tripartite test in California

2002"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 , 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 .) Defendant relies heavily on the familiar tripartite test of People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 .

2002"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 , 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 .) Defendant relies heavily on the familiar tripartite test of People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 .

1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St

1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St

2014(Ibid. ["[W]e did not overturn a judge-made rule of common law; rather, we recognized a statutory rule which the Legislature adopted in 1951 but to which courts had not previously given appropriate effect"].) Given this interpretation, the Supreme Court explained that it need not "undertake the often-perilous task of applying to the facts of this case the test of 'retroactivity' developed in a well-known series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court." (Ibid.) In other cases, largely involving questions of procedure, the Supreme Court has applied a tripartite test derived from the more

2014(Ibid. [“[W]e did not overturn a judge-made rule of common law; rather, we recognized a statutory rule which the Legislature adopted in 1951 but to which courts had not previously given appropriate effect.”].) Given this interpretation, the Supreme Court explained that it need not “undertake the often perilous task of applying to the facts of this case the test of ‘retroactivity’ developed in a well-known series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court.” (Ibid.) In other cases, largely involving questions of procedure, the Supreme Court has applied a tripartite test derived from the mor

1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St

1989On the other hand, retroactivity is not customarily required when the interest to be vindicated is one which is merely collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.” (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 10 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 559 P.2d 1028 ] [quoted in Donaldson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38].) “In search and seizure cases, the tripartite test leads generally to the conclusion that a decision should not be given retroactive effect.

2014A. State Standard Under the California Constitution, as the Supreme Court explained in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , “a statutory punishment may violate the constitutional prohibition [against cruel and unusual punishment] not only if it is inflicted by a cruel or unusual method, but also if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (Id. at p. 478.) “A penalty offends the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when it is ‘so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of

1986(People v. Villasenor (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 30, 33 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 349 ].) It also “provides for more severe punishment, proportionate to their persistence in crime of those who have proved immune to lesser punishment.” (In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 270 [ 176 P.2d 40 ].) We do not find Jameson’s sentence to be so disproportionate to the crime he committed that it “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ]; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2

2013Punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.‟ (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358 , fns. omitted.) „“A tripartite test has been established to determine whether a penalty offends the prohibition against cruel . . . [or] unusual punishment.

2007Punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 756 ], fns. omitted.) “ ‘A tripartite test has been established to determine whether a penalty offends the prohibition against cruel . . . [or] unusual punishment.

1989Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into ‘war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion.’ McCollum, supra, at 211-212 .” (Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 673 [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 610 ].) *573 In Lynch, the Supreme Court emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined” in its “line-drawing process” to “any single test or criterion” and observed that it had on occasion not found it useful to employ the so-called tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]. 6 No

1989Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into ‘war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion.’ McCollum, supra, at 211-212 .” (Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 673 [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 610 ].) *573 In Lynch, the Supreme Court emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined” in its “line-drawing process” to “any single test or criterion” and observed that it had on occasion not found it useful to employ the so-called tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ]. 6 No

1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St

1989On the other hand, retroactivity is not customarily required when the interest to be vindicated is one which is merely collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.” (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 10 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 559 P.2d 1028 ] [quoted in Donaldson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38].) “In search and seizure cases, the tripartite test leads generally to the conclusion that a decision should not be given retroactive effect.

1995On review, appellants have the burden of showing that the punishment prescribed is unconstitutional. {People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 534 P.2d 1001 ].) “A tripartite test has been established to determine whether a penalty offends the prohibition against cruel . . . [or] unusual punishment.

1995On review, appellants have the burden of showing that the punishment prescribed is unconstitutional. {People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 534 P.2d 1001 ].) “A tripartite test has been established to determine whether a penalty offends the prohibition against cruel . . . [or] unusual punishment.

