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35 California opinions name it 3 courts 1935–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Horwath v. City of East Palo Altogreen2 sentences2024It would threaten that core tenet if one person who did not like the election result could hire lawyers and with ease could invalidate an expression of popular will.” ( Owens, supra, at p.124 .) “A litigant cannot simply intone the words ‘due process.’” (Kerr, supra, at p. 934.) California courts “‘have recognized the “possibility” that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate “that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election.”’” (Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505 , 512 (Jobs 2023California courts “ ‘have recognized the “possibility” that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate “that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the 21 election.” ’ ” (Jobs & Housing, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 512.) When there is an allegation that there are omissions, inaccuracies, or misleading statements in the ballot materials, due process “ ‘depend[s] on whether the materials, in light of other circumstances of the election, were so inaccurate or misleading as to prevent the voters from making informed choices. | 2 | 9 |
PEOPLE EX REL. KERR v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences2024It would threaten that core tenet if one person who did not like the election result could hire lawyers and with ease could invalidate an expression of popular will.” ( Owens, supra, at p.124 .) “A litigant cannot simply intone the words ‘due process.’” (Kerr, supra, at p. 934.) California courts “‘have recognized the “possibility” that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate “that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election.”’” (Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505 , 512 (Jobs 2024It would threaten that core tenet if one person who did not like the election result could hire lawyers and with ease could invalidate an expression of popular will.” ( Owens, supra, at p.124 .) “A litigant cannot simply intone the words ‘due process.’” (Kerr, supra, at p. 934.) California courts “‘have recognized the “possibility” that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate “that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election.”’” (Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505 , 512 (Jobs | 2 | 5 |
Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madregreen2 sentences2024It would threaten that core tenet if one person who did not like the election result could hire lawyers and with ease could invalidate an expression of popular will.” ( Owens, supra, at p.124 .) “A litigant cannot simply intone the words ‘due process.’” (Kerr, supra, at p. 934.) California courts “‘have recognized the “possibility” that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate “that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election.”’” (Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505 , 512 (Jobs 2021The provisions of the Elections Code “do [not] provide a statutory bases ‘to attack the outcome of an election based on deficiencies in the impartial analysis’ of a ballot measure after the election,” as “[e]nforcing the requirements for an impartial analysis of a ballot is a preelection activity.” (Denny v. Arntz (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 914 , 921; accord, Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 192 .) While postelection challenges to ballot materials cannot be brought under the Elections Code, “California appellate courts have recognized the ‘possibility’ that an | 2 | 4 |
Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020(See Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1426 [preelection petitions for writs of mandate to address false or misleading statements]; 5We note that courts have recognized “the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election,’ ” but Denny does not raise any such claim here. 2020(See Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1426 [preelection petitions for writs of mandate to address false or misleading statements]; 5We note that courts have recognized “the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election,’ ” but Denny does not raise any such claim here. | 2 | 3 |
McDonough v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020(Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123 .) 10 McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1173 [preelection writ of mandate challenging ballot title and question].) Finally, even if Denny could rely on section 16100, subdivision (c) as a basis to challenge the ballot measure, Denny does not allege the defendants’ actions affected the election results for Proposition A as required for ballot measure election contests under section 16100, subdivision (c). 2020(Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123 .) 10 McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1173 [preelection writ of mandate challenging ballot title and question].) Finally, even if Denny could rely on section 16100, subdivision (c) as a basis to challenge the ballot measure, Denny does not allege the defendants’ actions affected the election results for Proposition A as required for ballot measure election contests under section 16100, subdivision (c). | 2 | 2 |
AMADOR VALLEY JT. UN. HIGH SCH. v. State Bd. of Equal.green2 sentences1990Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ].) However, in this instance the two word changes and one deletion did nothing to significantly alter the meaning of the impartial analysis. 1990Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ].) However, in this instance the two word changes and one deletion did nothing to significantly alter the meaning of the impartial analysis. | 2 | 2 |
Owens v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2025“Although the California appellate courts have recognized the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election’ [citation], no California appellate court, to our knowledge, has invalidated an election on this basis. [¶] The courts have set a ‘very high’ bar [citation] for litigants to successfully mount a postelection due process challenge to a ballot measure . . . .” (Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123 , fn. omitted (Owens 2025“Although the California appellate courts have recognized the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election’ [citation], no California appellate court, to our knowledge, has invalidated an election on this basis. [¶] The courts have set a ‘very high’ bar [citation] for litigants to successfully mount a postelection due process challenge to a ballot measure . . . .” (Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123 , fn. omitted (Owens | 1 | 8 |
