concept waiver (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
← Pennsylvania issues

concept waiver in Pennsylvania

49 Pennsylvania opinions name it 10 courts 1956–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (26)

CaseFollowedCited
Moore v. Mooregreen
pa · 1993 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2001–2026
2 sentences

2026See Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (Pa. 1993) (holding that “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the [c]ourt”); see also Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 425 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that “[w]e cannot allow the procedural aspects of custody matters to take precedence over the welfare of the child, therefore, a custody [o]rder is a final, appealable [o]rder, reviewable by this Court without any intervening procedures, such as exceptions, being neces

2013In doing so, the Supreme Court highlighted the inapplicability of post-trial motions in custody matters, stating “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court.” Id. at 25 , 634 A.2d at 166 -67 (citing Seger v. Seger, 377 Pa.Super. 391 , 547 A.2d 424 (1988)).

35
Seger v. Segergreen
pa · 1988 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1993–2026
2 sentences

2026See Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (Pa. 1993) (holding that “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the [c]ourt”); see also Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 425 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that “[w]e cannot allow the procedural aspects of custody matters to take precedence over the welfare of the child, therefore, a custody [o]rder is a final, appealable [o]rder, reviewable by this Court without any intervening procedures, such as exceptions, being neces

2013In doing so, the Supreme Court highlighted the inapplicability of post-trial motions in custody matters, stating “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court.” Id. at 25 , 634 A.2d at 166 -67 (citing Seger v. Seger, 377 Pa.Super. 391 , 547 A.2d 424 (1988)).

14
Commonwealth v. Holmesgreen
pa · 1978 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1981–1999
2 sentences

1981As this Court stated in Holmes, “To place the responsibility upon appellant to expedite the indictment procedure, over which he had no control, or responsibility, would distort the concept of waiver.” 480 Pa. at 541-42 , 391 A.2d at 1018 .

1981As this Court stated in Holmes, “To place the responsibility upon appellant to expedite the indictment procedure, over which he had no control, or responsibility, would distort the concept of waiver.” 480 Pa. at 541-42 , 391 A.2d at 1018 .

13
In Re Schmidtgreen
pa · 1981 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1999–2000
2 sentences

2000Consistent with this concept is the requirement that the least restriction consistent with adequate treatment or required care shall be employed.” Id. at 96 , 429 A.2d at 636 (emphasis added); see also, 55 Pa. Code §6350.11 .

2000Consistent with this concept is the requirement that the least restriction consistent with adequate treatment or required care shall be employed.” Id. at 96 , 429 A.2d at 636 (emphasis added); see also, 55 Pa. Code §6350.11 .

12
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Board of Revision of Taxesgreen
pa · 2003 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018SEPTA, 833 A.2d at 713 (emphasis added). 17 .

11
Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardfs Family Markets, Inc.green
pa · 2012 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018See Black's Law Dictionary 836 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "hearing" as "[a] judicial session ... held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying," and noting that the term has been used in equity practice as a synonym for trial). 14 The New Life Evangelistic Church panel derived its focus on the "hallmarks of trial" from this Court's decision in Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc. , 617 Pa. 265 , 52 A.3d 1233 (2012).

2018See Black's Law Dictionary 836 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "hearing" as "[a] judicial session ... held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying," and noting that the term has been used in equity practice as a synonym for trial). 14 The New Life Evangelistic Church panel derived its focus on the "hallmarks of trial" from this Court's decision in Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc. , 617 Pa. 265 , 52 A.3d 1233 (2012).

11
Doe v. Raezergreen
pasuperct · 1995 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag

11
Wing v. COM., UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REV.green
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Bd. of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 117 , 436 A.2d 179, 181 (1981). 5 Finally, we reject Providers’ due process argument.

2013Bd. of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 117 , 436 A.2d 179, 181 (1981). 5 Finally, we reject Providers’ due process argument.

11
Taylor v. City of Philadelphiagreen
pacommwct · 1997 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Sanction for the Discovery Violation Zauflik also contends that the trial court erred by only imposing a sanction in the amount of $5,000 for District’s discovery violation involving the excess policy, when it should have struck the defense of the immunity of the Tort Claims Act altogether. 32 Zauflik maintains that trial courts possess the power to strike a local political subdivision’s reliance on the Tort Claims Act as an appropriate discovery sanction, citing Taylor v. City of Philadelphia, 692 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (stating that sanctions are procedural in nature, not substantive

11
Sahutsky v. Mychak, Geckle & Welker, P.C.green
pasuperct · 2006 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Zauflik further argues that, even where only a single discovery violation has occurred, the trial court may impose a sanction “in order to effectuate the orderly administration of justice and processing of cases [and] actual prejudice need not be shown,” relying on Sahutsky v. Mychak, Geckle & Welker, P.C., 900 A.2d 866, 869 (Pa.Super.2006) (imposing the sanction of non pros and noting that a finding of willfulness or prejudice is no longer required per the amendment to Rule 4019 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure).

