concept waiver in Florida

2023In fact, the Tooley court itself “expressly disapprove[d] . . . the concept that a claim is necessarily derivative if it affects all stockholders equally.” Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1039 .

2023The court held that “a direct, individual 14 claim of stockholders that does not depend on harm to the corporation can also fall on all stockholders equally, without the claim thereby becoming a derivative claim.” Id.

2022Co., 183 So. 3d 1052 , 1062–64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (explaining attorney-client privilege waived when one party challenges settlement by asserting that counsel had no authority to settle))).

2018The majority correctly points out that waiver “is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, or conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071 , 1077 n.12 (Fla. 2001) (emphasis added).

2001The concept of waiver was originally explained in our decision in Bowles v. Singletary , 698 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1997).

1998The trial court apparently agreed with Hyundai's position that the two theories are duplicative, as it instructed the jury on the estate's failure-to-warn claim only with reference to the law of negligence. [3] Under the theory of strict products liability adopted in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976), a product may be defective by virtue of a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or an inadequate warning.

1990The Florida Supreme Court said in Ray that if Ray's attorney had requested the erroneous instruction (improper instruction on a lesser included offense) the court could have upheld the conviction on the basis of waiver or invited error. [4] It cited to Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1978), abrogated by State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), which holds that defense counsel must object to prosecutorial comment on a defendant's right to remain silent.

1990The Florida Supreme Court said in Ray that if Ray's attorney had requested the erroneous instruction (improper instruction on a lesser included offense) the court could have upheld the conviction on the basis of waiver or invited error. [4] It cited to Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1978), abrogated by State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), which holds that defense counsel must object to prosecutorial comment on a defendant's right to remain silent.

1990The concept of waiver occurring because trial counsel requests the later-found-to-be faulty instruction was suggested in Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1981).

1990The cases all reflect a recurring theme: the employer’s knowledge of the claimant’s condition and of the fact that benefits were being provided by a specific health care provider; its acquiescence in the treatment, and its disavowal of its responsibility to furnish medical benefits because of a violation of the reporting provisions. 455 So.2d at 1100-1101 .

1987Story v. First National Bank & Trust Company In Orlando, 115 Fla. 436 , 156 So. 101 (1934).

1987Story v. First National Bank & Trust Company In Orlando, 115 Fla. 436 , 156 So. 101 (1934).

1985See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 , 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1205 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).

1985See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 , 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1205 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).

1985See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 , 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1205 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 , 99 S.Ct. 2014 , 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979).

1981As stated by this court in Phillips v. State, supra ( 177 So.2d at 245 ): To extend the concept of immunity from unreasonable search and seizure so as to prohibit the search of any property included in a fenced area in which a dwelling may be located without having first obtained a search warrant, would extend the protection afforded by the Constitution to an absurdity. [11] Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed are AFFIRMED.

1972Ever since the Carroll case in 1925, decided by the United States Supreme Court (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 ), the legal distinction between search of a moving automobile and other species of searches has been clearly demarcated." (Emphasis added.) This distinction is further illustrated in Cameron v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 112 So.2d 864 , at 873: "As a necessary and proper evolution of the living law to meet the changing needs of society, the modern trend of authority is to narrow the concept of immunity against searches and seizures when it involves a

1972Ever since the Carroll case in 1925, decided by the United States Supreme Court (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 ), the legal distinction between search of a moving automobile and other species of searches has been clearly demarcated." (Emphasis added.) This distinction is further illustrated in Cameron v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 112 So.2d 864 , at 873: "As a necessary and proper evolution of the living law to meet the changing needs of society, the modern trend of authority is to narrow the concept of immunity against searches and seizures when it involves a

1972This trend is reflected by the acceptance of less compelling facts and circumstances than formerly required to constitute `probable cause' for an arrest of the driver or occupant, or for search of the vehicle and seizure of property found therein without supporting warrants." In Draper v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 307 , at page 313, 79 S.Ct. 329 , at page 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 , the Supreme Court of the United States in discussing "probable cause" commented: "In dealing with probable cause, * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.

1972This trend is reflected by the acceptance of less compelling facts and circumstances than formerly required to constitute `probable cause' for an arrest of the driver or occupant, or for search of the vehicle and seizure of property found therein without supporting warrants." In Draper v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 307 , at page 313, 79 S.Ct. 329 , at page 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 , the Supreme Court of the United States in discussing "probable cause" commented: "In dealing with probable cause, * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.

1969In Gorman v. United States, 1 Cir.1967, 380 F.2d 158 , the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit rejected the view proposed by the defendant that specific warnings are a condition precedent to a consent to a warrantless search.

1968This concept was originated in the case of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944), 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333 .

1968This concept was originated in the case of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944), 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , 88 L.Ed. 333 .

1965In Pegueno v. State, 85 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956), the Florida Supreme Court observed, in the light of United States v. Seiler, D.C.