concept waiver in Texas

2009See Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004).

2009See Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004).

2024See id. (“This case lies at the intersection of dilatoriness and waiver.”); see also In re State, No. 07-21-00315-CV, 2022 WL 1462275 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 9, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

2021Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008)).

2012The concept of waiver-by-conduct stems from a footnote in the Federal Sign case, in which the Texas Supreme Court suggested that “[t]here may be circumstances where the State may waive its immunity by conduct other than simply executing a contract so that it is not always immune from suit when it contracts.” Id.; see also Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343 (quoting Federal Sign footnote); IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 862 (Hecht, J., concurring) (“I cannot absolutely foreclose the possibility that the State may waive immunity in some circumstances other than by statute.”).

2012The concept of waiver-by-conduct stems from a footnote in the Federal Sign case, in which the Texas Supreme Court suggested that "[t]here may be circumstances where the State may waive its immunity by conduct other than simply executing a contract so that it is not always immune from suit when it contracts." Id .; see also Tooke , 197 S.W.3d at 343 (quoting Federal Sign footnote); IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 862 (Hecht, J., concurring) ("I cannot absolutely foreclose the possibility that the State may waive immunity in some circumstances other than by statute.").

2012The supreme court has yet to find a particular circumstance supporting the waiver-by-conduct 6 exception to sovereign immunity that it alluded to in Federal Sign, and we decline to do so on the record before us.5 Sunset relies on a line of cases discussed in General Services Commission v. Little- Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. 2001), in support of its assertion that UTEP’s acceptance of benefits under the contract waived its immunity from suit.

2012The supreme court has yet to find a particular circumstance supporting the waiver-by-conduct exception to sovereign immunity that it alluded to in Federal Sign , and we decline to do so on the record before us. (5) Sunset relies on a line of cases discussed in General Services Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation Co. , 39 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. 2001), in support of its assertion that UTEP's acceptance of benefits under the contract waived its immunity from suit.

2006As Justice Keller remarked in her concurring opinion in Williams : A estoppel [is] distinct from waiver and > is part of the definition of what can constitute error, and quite reasonably defines error of which a party may complain as excluding those actions of the trial court actually sought by the party to the tribunal. = @ 65 S.W.3d at 658 (Keller, J., concurring); s ee also Prystash v. State , 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim.

2006As Justice Keller remarked in her concurring opinion in Williams : “estoppel [is] distinct from waiver and ‘is part of the definition of what can constitute error, and quite reasonably defines error of which a party may complain as excluding those actions of the trial court actually sought by the party to the tribunal.’ ” 65 S.W.3d at 658 (Keller, J„ concurring); see also Pry stash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (explaining in an erroneous jury charge case that there is “a crucial distinction between the rules of waiver and the law of invited error,” and that the doctrine of i

2006As Justice Keller remarked in her concurring opinion in Williams : A estoppel [is] distinct from waiver and > is part of the definition of what can constitute error, and quite reasonably defines error of which a party may complain as excluding those actions of the trial court actually sought by the party to the tribunal. = @ 65 S.W.3d at 658 (Keller, J., concurring); s ee also Prystash v. State , 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim.

2006As Justice Keller remarked in her concurring opinion in Williams : “estoppel [is] distinct from waiver and ‘is part of the definition of what can constitute error, and quite reasonably defines error of which a party may complain as excluding those actions of the trial court actually sought by the party to the tribunal.’ ” 65 S.W.3d at 658 (Keller, J„ concurring); see also Pry stash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (explaining in an erroneous jury charge case that there is “a crucial distinction between the rules of waiver and the law of invited error,” and that the doctrine of i

2003In applying the harmless-error rule, our Court of Criminal Appeals instructs that we must “focus not on the weight of the other evidence of guilt, but rather on whether the error at issue might possibly have prejudiced the jurors’ decision making.” Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587 (emphasis added).

2003In applying the harmless-error rule, our Court of Criminal Appeals instructs that we must "focus not on the weight of the other evidence of guilt, but rather on whether the error at issue might possibly have prejudiced the jurors' decision making." Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587 (emphasis added).

1996Moreover, in Boyde v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we noted the general public does not understand the concept that defense attorneys are under an ethical obligation to represent the accused regardless of their personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused.

1996Moreover, in Boyde v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we noted the general public does not understand the concept that defense attorneys are under *62 an ethical obligation to represent the accused regardless of their personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused.

2012Palladian, 165 S.W.3d at 434-35 (analyzing waiver doctrine and section 150.002 but holding that evidence did not support a finding of waiver); Ustanik v. Nortex Found.

2012Palladian , 165 S.W.3d at 434–35 (analyzing waiver doctrine and section 150.002 but holding that evidence did not support a finding of waiver); Ustanik v. Nortex Found.

2008Hexter v. Pratt , 283 S.W. 653 , 654 B 59 (Tex. Civ.

2008Hexter v. Pratt, 283 S.W. 653, 654-59 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1926), aff'd, 10 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Comm’n App.1928, judgm’t adopted).

2013See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (explaining that Texas applies “futility rule,” meaning that despite trial court’s ruling that evidence is admissible, party must keep making futile objections on pain of waiver); Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (“[I]t is well settled that an error in admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection; defense counsel must object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered.”).

2013See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (explaining that Texas applies “futility rule,” meaning that despite trial court’s ruling that evidence is admissible, party must keep making futile objections on pain of waiver); Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (“[I]t is well settled that an error in admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection; defense counsel must object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered.”).

2004Comm’n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 72 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 893 S.W.2d 504 (1995) (referring generally to the concept of immunity founded on the principle that “the king can do no wrong”).

2004Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 72 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 893 S.W.2d 504 (1995) (referring generally to the concept of immunity founded on the principle that "the king can do no wrong").

2002See Kinnear v. Tex. Comm’n on Human Rights, 14 S.W.3d 299, 300 (Tex.2000).

1998See Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (observing that Court has held that defendant's testimony waives error and that defendant's testimony makes error harmless).

1998See Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (observing that Court has held that defendant’s testimony waives error and that defendant’s testimony makes error harmless).

1998See id.

1998See id.