Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
49 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2026 25 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2025See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 . 2019Within the framework of the Jackson sufficiency standard, the corpus delecti rule requires only that evidence independent of the extrajudicial confession show “that the ‘essential nature’ of the charged crime was committed by someone.” Id. | 26 | 27 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912-13, 926-28 . [4] We are bound to follow the Brooks majority holding, and we, therefore, apply the Jackson sufficiency standard of review to complaints styled as legal or factual sufficiency challenges concerning the elements of a criminal offense. 2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912-13, 926-28 . 4 We are bound to follow the Brooks majority holding, and we, therefore, apply the Jackson sufficiency standard of review to complaints styled as legal or factual sufficiency challenges concerning the elements of a criminal offense. | 9 | 9 |
Ervin v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902, 912 ; see also Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). 2020See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902, 912 ; see also Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). | 3 | 5 |
Hooper v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16 (noting that inference stacking is not inappropriate in a Jackson sufficiency analysis “as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. . . . [and not] based on mere speculation”).7 Second, in addition to this substantial circumstantial evidence, the jury also heard Detective Lewellyn’s account of the inmate, Bendy’s, claim that Appellant had confessed specifically “to being a party to this aggravated robbery.” While this constitutes hearsay on at least one level, Appellant did not object to it at trial. 2012See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16 (explaining the Jackson sufficiency standard allows the fact-finder to make reasonable inferences from the evidence); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Schmutz v. Stategreen1 sentence2023However, “an allegation of improper venue does not implicate the Jackson sufficiency standard.” Calhoun v. State, No. 13-13-00412-CR, 2014 WL 4401528 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 29, 2014, no pet.) (citing Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). | 1 | 1 |
Nilda Iliana Rodriguez v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Id. at 507-08. 10 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals did not cite Jackson or recite the familiar Jackson sufficiency standard, the court’s holding expressly turned on the “evidence presented at trial.” Id. at 507-08 (referencing and agreeing with lower court’s dissent); Rodriguez I, 408 S.W.3d at 637 n.2, 638 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (clarifying reliance on the hypothetically correct jury charge). 2022See id. at 632-34. | 1 | 1 |
Clayton v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16 (explaining the Jackson sufficiency standard allows the fact-finder to make reasonable inferences from the evidence); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Clewis v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 438 . | 1 | 1 |
Crouch v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Crouch, 858 S.W.2d at 601 . 1994See Crouch, 858 S.W.2d at 601 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adkinsgreen2 sentences1994Conversely, however, we cannot conceive of any sufficient, i.e., rational, verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that would be “manifestly unjust and clearly wrong.” Furthermore, even if such a verdict is theoretically possible, we agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which under similar circumstances stated, “We find the weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal cases.” Tennessee v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn.1990) (quoting Tennessee v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tenn.1985)). 21 Likewise, we agree with t 1994Conversely, however, we cannot conceive of any sufficient, i.e., rational, verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that would be "manifestly unjust and clearly wrong." Furthermore, even if such a verdict is theoretically possible, we agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which under similar circumstances stated, "We find the weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal cases." Tennessee v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn.1990) (quoting Tennessee v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tenn.1985)). [21] Likewise, we agree with | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsonyellow2 sentences1994Conversely, however, we cannot conceive of any sufficient, i.e., rational, verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that would be “manifestly unjust and clearly wrong.” Furthermore, even if such a verdict is theoretically possible, we agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which under similar circumstances stated, “We find the weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal cases.” Tennessee v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn.1990) (quoting Tennessee v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tenn.1985)). 21 Likewise, we agree with t 1994Conversely, however, we cannot conceive of any sufficient, i.e., rational, verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that would be "manifestly unjust and clearly wrong." Furthermore, even if such a verdict is theoretically possible, we agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which under similar circumstances stated, "We find the weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal cases." Tennessee v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn.1990) (quoting Tennessee v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tenn.1985)). [21] Likewise, we agree with | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. State
green
1 sentence2026For result-oriented offenses, such as injury to a disabled individual, the manner and means is not included in the hypothetically correct charge and consequently “should be disregarded in a Jackson sufficiency analysis.” Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308 , 326-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 2. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Clewis v. State
red
1 sentence2026Application As we have said, we will analyze Appellant’s sufficiency arguments only under the Jackson legal sufficiency standard.9 See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Zuniga v. State
green
1 sentence2021Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729 , 732–33 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Jacob Matthew Kiffe v. State
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wawrykow v. State
green
2 sentences2018The court also noted that the penal code’s definition of “bodily injury” is “purposefully broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere offensive touching.” Id. 2018But the court pointed out that under the Jackson sufficiency standard, “juries are free to use their common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when giving effect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 99 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Keller v. State
green
1 sentence2015Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600 , 604- 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2003), pet. dism’d as improvidently granted, 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Keller, Stephen Philip
green
1 sentence2015Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600 , 604- 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 30, 2003), pet. dism’d as improvidently granted, 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Malik v. State
green
2 sentences2001We viewed “the Benson/Boozer rule [as] inherently at odds with the purpose of the Jackson sufficiency standard.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239 . 2001We viewed "the Benson/Boozer rule [as] inherently at odds with the purpose of the Jackson sufficiency standard." Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Moreno v. State
green
2 sentences1989The irony is the Combs decision was a full three years after that standard had been "expressly abandoned." See Moreno, 755 S.W.2d at 870-872 . 1989The irony is the Combs decision was a full three years after that standard had been “expressly abandoned.” See Moreno, 755 S.W.2d at 870-872 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.