tripartite analysis in Massachusetts

2024We did not expressly employ the tripartite analysis from Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910, 913 (1976), and Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-498 (1981) (considering "the penalties prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions"), and therefore tie our decision to how most other States treated like offenders by applying the third step of that analysis.

2024We adopted the tripartite analysis in Jackson, 369 Mass. at 910 , and have, thus far, not confined it to individual proportionality challenges.

2024We did not expressly employ the tripartite analysis from Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910, 913 (1976), and Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 497-498 (1981) (considering "the penalties prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions"), and therefore tie our decision to how most other States treated like offenders by applying the third step of that analysis.

2018Applying the tripartite test established in Cepulonis v. Commonwealth , 384 Mass. 495 , 497-499, 427 N.E.2d 17 (1981), we held that "a juvenile defendant's aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses with parole eligibility exceeding that applicable to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder is presumptively disproportionate.

1984Application of the tripartite test discussed in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910-916 (1976), and in Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 387 Mass. 718, 725-727 (1982), to the present case leads us to conclude that Hamm’s term of imprisonment does not “shock[] the conscience and offend[] fundamental notions of human dignity.” Commonwealth v. Jackson , 369 Mass, at 910, quoting from In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424 (1972).

1982We have used a tripartite test in evaluating whether a defendant has met his burden of proving that a punishment is “so disproportionate to the crime that ‘it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910 (1976), quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424 (1972).

1989In making that determination, we engage in a tripartite analysis: “(1) Did the Legislature delegate the making of fundamental policy decisions, rather than just the implementation of legislatively determined policy; (2) does the act provide adequate direction for implementation, either in the form of statutory standards or, if the [commissioner] is to develop the standards, sufficient guidance to enable [him] to do so; and (3) does the act provide safeguards such that abuses of discretion can be controlled?” Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 190 (1984).

1989In making that determination, we engage in a tripartite analysis: "(1) Did the Legislature delegate the making of fundamental policy decisions, rather than just the implementation of legislatively determined policy; (2) does the act provide adequate direction for implementation, either in the form of statutory standards or, if the [commissioner] is to develop the standards, sufficient guidance to enable [him] to do so; and (3) does the act provide safeguards such that abuses of discretion can be controlled?" Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186, 190 (1984).

2024See Perez, 477 Mass. at 686 (concluding, based on application of tripartite analysis, that "a juvenile defendant's aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses with parole eligibility exceeding that applicable to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder is presumptively disproportionate," and that only after hearing according to Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 , could that presumption be rebutted).

2024See Perez, 477 Mass. at 685-687 (because sentence in that case was disproportionate under first two prongs of tripartite analysis, court "need not discuss the third prong").

2014In Athol Daily News v. Board of Review of the Div. of Employment and Training, 439 Mass. 171,175 (2003) (Athol Daily News), the Supreme Judicial Court explained that, in assessing whether the employing unit has met its burden of proof on part (a) of the tripartite test, there are two critical questions: did the person performing services (1) have the right to control the details of how the services were performed; 6 and (2) have the freedom from supervision “not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the means and methods that are to be utilized in the performance of the work.

2014In Athol Daily News v. Board of Review of the Div. of Employment and Training, 439 Mass. 171,175 (2003) (Athol Daily News), the Supreme Judicial Court explained that, in assessing whether the employing unit has met its burden of proof on part (a) of the tripartite test, there are two critical questions: did the person performing services (1) have the right to control the details of how the services were performed; 6 and (2) have the freedom from supervision “not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the means and methods that are to be utilized in the performance of the work.

2024See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 239-240 (1987) (challenge to one-year minimum mandatory prison term for homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated); Opinions of the Justices, 378 Mass. at 829 (facial examination whether proposed "bills' mandatory sentencing provisions -- including the requirement that a twenty-five year mandatory sentence in State prison be imposed on persons found manufacturing, distributing dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute, certain narcotics having a street value in excess of $25,000" -- were constitutionally disproportionate); Jackson, sup

2024See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 239-240 (1987) (challenge to one-year minimum mandatory prison term for homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated); Opinions of the Justices, 378 Mass. at 829 (facial examination whether proposed "bills' mandatory sentencing provisions -- including the requirement that a twenty-five year mandatory sentence in State prison be imposed on persons found manufacturing, distributing dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute, certain narcotics having a street value in excess of $25,000" -- were constitutionally disproportionate); Jackson, sup

2024See In re Nuñez, 173 Cal. App. 4th 709, 725-731 (2006). 40 assessing proportionality.

2024See Perez, 477 Mass. at 686 (concluding, based on application of tripartite analysis, that "a juvenile defendant's aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses with parole eligibility exceeding that applicable to a juvenile defendant convicted of murder is presumptively disproportionate," and that only after hearing according to Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 , could that presumption be rebutted).

2024See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 239-240 (1987) (challenge to one-year minimum mandatory prison term for homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated); Opinions of the Justices, 378 Mass. at 829 (facial examination whether proposed "bills' mandatory sentencing provisions -- including the requirement that a twenty-five year mandatory sentence in State prison be imposed on persons found manufacturing, distributing dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute, certain narcotics having a street value in excess of $25,000" -- were constitutionally disproportionate); Jackson, sup

2024See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 401 Mass. 237, 239-240 (1987) (challenge to one-year minimum mandatory prison term for homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated); Opinions of the Justices, 378 Mass. at 829 (facial examination whether proposed "bills' mandatory sentencing provisions -- including the requirement that a twenty-five year mandatory sentence in State prison be imposed on persons found manufacturing, distributing dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute, certain narcotics having a street value in excess of $25,000" -- were constitutionally disproportionate); Jackson, sup

2024See Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 230 (1983).

2024See Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 88; Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. 399, 406 (2019).

2024LaPlante, 482 Mass. at 404 n.4.

2016See Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525, 531 (2006).

2014In Athol Daily News v. Board of Review of the Div. of Employment and Training, 439 Mass. 171,175 (2003) (Athol Daily News), the Supreme Judicial Court explained that, in assessing whether the employing unit has met its burden of proof on part (a) of the tripartite test, there are two critical questions: did the person performing services (1) have the right to control the details of how the services were performed; 6 and (2) have the freedom from supervision “not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the means and methods that are to be utilized in the performance of the work.

2001In the context of summary judgment, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework remains appropriate to “give judges a method of organizing evidence and assigning the burdens of production and persuasion in a discrimination case.” Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979), quoted in Lipchitz, supra at 7.

1984See Muldoon v. Board of Appeals of Watertown, 351 Mass. 702 (1966) (suggesting that the lapse of time caused by a plaintiff’s failure to join a necessary party cannot make that party’s motion for relief untimely). (b) There is no question that Carley has factual evidence which is relevant to the application (to Butts’ proposed reconstruction) of the tripartite test governing expansion or change in a nonconforming use.

1984Application of the tripartite test discussed in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 910-916 (1976), and in Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 387 Mass. 718, 725-727 (1982), to the present case leads us to conclude that Hamm’s term of imprisonment does not “shock[] the conscience and offend[] fundamental notions of human dignity.” Commonwealth v. Jackson , 369 Mass, at 910, quoting from In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424 (1972).

1984See Powers v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 363 Mass. 648, 653-658 (1973).

1982See also Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 495, 496-497 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).