Doyle v. City of Chinogreen2 sentences2022(Gray, at p. 632.) This court concluded that the police chief “has thus far failed to establish good cause to recuse the city council.” (Ibid.; see Dole v. City of Chino (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 673 , 682–684 [city council was appropriate body to hearing police chief’s appeal].) Similarly, on the record presented in this appeal, we cannot conclude the city council is a biased decision maker unable to provide an impartial hearing of the administrative appeal. 2022(Gray, at p. 632.) This court concluded that the police chief “has thus far failed to establish good cause to recuse the city council.” (Ibid.; see Dole v. City of Chino (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 673 , 682–684 [city council was appropriate body to hearing police chief’s appeal].) Similarly, on the record presented in this appeal, we cannot conclude the city council is a biased decision maker unable to provide an impartial hearing of the administrative appeal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kellygreen1 sentence2014(Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 279-284 ; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 ; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124 .) Appellant contends he could not get an impartial hearing on the motion to suppress when his lawyer had him waive his rights and submit the motion on the police report because he “had no idea” what was going on and that he was “giving up so much,” and he only agreed to the waiver because his attorney told him to. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences2006(See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 806 P.2d 1360 ] [considering ballot pamphlet arguments in interpreting scope of proposition].) Accordingly, we reject appellant’s interpretation of the Resolution’s exhibits and conclude *1190 that exhibit B to the Resolution properly included the list of specific school facilities projects as well as the remaining accountability requirements. 2006(See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 806 P.2d 1360 ] [considering ballot pamphlet arguments in interpreting scope of proposition].) Accordingly, we reject appellant’s interpretation of the Resolution’s exhibits and conclude *1190 that exhibit B to the Resolution properly included the list of specific school facilities projects as well as the remaining accountability requirements. | 1 | 1 |
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2004(See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 582 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 , 12 P.3d 1068 ] (cone. & dis. opn. of George, C. 2004(See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 582 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 , 12 P.3d 1068 ] (cone. & dis. opn. of George, C. | 1 | 1 |
Brennan v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2003(See Brennan v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 87, 96 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] [if “reasonable minds may differ” on the “sufficiency” of a ballot summary, “it should be held sufficient”].) Now to the actual facts in Horwath . 2003(See Brennan v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 87, 96 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] [if “reasonable minds may differ” on the “sufficiency” of a ballot summary, “it should be held sufficient”].) Now to the actual facts in Horwath . | 1 | 1 |
Fair v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2003Given that the use of the word “may” denotes discretionary authority (e.g., Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d *942 1, 23 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 769 ]; Fair v. Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 876 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]), it is relatively clear here that the board of supervisors’ decision not to refer Measure V out for a fiscal impact statement was within the realm of reason. 2003Given that the use of the word “may” denotes discretionary authority (e.g., Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d *942 1, 23 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 769 ]; Fair v. Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 876 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]), it is relatively clear here that the board of supervisors’ decision not to refer Measure V out for a fiscal impact statement was within the realm of reason. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Minnisgreen2 sentences2000Real Parties correctly contend they are entitled to due process (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 649 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 498 P.2d 997 ]), which includes having an impartial hearing, “free from bias or prejudice.” (O’Bremski v. Maass (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 418, 422 .) The California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2250 defines an impartial panel as one whose members do not have a specific prejudice for or against the particular prisoner. 3 Real Parties have made no showing of such individualized prejudice. 2000Real Parties correctly contend they are entitled to due process (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 649 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 498 P.2d 997 ]), which includes having an impartial hearing, “free from bias or prejudice.” (O’Bremski v. Maass (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 418, 422 .) The California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2250 defines an impartial panel as one whose members do not have a specific prejudice for or against the particular prisoner. 3 Real Parties have made no showing of such individualized prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. California State Lands Commissiongreen2 sentences2000“Failure to provide for a consequence or penalty for noncompliance strongly suggests that the provision is merely directory. [Citation.]” (Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 168 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 445 ].) There is no evidence to support a conclusion that counsel knowingly waived *505 the rights of Florence to enforce the provisions of section 14171 enacted after the waiver was signed. 