11
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur

2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur

11
Gaster v. Township of Nether Providencegreen
pacommwct · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See id. at 289-90 , 638 A.2d at 468 (holding that, although the record of a zoning hearing was closed to further substantive evidence, a later board meeting at which counsel offered oral argument constituted the final hearing for purposes of Section 908(9)); see also Gaster v. Township of Nether Providence , *Page 424 124 Pa. Cmwlth. 595 , 601 , 556 A.2d 947 , 949-50 (1989) (holding that the term "hearing" includes specially scheduled sessions for argument by counsel).

2007See id. at 289-90 , 638 A.2d at 468 (holding that, although the record of a zoning hearing was closed to further substantive evidence, a later board meeting at which counsel offered oral argument constituted the final hearing for purposes of Section 908(9)); see also Gaster v. Township of Nether Providence, 124 Pa. *424 Cmwlth. 595, 601, 556 A.2d 947, 949-50 (1989) (holding that the term “hearing” includes specially scheduled sessions for argument by counsel).

11
Hogan, Lepore & Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Boardgreen
pacommwct · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007In this regard, the common pleas court relied on Hogan, Lepore Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board , 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282 , 638 A.2d 464 (1994), as support for the proposition that the concept of a hearing, for purposes of Section 908, is not limited to a proceeding in which a zoning hearing board receives substantive evidence.

2007In this regard, the common pleas court relied on Hogan, Lepore Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board , 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282 , 638 A.2d 464 (1994), as support for the proposition that the concept of a hearing, for purposes of Section 908, is not limited to a proceeding in which a zoning hearing board receives substantive evidence.

11
cluster 769628green
ca3 · 2000 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005See id.

11
Shaner v. State System of Higher Educationgreen
pactcompldauphi · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
Nicholson v. Combsgreen
pa · 1997 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002See e.g., Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 34 , 703 A.2d 407, 412 (1997) (one parent cannot bargain away his or her children’s right to support from the other parent); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25 , 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1993) (in child custody cases, “the concept of waiver would be inappropriate ... where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court”); Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa.Super.2001) (purpose of Pa.R.C.P.2039(a), requiring court approval of compromise, settlement or discontinuance of any actions to which a minor is a party, is to prevent settlements tha

2002See e.g., Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 34 , 703 A.2d 407, 412 (1997) (one parent cannot bargain away his or her children’s right to support from the other parent); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25 , 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1993) (in child custody cases, “the concept of waiver would be inappropriate ... where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court”); Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa.Super.2001) (purpose of Pa.R.C.P.2039(a), requiring court approval of compromise, settlement or discontinuance of any actions to which a minor is a party, is to prevent settlements tha

11
Storms Ex Rel. Storms v. O'MALLEYgreen
pasuperct · 2001 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
Moon Area School District v. Garzonygreen
pa · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Commonwealth v. Cortesgreen
pasuperct · 1995 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Commonwealth v. Wallacegreen
pasuperct · 1992 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
United States v. 23.76 Acres of Landgreen
mdd · 1963 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Commonwealth v. Muffleygreen
pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
11
Cooper v. City of Greensburggreen
pacommwct · 1976 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
11
United States v. Shermangreen
ca2 · 1948 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
11
Thomas Eugene Barfield v. United Statesgreen
ca5 · 1956 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
11
Commonwealth v. Ryhalgreen
pa · 1922 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1956–1956
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (39)

CaseCitedYears
Hebden v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 1991
2 sentences

1992Id., 142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 187, 597 A.2d at 187 .

1992Id., 142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 187, 597 A.2d at 187 .

31992–1992
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. green
pa · 1974
2 sentences

1988In that case the Supreme Court extended to unemployment compensation proceedings the concept of waiver, which it previously had applied to civil matters in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974).

1988In that case the Supreme Court extended to unemployment compensation proceedings the concept of waiver, which it previously had applied to civil matters in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974).

21976–1988
Commonwealth v. Redline green
pa · 1958
2 sentences

1967However, a very significant change in the concept of the rule of felony murder was enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A. 2d 472 (1958).

1967However, a very significant change in the concept of the rule of felony murder was enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A. 2d 472 (1958).

21963–1967
Rancosky v. Washington National Ins. Co., Aplt. green
pa · 2017
1 sentence

2025Rather, in Rancosky, our Supreme Court stated that the term “bad faith” (without reference to the term “claim”) “had acquired a particular meaning.” Rancosky, 170 A.3d at 373 . - 25 - J-A18009-25 “claim” “and there is no basis to limit its meaning”); Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 383 .

