concept rule in Connecticut

1997“Inherent in the concept of waiver is the notion of assent, which is an act of understanding that presupposes that the party to be affected has knowledge of its rights but does not want to assert them.” Fisette v. DiPietro, 28 Conn. App. 379, 385 , 611 A.2d 417 (1992).

1997“Inherent in the concept of waiver is the notion of assent, which is an act of understanding that presupposes that the party to be affected has knowledge of its rights but does not want to assert them.” Fisette v. DiPietro, 28 Conn. App. 379, 385 , 611 A.2d 417 (1992).

2017Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own [c]onstitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler , 321 Conn. 375 , 378, 140 A.3d 811 (2016) ; see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833 , 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1992) ; see also George v. Ericson , 250 Conn. 312 , 318, 736 A.2d 889 (1999) ("Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception

2017Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own [c]onstitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler , 321 Conn. 375 , 378, 140 A.3d 811 (2016) ; see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833 , 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1992) ; see also George v. Ericson , 250 Conn. 312 , 318, 736 A.2d 889 (1999) ("Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception

2026This provi- sion was promulgated in 1946 “to avoid exclusionary constructions [of rule 24 (b) when] . . . public officials seek permission to intervene, and the amendment in effect expands the concept of claim or defense12 insofar as intervention by a governmental officer or agency is concerned.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 , 704–705 (D.C.

2026This provi- sion was promulgated in 1946 “to avoid exclusionary constructions [of rule 24 (b) when] . . . public officials seek permission to intervene, and the amendment in effect expands the concept of claim or defense12 insofar as intervention by a governmental officer or agency is concerned.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 704–705 (D.C.

2018Strickland [v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984) ] introduces the concept of presumption of prejudice, which Cronic later refines....

2018Strickland [v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984) ] introduces the concept of presumption of prejudice, which Cronic later refines....

2017The court reiterated that, with respect to Golding and the concept of waiver, "[a] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party ... or that the alleged constitutional violation ... exists and ... deprived the defendant of a fair trial ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 467, 10 A.3d 942 .

2016"While stare decisis is not an inexorable command ... particularly when we are interpreting the [c]onstitution ... even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).

2016"While stare decisis is not an inexorable command ... particularly when we are interpreting the [c]onstitution ... even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).

1998The defendant failed to raise this claim at trial and now seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 9 or, alternatively, under the plain error doctrine.

1998The defendant failed to raise this claim at trial and now seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), 9 or, alternatively, under the plain error doctrine.

1992Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972). “ ‘Waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable so to do.’ ” Id.

1992Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 562 , 316 A.2d 394 (1972). “ ‘Waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable so to do.’ ” Id.

1990In First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co. v. Arba, Inc., 170 Conn. 168 , at 174-175 (1976), the court stated the concept that the doctrine of estoppel could be applied in circumstances of fraud.

1990"When the Statute of Frauds is pleaded (as a defense) the doctrine may be applied to prevent the use of that statute to accomplish a fraud." Id. citing Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507 , 515 (1938).

1990"When the Statute of Frauds is pleaded (as a defense) the doctrine may be applied to prevent the use of that statute to accomplish a fraud." Id. citing Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507 , 515 (1938).

1990While Helbig v. Zoning Commission, 185 Conn. 294 , 299 , 300 , dealt with a different legal issue, it supports the concept that a challenge to enforcement of zoning regulations can be made in an administrative appeal on grounds of estoppel, particularly where the same issue is likely to arise in future proceedings.