9 Finally, the Department argues that the trial court erred in denying its request to file an answer and memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the petition af 2000“Failure to provide for a consequence or penalty for noncompliance strongly suggests that the provision is merely directory. [Citation.]” (Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 168 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 445 ].) There is no evidence to support a conclusion that counsel knowingly waived *505 the rights of Florence to enforce the provisions of section 14171 enacted after the waiver was signed. 9 Finally, the Department argues that the trial court erred in denying its request to file an answer and memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the petition af | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Semonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Withrow v. Larkingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schullman v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brotsky v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kramer v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mannon v. Pesulagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wagner v. Sariottigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ritz v. Lightstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Superior Court of San Diego County
green
2 sentences2018Instead, the court remanded the matter to the DMV to conduct a new hearing with an impartial hearing officer. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 806 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) The DMV advised Hall that he had "been granted a denovo [ sic ] hearing" at a "mutually agreeable" date and time. 2018Instead, the court remanded the matter to the DMV to conduct a new hearing with an impartial hearing officer. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 806 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) The DMV advised Hall that he had "been granted a denovo [ sic ] hearing" at a "mutually agreeable" date and time. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. Cnty. of Mendocino
green
1 sentence2025“Although the California appellate courts have recognized the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election’ [citation], no California appellate court, to our knowledge, has invalidated an election on this basis. [¶] The courts have set a ‘very high’ bar [citation] for litigants to successfully mount a postelection due process challenge to a ballot measure . . . .” (Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 123 , fn. omitted (Owens | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gray v. City of Gustine
green
2 sentences2022In Gray, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 621 , the police chief alleged the city council was prejudiced against him and could not conduct the impartial hearing required by section 3304. 2022In Gray, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 621 , the police chief alleged the city council was prejudiced against him and could not conduct the impartial hearing required by section 3304. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. DeLeon
green
1 sentence2021(DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 654 ) In this case, defendant was not given a prerevocation preliminary hearing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Center for Biological Diversity v. California Fish and Game Commission
green
2 sentences2018Unsatisfied with the trial court's ruling giving him a new hearing with an impartial hearing officer, Hall insisted on appeal that this court must reinstate his driver's license. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) He characterized the superior court's remand order as being "ultra vires." ( Id. at p. 807, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) We rejected that argument. ( Ibid . ) Under California law, a plaintiff may be deemed to have been successful under section 1021.5 by succeeding on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit plaintiff s 2018Unsatisfied with the trial court's ruling giving him a new hearing with an impartial hearing officer, Hall insisted on appeal that this court must reinstate his driver's license. ( Hall I , supra , 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) He characterized the superior court's remand order as being "ultra vires." ( Id. at p. 807, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 .) We rejected that argument. ( Ibid . ) Under California law, a plaintiff may be deemed to have been successful under section 1021.5 by succeeding on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit plaintiff s | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. Robbins
green
1 sentence2014(Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 279-284 ; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 ; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124 .) Appellant contends he could not get an impartial hearing on the motion to suppress when his lawyer had him waive his rights and submit the motion on the police report because he “had no idea” what was going on and that he was “giving up so much,” and he only agreed to the waiver because his attorney told him to. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Wende
green
2 sentences2014(Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 279-284 ; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 ; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124 .) Appellant contends he could not get an impartial hearing on the motion to suppress when his lawyer had him waive his rights and submit the motion on the police report because he “had no idea” what was going on and that he was “giving up so much,” and he only agreed to the waiver because his attorney told him to. 2014(Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 279-284 ; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 ; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124 .) Appellant contends he could not get an impartial hearing on the motion to suppress when his lawyer had him waive his rights and submit the motion on the police report because he “had no idea” what was going on and that he was “giving up so much,” and he only agreed to the waiver because his attorney told him to. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dodd v. Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa
green
1 sentence2014(Dodd, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1627 .) The references in the title and in the impartial analysis to each ballot measure being a “continuation” of an existing tax or providing for the “readopt[ion]” of an existing tax are not misleading or false. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.
