49 Pennsylvania opinions name it 10 courts 1956–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Mooregreen2 sentences2026See Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (Pa. 1993) (holding that “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the [c]ourt”); see also Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 425 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that “[w]e cannot allow the procedural aspects of custody matters to take precedence over the welfare of the child, therefore, a custody [o]rder is a final, appealable [o]rder, reviewable by this Court without any intervening procedures, such as exceptions, being neces 2013In doing so, the Supreme Court highlighted the inapplicability of post-trial motions in custody matters, stating “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court.” Id. at 25 , 634 A.2d at 166 -67 (citing Seger v. Seger, 377 Pa.Super. 391 , 547 A.2d 424 (1988)). | 3 | 5 |
Seger v. Segergreen2 sentences2026See Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (Pa. 1993) (holding that “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the [c]ourt”); see also Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 425 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that “[w]e cannot allow the procedural aspects of custody matters to take precedence over the welfare of the child, therefore, a custody [o]rder is a final, appealable [o]rder, reviewable by this Court without any intervening procedures, such as exceptions, being neces 2013In doing so, the Supreme Court highlighted the inapplicability of post-trial motions in custody matters, stating “post-trial motions are an unnecessary step in a custody appeal as the concept of waiver would be inappropriate in a case where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court.” Id. at 25 , 634 A.2d at 166 -67 (citing Seger v. Seger, 377 Pa.Super. 391 , 547 A.2d 424 (1988)). | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Holmesgreen2 sentences1981As this Court stated in Holmes, “To place the responsibility upon appellant to expedite the indictment procedure, over which he had no control, or responsibility, would distort the concept of waiver.” 480 Pa. at 541-42 , 391 A.2d at 1018 . 1981As this Court stated in Holmes, “To place the responsibility upon appellant to expedite the indictment procedure, over which he had no control, or responsibility, would distort the concept of waiver.” 480 Pa. at 541-42 , 391 A.2d at 1018 . | 1 | 3 |
In Re Schmidtgreen2 sentences2000Consistent with this concept is the requirement that the least restriction consistent with adequate treatment or required care shall be employed.” Id. at 96 , 429 A.2d at 636 (emphasis added); see also, 55 Pa. Code §6350.11 . 2000Consistent with this concept is the requirement that the least restriction consistent with adequate treatment or required care shall be employed.” Id. at 96 , 429 A.2d at 636 (emphasis added); see also, 55 Pa. Code §6350.11 . | 1 | 2 |
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Board of Revision of Taxesgreen1 sentence2018SEPTA, 833 A.2d at 713 (emphasis added). 17 . | 1 | 1 |
Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardfs Family Markets, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Black's Law Dictionary 836 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "hearing" as "[a] judicial session ... held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying," and noting that the term has been used in equity practice as a synonym for trial). 14 The New Life Evangelistic Church panel derived its focus on the "hallmarks of trial" from this Court's decision in Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc. , 617 Pa. 265 , 52 A.3d 1233 (2012). 2018See Black's Law Dictionary 836 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "hearing" as "[a] judicial session ... held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying," and noting that the term has been used in equity practice as a synonym for trial). 14 The New Life Evangelistic Church panel derived its focus on the "hallmarks of trial" from this Court's decision in Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc. , 617 Pa. 265 , 52 A.3d 1233 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Raezergreen2 sentences2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag 2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag | 1 | 1 |
Wing v. COM., UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REV.green2 sentences2013Bd. of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 117 , 436 A.2d 179, 181 (1981). 5 Finally, we reject Providers’ due process argument. 2013Bd. of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 117 , 436 A.2d 179, 181 (1981). 5 Finally, we reject Providers’ due process argument. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2013Sanction for the Discovery Violation Zauflik also contends that the trial court erred by only imposing a sanction in the amount of $5,000 for District’s discovery violation involving the excess policy, when it should have struck the defense of the immunity of the Tort Claims Act altogether. 32 Zauflik maintains that trial courts possess the power to strike a local political subdivision’s reliance on the Tort Claims Act as an appropriate discovery sanction, citing Taylor v. City of Philadelphia, 692 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (stating that sanctions are procedural in nature, not substantive | 1 | 1 |
Sahutsky v. Mychak, Geckle & Welker, P.C.green1 sentence2013Zauflik further argues that, even where only a single discovery violation has occurred, the trial court may impose a sanction “in order to effectuate the orderly administration of justice and processing of cases [and] actual prejudice need not be shown,” relying on Sahutsky v. Mychak, Geckle & Welker, P.C., 900 A.2d 866, 869 (Pa.Super.2006) (imposing the sanction of non pros and noting that a finding of willfulness or prejudice is no longer required per the amendment to Rule 4019 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure). | 1 | 1 |
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green2 sentences2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur 2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur | 1 | 1 |
Gaster v. Township of Nether Providencegreen2 sentences2007See id. at 289-90 , 638 A.2d at 468 (holding that, although the record of a zoning hearing was closed to further substantive evidence, a later board meeting at which counsel offered oral argument constituted the final hearing for purposes of Section 908(9)); see also Gaster v. Township of Nether Providence , *Page 424 124 Pa. Cmwlth. 595 , 601 , 556 A.2d 947 , 949-50 (1989) (holding that the term "hearing" includes specially scheduled sessions for argument by counsel). 2007See id. at 289-90 , 638 A.2d at 468 (holding that, although the record of a zoning hearing was closed to further substantive evidence, a later board meeting at which counsel offered oral argument constituted the final hearing for purposes of Section 908(9)); see also Gaster v. Township of Nether Providence, 124 Pa. *424 Cmwlth. 595, 601, 556 A.2d 947, 949-50 (1989) (holding that the term “hearing” includes specially scheduled sessions for argument by counsel). | 1 | 1 |
Hogan, Lepore & Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Boardgreen2 sentences2007In this regard, the common pleas court relied on Hogan, Lepore Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board , 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282 , 638 A.2d 464 (1994), as support for the proposition that the concept of a hearing, for purposes of Section 908, is not limited to a proceeding in which a zoning hearing board receives substantive evidence. 2007In this regard, the common pleas court relied on Hogan, Lepore Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board , 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282 , 638 A.2d 464 (1994), as support for the proposition that the concept of a hearing, for purposes of Section 908, is not limited to a proceeding in which a zoning hearing board receives substantive evidence. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 769628green1 sentence2005See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Shaner v. State System of Higher Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
