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11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995). 2012Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind.1995). | 2 | 2 |
Blackwell v. Dykes Funeral Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2005While there was no physical impact, the Blackwells have alleged serious emotional trauma and it is of a kind that a reasonable person would experience." Blackwell, 771 N.E.2d at 697 (emphasis supplied). 2004While noting that the tripartite test set out in Groves was inapposite, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims satisfied the underlying rationale of roves and that the plaintiffs' claim of emotional trauma was "of a kind that a reasonable person would experience" and "is not likely speculative, exaggerated, fictitious or unforeseeable." Id. at 697 . | 1 | 2 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Spaulding v. Int’l Bakers Servs., Inc., 650 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ind. 1990) (“Where possible, we interpret a statute such that every word receives effect and meaning and no part is rendered meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute.”) By applying the “rules governing civil actions in court,” the trial court relied on the tripartite test of T.R. 24(A)(2) to review Remonstrators’ motion to intervene and found all three elements satisfied by the Remonstrators. | 1 | 1 |
Dillard v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Dillard v. State, 257 Ind. 282, 291-92 , 274 *19 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1971); see also Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 358 (Ind. 2016) (referring to the tripartite test as the “Dillard test”). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas L. Hale v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2017See Dillard v. State, 257 Ind. 282, 291-92 , 274 *19 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1971); see also Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 358 (Ind. 2016) (referring to the tripartite test as the “Dillard test”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kois v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere 2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere | 2 | 1991–2004 |
Miller v. California
green
2 sentences2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere 2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere | 2 | 1991–2004 |
Fordyce v. State
green
1 sentence2004In addressing the issues that Adams presents today, we note that obscenity is not protected speech under the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution, Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 360-61 , and the genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973): The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient intere | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Matheney v. State
green
2 sentences1993Matheney v. State (1992), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1202 , cert. denied, - U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 2320 , 119 LEd.2d 238. 1993Matheney v. State (1992), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1202 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2320 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Matheney v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1993Matheney v. State (1992), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1202 , cert. denied, - U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 2320 , 119 LEd.2d 238. 1993Matheney v. State (1992), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1202 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2320 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Daniels v. State
green
2 sentences1991Rather, the post-conviction court would evaluate the petitioner's argument in light of the tripartite test from Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173 , 258 N.E.2d 616 or Daniels v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 487 . 1991Rather, the post-conviction court would evaluate the petitioner's argument in light of the tripartite test from Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173 , 258 N.E.2d 616 or Daniels v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 487 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Fossey v. State
green
2 sentences1991Prior to Daniels, retroactivity analysis followed a tripartite test crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted in Indiana in Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173 , 258 N.E.2d 616 . 1991Prior to Daniels, retroactivity analysis followed a tripartite test crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted in Indiana in Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173 , 258 N.E.2d 616 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Roth v. United States
green
2 sentences1991The genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California (1973), 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 LEd.2d 419: "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, supra [ 408 U.S. 229 ] at 230 [ 92 S.Ct. 2245, 2246 , 33 LEd.2d 312 (1972)], quoting Roth v. United States, supra [ 354 U.S. 476 ] at 489 [ 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311 , 1 L.Ed.2 1991The genesis of Indiana's statutory definition of obscenity is the tripartite test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California (1973), 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 LEd.2d 419: "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, supra [ 408 U.S. 229 ] at 230 [ 92 S.Ct. 2245, 2246 , 33 LEd.2d 312 (1972)], quoting Roth v. United States, supra [ 354 U.S. 476 ] at 489 [ 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311 , 1 L.Ed.2 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences1988In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), 403 U.S. 602 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , the United States Supreme Court articulated a tripartite test to determine when government action violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause. 1988In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), 403 U.S. 602 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , the United States Supreme Court articulated a tripartite test to determine when government action violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.