1978See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd. 426 U.S. 736, 748 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 179 , 96 S.Ct. 2337 ]; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965-2966 ]; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 ] (1971)." (433 U.S. at pp. 235-236 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 724-725, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2599 ].) The foregoing tripartite test is now well established for determining whether a particular governmental action founders on the establishment clause, and I apply these analytical measures to the city's action in the case befor

1978See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd. 426 U.S. 736, 748 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 179 , 96 S.Ct. 2337 ]; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-773 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965-2966 ]; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 ] (1971)." (433 U.S. at pp. 235-236 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 724-725, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2599 ].) The foregoing tripartite test is now well established for determining whether a particular governmental action founders on the establishment clause, and I apply these analytical measures to the city's action in the case befor

2014Regarding "the purpose to be served by the new standards" (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 401 ), the District Attorney maintains that Chun was intended not to rectify a great injustice, but rather, to create a uniform standard for the application of the second degree felony-murder rule.

1987However, as this court took pains to point out in People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 401, the Stovall inquiry takes place only after it has been established that "there can have been justifiable reliance on an old rule to the contrary....

2014A. State Standard Under the California Constitution, as the Supreme Court explained in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , “a statutory punishment may violate the constitutional prohibition [against cruel and unusual punishment] not only if it is inflicted by a cruel or unusual method, but also if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (Id. at p. 478.) “A penalty offends the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when it is ‘so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of

1986(People v. Villasenor (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 30, 33 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 349 ].) It also “provides for more severe punishment, proportionate to their persistence in crime of those who have proved immune to lesser punishment.” (In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 270 [ 176 P.2d 40 ].) We do not find Jameson’s sentence to be so disproportionate to the crime he committed that it “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ]; In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2

2005“As we read Killian[, supra, 368 U.S. 231 ] .. . there is no deprivation of a federal due process right if destruction of the original notes complies with the tripartite test of Killian .

1985In order to obtain that remedy, the defendant must also overcome the doctrine of harmless error and demonstrate that the particular destruction of evidence resulted in actual harm to the defense.’ (Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine *1214 (1975) 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1355, 1357, fns. omitted; italics in original.)” (People v. Tierce, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 264 .) As we read Killian v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at page 242 [ 7 L.Ed.2d at page 264 ], and California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at page 491 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at page 423 ],

1985In order to obtain that remedy, the defendant must also overcome the doctrine of harmless error and demonstrate that the particular destruction of evidence resulted in actual harm to the defense.’ (Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine *1214 (1975) 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1355, 1357, fns. omitted; italics in original.)” (People v. Tierce, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 264 .) As we read Killian v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at page 242 [ 7 L.Ed.2d at page 264 ], and California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at page 491 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at page 423 ],

1985In order to obtain that remedy, the defendant must also overcome the doctrine of harmless error and demonstrate that the particular destruction of evidence resulted in actual harm to the defense.’ (Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine *1214 (1975) 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1355, 1357, fns. omitted; italics in original.)” (People v. Tierce, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 264 .) As we read Killian v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at page 242 [ 7 L.Ed.2d at page 264 ], and California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at page 491 [ 81 L.Ed.2d at page 423 ],

2016(Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney).) BMS contests neither the first prong of this tripartite test, that the company has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits by its continuous course of substantial business activities in California, nor the third, that taking jurisdiction 5 would impose unreasonable burdens on the company.

2016(Snowney v. Harrah ’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 33 , 112 P.3d 28 ] (Snowney).) BMS contests neither the first prong of this tripartite test, that the company has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits by its continuous course of substantial business activities in California, nor the third, that taking jurisdiction would impose unreasonable burdens on the company. ( Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) The key issue here is therefore whether the claims of the real parties in interest (plaintiffs residing in states other than California) arise ou

2014(See Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 843 ["The rule discussed above that one may renew on habeas corpus certain challenges to a final judgment even after unsuccessfully raising the issue on direct appeal, however, presupposes that no law of the case barrier exists"]; see also Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 396 .) Moreover, it is well- settled that the doctrine of law of the case will not be applied "when an intervening decision has altered or clarified the controlling rules of law . . . ." (People v. Jurado particularly its language pertaining to an "abandoned and malignant heart," it could be ar

2014(See Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 843 ["The rule discussed above that one may renew on habeas corpus certain challenges to a final judgment even after unsuccessfully raising the issue on direct appeal, however, presupposes that no law of the case barrier exists"]; see also Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 396 .) Moreover, it is well- settled that the doctrine of law of the case will not be applied "when an intervening decision has altered or clarified the controlling rules of law . . . ." (People v. Jurado particularly its language pertaining to an "abandoned and malignant heart," it could be ar