Nicholson v. Combsgreen2 sentences2002See e.g., Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 34 , 703 A.2d 407, 412 (1997) (one parent cannot bargain away his or her children’s right to support from the other parent); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25 , 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1993) (in child custody cases, “the concept of waiver would be inappropriate ... where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court”); Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa.Super.2001) (purpose of Pa.R.C.P.2039(a), requiring court approval of compromise, settlement or discontinuance of any actions to which a minor is a party, is to prevent settlements tha 2002See e.g., Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 34 , 703 A.2d 407, 412 (1997) (one parent cannot bargain away his or her children’s right to support from the other parent); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25 , 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1993) (in child custody cases, “the concept of waiver would be inappropriate ... where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court”); Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa.Super.2001) (purpose of Pa.R.C.P.2039(a), requiring court approval of compromise, settlement or discontinuance of any actions to which a minor is a party, is to prevent settlements tha | 1 | 1 |
| Storms Ex Rel. Storms v. O'MALLEYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moon Area School District v. Garzonygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Cortesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wallacegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. 23.76 Acres of Landgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Muffleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. City of Greensburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Shermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas Eugene Barfield v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ryhalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hebden v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1992Id., 142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 187, 597 A.2d at 187 . 1992Id., 142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 187, 597 A.2d at 187 . | 3 | 1992–1992 |
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1988In that case the Supreme Court extended to unemployment compensation proceedings the concept of waiver, which it previously had applied to civil matters in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974). 1988In that case the Supreme Court extended to unemployment compensation proceedings the concept of waiver, which it previously had applied to civil matters in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974). | 2 | 1976–1988 |
Commonwealth v. Redline
green
2 sentences1967However, a very significant change in the concept of the rule of felony murder was enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A. 2d 472 (1958). 1967However, a very significant change in the concept of the rule of felony murder was enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A. 2d 472 (1958). | 2 | 1963–1967 |
Rancosky v. Washington National Ins. Co., Aplt.
green
1 sentence2025Rather, in Rancosky, our Supreme Court stated that the term “bad faith” (without reference to the term “claim”) “had acquired a particular meaning.” Rancosky, 170 A.3d at 373 . - 25 - J-A18009-25 “claim” “and there is no basis to limit its meaning”); Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 383 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bonenberger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Rather, in Rancosky, our Supreme Court stated that the term “bad faith” (without reference to the term “claim”) “had acquired a particular meaning.” Rancosky, 170 A.3d at 373 . - 25 - J-A18009-25 “claim” “and there is no basis to limit its meaning”); Bonenberger, 791 A.2d at 383 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hunter Co. v. McHugh
green
1 sentence2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hunter Co. v. McHugh
green
2 sentences2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a 2020The legislative branch is not similarly constrained, and if the General Assembly believes that additional measures are needed in favor of small landowners, it is in a better position to ascertain the need for such measures and to articulate their details.15 Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the concept that the rule of capture is inapplicable to drilling and hydraulic fracturing that occurs entirely within the developer’s property solely because drainage of 15See, e.g., 58 P.S. §§401-419 (Oil and Gas Conservation Law of 1961); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942) (upholding a | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Best
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Matheny v. West Shore Country Club
green
2 sentences2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag 2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Vogelsberger v. Magee-Womens Hospital of UPMC Health System
green
2 sentences2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 664 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super. 1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Magee-Womens 2014Appellant relies instead on general statements in much later cases that it is “the exclusive province of the jury” to hear evidence and decide damages in negligence cases, and broadly declares that the “right to sue governmental units for negligence includes the right to have a jury determine damages.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55 (citing Doe v. Raezer, 444 Pa.Super. 334 , 664 A.2d 102, 105 (1995) (reversing trial court’s grant of remittitur; judicial reduction of jury award appropriate only if award is plainly excessive and exorbitant) (superseded in part on other grounds by Vogelsberger v. Mag | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barr v. Matteo
green
2 sentences2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi 2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Scheuer v. Rhodes
red
2 sentences2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi 2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Davis v. Scherer
green
2 sentences2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi 2011The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all. 'The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.’ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959)), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (citations omi | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur 2007Were we to ignore the question, moreover, we would fail to "make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706-07 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (suggesting that the enhanced appellate review required by Bose Corp. applies to determinations as to public-figure versus private-figur | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Although the concept of waiver based upon an “advice of counsel” defense can be applied with greater ease if the underlying arbitration or litigation has already been concluded, see e,g., Birth Center, supra, it is equally applicable in cases where the first-party benefits claim is still pending. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Gephart v. Gephart green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Donaldson v. Maffucci green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Hough v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Sheldon v. Sheldon green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Helton v. City of Burkburnett green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Piper green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Kuhns v. Brugger green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Custody of Frank green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Owensby v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Goolsby v. Virginia green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Eades v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth v. Ingram green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Commonwealth v. Stewart green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Catherine Lake v. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Gunter v. Gunter green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Clair green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Commonwealth v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Kaufer v. United States green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| PENNSYLVANIA CO., ETC. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev. neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.