impartial hearing in Maryland

2006With respect to the OAH, to which adjudicating responsibility is delegated, in Anderson v. Department of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187 , 623 A.2d 198 (1993), Judge Orth adverted to the establishment of the Office of Administrative Hearings in 1989 and then explained the salutary effect of making available to a complainant “an impartial hearing officer” rather than a hearing officer “under the control of the agency” with the possibly resultant appearance of “unfairness or bias.” *382 One of the main objectives of the Legislature in establishing the OAH was to provide an impartial hearing officer i

2006With respect to the OAH, to which adjudicating responsibility is delegated, in Anderson v. Department of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187 , 623 A.2d 198 (1993), Judge Orth adverted to the establishment of the Office of Administrative Hearings in 1989 and then explained the salutary effect of making available to a complainant “an impartial hearing officer” rather than a hearing officer “under the control of the agency” with the possibly resultant appearance of “unfairness or bias.” *382 One of the main objectives of the Legislature in establishing the OAH was to provide an impartial hearing officer i

2021J.H., 233 Md.

1994The only support provided by Manders is the cryptic allegation that “the trial court’s view on [appellees’] ‘immunity’ as individuals for acts as public officials clearly suggested that it was impossible for [Manders] to receive an impartial hearing on [appellees’] motion to dismiss, given that [Manders’s] claims concerned the actions of the [appellees] in their official capacity and sought to hold them liable in their individual capacity.” In Jeffersoro-El, the Court of Appeals stated that, in determining whether the trial judge created the appearance of impropriety, “the test is an objective

1994The only support provided by Manders is the cryptic allegation that “the trial court’s view on [appellees’] ‘immunity’ as individuals for acts as public officials clearly suggested that it was impossible for [Manders] to receive an impartial hearing on [appellees’] motion to dismiss, given that [Manders’s] claims concerned the actions of the [appellees] in their official capacity and sought to hold them liable in their individual capacity.” In Jeffersoro-El, the Court of Appeals stated that, in determining whether the trial judge created the appearance of impropriety, “the test is an objective

1994The only support provided by Manders is the cryptic allegation that “the trial court’s view on [appellees’] ‘immunity’ as individuals for acts as public officials clearly suggested that it was impossible for [Manders] to receive an impartial hearing on [appellees’] motion to dismiss, given that [Manders’s] claims concerned the actions of the [appellees] in their official capacity and sought to hold them liable in their individual capacity.” In Jeffersoro-El, the Court of Appeals stated that, in determining whether the trial judge created the appearance of impropriety, “the test is an objective

1994The only support provided by Manders is the cryptic allegation that “the trial court’s view on [appellees’] ‘immunity’ as individuals for acts as public officials clearly suggested that it was impossible for [Manders] to receive an impartial hearing on [appellees’] motion to dismiss, given that [Manders’s] claims concerned the actions of the [appellees] in their official capacity and sought to hold them liable in their individual capacity.” In Jeffersoro-El, the Court of Appeals stated that, in determining whether the trial judge created the appearance of impropriety, “the test is an objective

1993Id. (citations omitted). 2 One of the main objectives of the Legislature in establishing the OAH was to provide an impartial hearing officer in contested cases.

1958(This is a motion to strike, not a motion under Rule 744 b of the Maryland Rules under which the sentence in bastardy or certain other types of cases may be reduced, changed, modified or suspended.) Judge Cullen held that under Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 434 , 109 A. 2d 96 , he had no power after the term at which Carr had been convicted to determine whether any witness testified falsely at the trial, or to correct any issue of fact, which had been adjudicated, even though wrongly determined.

1958(This is a motion to strike, not a motion under Rule 744 b of the Maryland Rules under which the sentence in bastardy or certain other types of cases may be reduced, changed, modified or suspended.) Judge Cullen held that under Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 434 , 109 A. 2d 96 , he had no power after the term at which Carr had been convicted to determine whether any witness testified falsely at the trial, or to correct any issue of fact, which had been adjudicated, even though wrongly determined.