Smiths claim in California

2020We disagree. “[T]he later [a disqualification] motion is made, the more difficult it is to replace counsel” because “mastery over a complex case is best acquired as the case progresses through discovery.” (Liberty National, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 847, 848.) Here, the Smiths sought disqualification after the parties partook in significant discovery, including witness depositions, hundreds of discovery requests, and multiple discovery motions.

2020Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 847 (Liberty National).) A further indication the Smiths’ delay was unreasonable is the fact that the Smiths do not claim that anyone prevented them from seeking to disqualify Mahavier.

2020(River West, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1309 [courts should consider “whether anyone prevented the moving party from making the motion earlier, and if so, under what circumstances”].) The Smiths were represented by counsel throughout the case—by three different slates of attorneys.

2002Further, the contract contains a “[t]ime is of the essence” clause, and “[s]uch considerations have nothing to do with options.” (Auslen v. Johnson (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 319, 322 [ 257 P.2d 664 ]; Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390, 394 [ 317 P.2d 1018 ].) Rather, on the lapse of the option period the “matter is completely ended and the offer is withdrawn.” (Auslen v. Johnson, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p. 322 .) The Smiths claim that under rules of contract interpretation, the counteroffer language “nonrefundable purchase option monies” prevails because it is handwritten.

2002Further, the contract contains a “[t]ime is of the essence” clause, and “[s]uch considerations have nothing to do with options.” (Auslen v. Johnson (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 319, 322 [ 257 P.2d 664 ]; Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390, 394 [ 317 P.2d 1018 ].) Rather, on the lapse of the option period the “matter is completely ended and the offer is withdrawn.” (Auslen v. Johnson, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p. 322 .) The Smiths claim that under rules of contract interpretation, the counteroffer language “nonrefundable purchase option monies” prevails because it is handwritten.

2002Further, the contract contains a “[t]ime is of the essence” clause, and “[s]uch considerations have nothing to do with options.” (Auslen v. Johnson (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 319, 322 [ 257 P.2d 664 ]; Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390, 394 [ 317 P.2d 1018 ].) Rather, on the lapse of the option period the “matter is completely ended and the offer is withdrawn.” (Auslen v. Johnson, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p. 322 .) The Smiths claim that under rules of contract interpretation, the counteroffer language “nonrefundable purchase option monies” prevails because it is handwritten.

2002Further, the contract contains a “[t]ime is of the essence” clause, and “[s]uch considerations have nothing to do with options.” (Auslen v. Johnson (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 319, 322 [ 257 P.2d 664 ]; Wilson v. Ward (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 390, 394 [ 317 P.2d 1018 ].) Rather, on the lapse of the option period the “matter is completely ended and the offer is withdrawn.” (Auslen v. Johnson, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p. 322 .) The Smiths claim that under rules of contract interpretation, the counteroffer language “nonrefundable purchase option monies” prevails because it is handwritten.

1997(Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) This includes reading the statutory scheme as a whole.

1997(Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) This includes reading the statutory scheme as a whole.

1968The effect of this dismissal was to remove the tolling of the statute of limitations that had occurred on the filing of the action (Yorba v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 41 Cal.2d 265, 270 [ 259 P.2d 2 ]) and the last prescriptive period here involved (1957-1963) began with the Allans’ inaction in face of the Smiths’ claim (by then a matter of public record) that they could apportion their easement with the sale of any part of their property and the continued declaration by the Smiths that they intended to subdivide and sell off their property.

1968The effect of this dismissal was to remove the tolling of the statute of limitations that had occurred on the filing of the action (Yorba v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 41 Cal.2d 265, 270 [ 259 P.2d 2 ]) and the last prescriptive period here involved (1957-1963) began with the Allans’ inaction in face of the Smiths’ claim (by then a matter of public record) that they could apportion their easement with the sale of any part of their property and the continued declaration by the Smiths that they intended to subdivide and sell off their property.