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6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gudinas v. Stategreen1 sentence2006This Court rejected this claim in Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1071 (Fla.2000) (rejecting Freeman's claim that "appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying the pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because it did not specifically charge felony murder"); see also Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 964 (Fla.1997) ("We have repeatedly rejected claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to pursue a felony murder theory when the indictment gave no notice of the theory."). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stategreen1 sentence2006This Court rejected this claim in Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1071 (Fla.2000) (rejecting Freeman's claim that "appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying the pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because it did not specifically charge felony murder"); see also Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 964 (Fla.1997) ("We have repeatedly rejected claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to pursue a felony murder theory when the indictment gave no notice of the theory."). | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Stategreen1 sentence2000However, self-defense is not legally available "to a person who `[i]s attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony.'" Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553, 560 (Fla.1999) (quoting Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 803 (Fla.1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2000However, self-defense is not legally available "to a person who `[i]s attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony.'" Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553, 560 (Fla.1999) (quoting Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 803 (Fla.1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen1 sentence1991See Robinson v. State, 393 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (if a trial court's order is sustainable under any theory revealed by the record on appeal, notwithstanding that it may have been entered for erroneous reasons, the order will be affirmed). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith
red
2 sentences2006The FRFRA was enacted as a result of the decision by the United States Supreme Court that changed the standard for evaluating claims filed pursuant to the Free *53 Exercise Clause. [6] In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) ( Smith II ), the Supreme Court addressed the effect of peyote use during religious services upon the right of discharged employees to collect unemployment benefits. 2006The FRFRA was enacted as a result of the decision by the United States Supreme Court that changed the standard for evaluating claims filed pursuant to the Free *53 Exercise Clause. [6] In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) ( Smith II ), the Supreme Court addressed the effect of peyote use during religious services upon the right of discharged employees to collect unemployment benefits. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Amente v. Newman
green
1 sentence2002Cedars relies on Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995), to argue that the plaintiff's discovery request violates the privacy rights of their non party psychiatric patients. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
green
1 sentence1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In re Bers
green
1 sentence1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Greene v. Massey
green
1 sentence1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Dixon
green
1 sentence1990When defense counsel initially objected to the instruction on this factor, the trial judge agreed to modify the instruction based on the language of State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 , 94 S.Ct. 1950 , 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Teffeteller v. State
green
1 sentence1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Arbuckle v. Scott
green
1 sentence1990When defense counsel initially objected to the instruction on this factor, the trial judge agreed to modify the instruction based on the language of State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 , 94 S.Ct. 1950 , 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hutchinson v. Warden
green
1 sentence1990When defense counsel initially objected to the instruction on this factor, the trial judge agreed to modify the instruction based on the language of State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 , 94 S.Ct. 1950 , 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Maynard v. Cartwright
green
2 sentences1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). 1990However, there was no objection to the comment, and its potential for prejudice falls far short of the circumstances which required this Court to reverse for a new sentencing proceeding in Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 , 104 S.Ct. 1430 , 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). [2] Next, we turn to Freeman's claim that the jury instruction on the aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.