6 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blevins v. Johnson Countygreen1 sentence2012We have stated that “another kind of notice occupying what amounts to a middle ground between constructive notice and actual notice is recognized as inquiry notice.” Blevins v. Johnson Cnty., 746 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tenn.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Caruthers v. Stategreen1 sentence1995Our research has revealed no reported Tennessee case dealing directly with the issue of the appropriate standard to apply when determining whether an issue has been waived. 17 Courts in other states have split on whether to apply a subjective or objective standard and provide us little assistance because their decisions were based largely on the particular state statutory procedure. 18 However, Tennessee cases dealing generally with the concept of waiver in the post-conviction context apply an objective standard and impute the conduct of counsel to their clients. 19 See e.g., Caruthers v. Stat | 1 | 1 |
Powers v. McKenziegreen2 sentences1987“Manifestly, a trial Judge must have some control over the dispatch of business in his court, and some discretion respecting the number of witnesses he will hear upon a specific line of inquiry incident to a case.” Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, 182 , 16 S.W. 559, 562 (1891). 1987“Manifestly, a trial Judge must have some control over the dispatch of business in his court, and some discretion respecting the number of witnesses he will hear upon a specific line of inquiry incident to a case.” Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, 182 , 16 S.W. 559, 562 (1891). | 1 | 1 |
Tompsett v. State of Ohiogreen1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bishop
neutral
1 sentence1995Our research has revealed no reported Tennessee case dealing directly with the issue of the appropriate standard to apply when determining whether an issue has been waived. 17 Courts in other states have split on whether to apply a subjective or objective standard and provide us little assistance because their decisions were based largely on the particular state statutory procedure. 18 However, Tennessee cases dealing generally with the concept of waiver in the post-conviction context apply an objective standard and impute the conduct of counsel to their clients. 19 See e.g., Caruthers v. Stat | 1 | 1995–1995 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences1988To determine the waiver issue, Tennessee adheres to the totality of circumstances test as stated in the case of North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), at 374-75, 99 S.Ct. at 1758 : *432 The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. 1988To determine the waiver issue, Tennessee adheres to the totality of circumstances test as stated in the case of North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), at 374-75, 99 S.Ct. at 1758 : *432 The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
James Anderson and Fad Williams v. William H. Bannan, Warden
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Roosevelt Mitchell v. United States
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Charles Robert O'Malley v. United States
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Powers v. Rhay
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Granieri v. California
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
St. John v. Stubblefield
green
2 sentences1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this 1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Tompsett v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1969D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, 789-791 , cert. denied, 358 *458 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81 , 3 L.Ed.2d 86 ; O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 , C.A. 6th; Anderson v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 , C.A. 6th.’ “In Tompsett v. State of Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (C.A. 6), cert denied, 324 U.S. 869 , 65 S.Ct. 916 , 89 L.Ed. 1424 , a case involving employed counsel, this court said: ‘The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a fortiorari will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * ‘The concept of this | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Denegre v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences1912In Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill., 113 , 73 N. E., 409 , 105 Am. 1912In Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill., 113 , 73 N. E., 409 , 105 Am. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.