration that commences an independent action.”].) Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 The Sierra defendants argued Mar worked for an additional 18 months at Sierra, but we

2024(South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 329 (South of Market), quoting Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 275 ; see also Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 530 [evaluating the legal adequacy of an EIR, “a court presumes a public agency’s decision to certify the EIR is correct, thereby imposing on a party challenging it the burden of establishing otherwise”].) The California Supreme Court decisions applying the abuse of discretion standard of review in CEQA challenges have “ar

2024(South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 329 (South of Market), quoting Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 275 ; see also Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 530 [evaluating the legal adequacy of an EIR, “a court presumes a public agency’s decision to certify the EIR is correct, thereby imposing on a party challenging it the burden of establishing otherwise”].) The California Supreme Court decisions applying the abuse of discretion standard of review in CEQA challenges have “ar

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2014“Orders sustaining demurrers are not appealable.” (Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) *1291 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125 ]; see Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1019 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 ].) Nevertheless, “an appellate court may deem an order sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.” (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ].) It is particularly appropriate to do so when the absence of a final judgment results from inadvertence or mistake (ibid.), and Sierra prepared

2009Finally, Snider and Sierra claim that the imposition of the lien is an “unconstitutional ‘taking’ ... in the absence of any benefit to the real property in question.” Since they offer no arguments or citations of authority in support of this contention, we will treat the issue as waived. 2 (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 366, fn. 2 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) In sum, Snider and Sierra’s agent rented United Rentals’s equipment and used it to help remove buildings from Snider and Sierra’s land.

2009Finally, Snider and Sierra claim that the imposition of the lien is an “unconstitutional ‘taking’ ... in the absence of any benefit to the real property in question.” Since they offer no arguments or citations of authority in support of this contention, we will treat the issue as waived. 2 (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 366, fn. 2 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) In sum, Snider and Sierra’s agent rented United Rentals’s equipment and used it to help remove buildings from Snider and Sierra’s land.