green
1 sentence2003Given that the use of the word “may” denotes discretionary authority (e.g., Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d *942 1, 23 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 769 ]; Fair v. Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 876 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]), it is relatively clear here that the board of supervisors’ decision not to refer Measure V out for a fiscal impact statement was within the realm of reason. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2000(Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325 , 1339-1341 & fn. 10 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 813 P.2d 240 ].) We do not rely upon the deliberative process privilege in this case because the decisions made by the Board of Prison Terms are quasi-judicial decisions. 3 Under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2250, prisoners are entitled to an impartial hearing panel: “A prisoner is entitled to a hearing by an impartial panel. 2000(Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325 , 1339-1341 & fn. 10 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 813 P.2d 240 ].) We do not rely upon the deliberative process privilege in this case because the decisions made by the Board of Prison Terms are quasi-judicial decisions. 3 Under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2250, prisoners are entitled to an impartial hearing panel: “A prisoner is entitled to a hearing by an impartial panel. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Russell L. O'Bremski v. Manfred Maass, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary
green
1 sentence2000Real Parties correctly contend they are entitled to due process (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 649 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 498 P.2d 997 ]), which includes having an impartial hearing, “free from bias or prejudice.” (O’Bremski v. Maass (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 418, 422 .) The California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2250 defines an impartial panel as one whose members do not have a specific prejudice for or against the particular prisoner. 3 Real Parties have made no showing of such individualized prejudice. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Linney v. Turpen
green
2 sentences1999Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) The California Supreme Court "construes the state Constitution's due process guaranty of a fair and impartial administrative decisionmaker in the same manner as the federal courts have interpreted parallel provisions in the federal Constitution." ( Burrell v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 568, 582 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) Due process rights to a fair tribunal apply to administrative hearings, as well as to court proceedings. ( Id., at p. 577, 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) Here, standards of due process entitled Haas to oppose revocation of his license, including t 1999Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) The California Supreme Court "construes the state Constitution's due process guaranty of a fair and impartial administrative decisionmaker in the same manner as the federal courts have interpreted parallel provisions in the federal Constitution." ( Burrell v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 568, 582 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) Due process rights to a fair tribunal apply to administrative hearings, as well as to court proceedings. ( Id., at p. 577, 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) Here, standards of due process entitled Haas to oppose revocation of his license, including t | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1999Our high court in Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 623 P.2d 151 , formulated the following twotier test for determining whether disqualification of a hearing officer is required: "The first inquiry consists of deciding whether the moving party has set forth legally sufficient facts to demonstrate the bias of the judicial officer. 1999Our high court in Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 590 , 623 P.2d 151 , formulated the following twotier test for determining whether disqualification of a hearing officer is required: "The first inquiry consists of deciding whether the moving party has set forth legally sufficient facts to demonstrate the bias of the judicial officer. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Burrell v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1999Although the County had the prerogative to codify its own procedures for conducting hearings and selecting hearing officers, it did not have the prerogative to diminish the minimum state and federal constitution procedural guarantees. ( Burrell v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 576-577, 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) "In other words, state and local governments cannot mandate which procedures they unilaterally deem adequate to protect an individual's due process rights; the minimum requisite procedures are federally mandated." ( Ibid. ) We thus examine whether the particular method of 1999Although the County had the prerogative to codify its own procedures for conducting hearings and selecting hearing officers, it did not have the prerogative to diminish the minimum state and federal constitution procedural guarantees. ( Burrell v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 576-577, 257 Cal.Rptr. 427 .) "In other words, state and local governments cannot mandate which procedures they unilaterally deem adequate to protect an individual's due process rights; the minimum requisite procedures are federally mandated." ( Ibid. ) We thus examine whether the particular method of | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach
green
2 sentences1999Due Process Rights to a Fair Hearing The issue before us is whether the County's unilateral selection, retention and payment of the hearing officer deprived Haas of a fair hearing by an impartial hearing officer in violation of his due process rights. [1] This is a question of law which we review de novo. ( Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169 , 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 223 .) The trial court's "`foundational factual findings must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence; however, the ultimate determination of whether the administrative proceedings were fundamentally 1999Due Process Rights to a Fair Hearing The issue before us is whether the County's unilateral selection, retention and payment of the hearing officer deprived Haas of a fair hearing by an impartial hearing officer in violation of his due process rights. [1] This is a question of law which we review de novo. ( Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169 , 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 223 .) The trial court's "`foundational factual findings must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence; however, the ultimate determination of whether the administrative proceedings were fundamentally | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mandicino v. Maggard green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| McCullough v. Terzian green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Goldberg v. Kelly green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Baxter v. Palmigiano green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.