12025–2025
Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance green
pasuperct · 2002
1 sentence

2025Rather, in Rancosky, our Supreme Court stated that the term “bad faith” (without reference to the term “claim”) “had acquired a particular meaning.” Rancosky, 170 A.3d at 373 . - 25 - J-A18009-25 “claim” “and there is no basis to limit its meaning”); Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 383 .

12025–2025
Hunter Co. v. McHugh green
la · 1942
1 sentence

2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a

12020–2020
Hunter Co. v. McHugh green
scotus · 1943
2 sentences

2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a

2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a

12020–2020
Commonwealth v. Best green
pa · 1984
1 sentence

2015Id.

12015–2015
Matheny v. West Shore Country Club green
pasuperct · 1994
2 sentences

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag

12014–2014
Vogelsberger v. Magee-Womens Hospital of UPMC Health System green
pasuperct · 2006
2 sentences

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 664 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super. 1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Magee-Womens

2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag

12014–2014
Barr v. Matteo green
scotus · 1959
2 sentences

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

12011–2011
Scheuer v. Rhodes red
scotus · 1974
2 sentences

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

12011–2011
Davis v. Scherer green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi

12011–2011
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur

2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur

12007–2007
Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc. green
pasuperct · 1999
1 sentence

2002Although the concept of waiver based upon an “advice of counsel” defense can be applied with greater ease if the underlying arbitration or litigation has already been concluded, see e,g., Birth Center, supra, it is equally applicable in cases where the first-party benefits claim is still pending.

12002–2002
Gephart v. Gephart green
pasuperct · 2000
12001–2001
Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny green
pa · 1981
11997–1997
Donaldson v. Maffucci green
pa · 1959
11997–1997
Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green
pa · 1992
11997–1997
Hough v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP. green
pacommwct · 1993
11997–1997
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. green
scotus · 1982
11997–1997
Sheldon v. Sheldon green
scotus · 1982
11997–1997
Helton v. City of Burkburnett green
scotus · 1982
11997–1997
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Piper green
pacommwct · 1992
11993–1993
Kuhns v. Brugger green
pa · 1957
11992–1992
In Re Custody of Frank green
pasuperct · 1980
11988–1988
United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr. green
ca8 · 1980
11985–1985
Owensby v. United States green
scotus · 1981
11985–1985
Goolsby v. Virginia green
scotus · 1981
11985–1985
Eades v. United States green
scotus · 1981
11985–1985
Commonwealth v. Ingram green
pa · 1974
11982–1982
Commonwealth v. Stewart green
pa · 1981
11981–1981
Catherine Lake v. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital green
cadc · 1966
11981–1981
Gunter v. Gunter green
pasuperct · 1976
11980–1980
Commonwealth v. Clair green
pa · 1974
11977–1977
Commonwealth v. Mitchell green
pa · 1975
11977–1977
Johnson v. Zerbst green
scotus · 1938
11976–1976
Kaufer v. United States green
scotus · 1969
11976–1976
PENNSYLVANIA CO., ETC. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev. neutral
ca3 · 1935
11956–1956

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 50 (1952–2026) PA 49 (1956–2026) TX 42 (1975–2024) CA 34 (1963–2026) IN 30 (1979–2025) MD 29 (1979–2025) OH 28 (1963–2025) NJ 23 (1968–2024) LA 22 (1955–2024) FL 22 (1960–2025) NY 21 (1958–2025) MO 19 (1951–2024) KS 16 (1982–2021) IA 16 (1967–2022) MA 15 (1970–2020) WI 15 (1975–2023) MI 14 (1976–2025) CT 14 (1990–2026) AZ 13 (1973–2025) WY 12 (1976–2024) AL 10 (1984–2008) WV 10 (1977–2020) GA 8 (1987–2018) VA 8 (1933–2023) OK 6 (1972–2007) VT 6 (1977–2022) ME 6 (1955–2023) TN 6 (1912–2012) OR 6 (1971–2018) NM 6 (1972–2023) DE 6 (1973–2024) UT 6 (1989–2011) MN 6 (1966–2019) MS 6 (1988–2020) CO 5 (1970–2019) AR 4 (1987–2005) WA 4 (2006–2025) NC 4 (2006–2021) NV 3 (1981–2018) HI 3 (1981–2018) SC 3 (2007–2025) ND 2 (1984–1994) MT 2 (1978–1995) SD 2 (1976–2025) NH 2 (2011–2022) KY 2 (2003–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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