laboratory analysis in California

2017In doing *100 so, we adhere to the result in the California Supreme Court's decision in Talibdeen , supra , 27 Cal.4th 1151 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 , 46 P.3d 388 , as well as a line of authority this court has previously recognized as having "settled" that the laboratory analysis statute constitutes a fine. ( Turner , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414, fn. 3 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 .) Moreover, the Legislature, which is presumed to be aware of longstanding judicial interpretations of statute ( Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411 , 431, 188 Cal.R

2014(People v. Clark (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1050 [Imposition of § 11372.5 fee is mandatory and not, in itself, improperly imposed as a condition of probation unless not disclosed in negotiated plea bargain because it is punitive.]; People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1522 ; People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 456 [Imposition of § 11372.5 fee is mandatory]; People v. Turner (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1413 [§ 11372.5 fee is a mandatory penalty assessment]; People v. Talibdeen, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1152 [Laboratory analysis fee imposed by Court of Appeal because it was a

2017(People v. Sharret (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 859, 869 .) The Sharret court identified numerous factors to support its conclusion that the laboratory fee is "punitive in nature," including: (1) the statutory language that the "laboratory analysis fee is an increment of a fine and as such it is a fine"; (2) the principle that " '[f]ines arising from [criminal] convictions are generally considered punishment' "; (3) the laboratory fee is imposed only upon conviction of a criminal offense and has solely a law enforcement purpose; and (4) the laboratory analysis fee "has no application in a civil cont

2016In People v. Sharret (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 859 , another division of the Second Appellate Court, did not analyze Vega in its analysis and concluded that “[t]he section 11372.5 criminal laboratory analysis fee constitutes punishment and must be stayed under section 654.” (Id. at p. 869.) Additionally, in People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151 (Talibdeen), the California Supreme Court considered the related issue of whether a trial court has discretion to waive penalties under section 1464. ( Talibdeen, supra, at p. 1153 .) In Talibdeen, the trial court “imposed, among other things, a labor

2015In Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S.__[131 S.Ct.2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 ], a laboratory analysis of defendant’s blood alcohol level was introduced without the 3 For a detailed analysis of the relevant cases and development of this doctrine, see People v. Barba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 712 . 4 We note in each case the issue before the court was the admission of documents reporting the laboratory findings of non-testifying analysts. 5 testimony of the analyst who had performed the testing.

2013On June 28, 2011, the United States Supreme Court granted a new petition for certiorari from Barba, vacated our decision in Barba II, and remanded the case to us with directions to reconsider our decision in light of its holding in Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S._[ 180 L.Ed.2d 610 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 ] (Bullcoming), which considered whether a defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights were violated by having someone other than the person who conducted a laboratory analysis testify about the results and report of the person who actually conducted the test.

2022Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1549 , 1567-1568.) We turn first to the trial court’s conclusion that a laboratory test finding a high level of mercury in one unit of a skin-lightening cream is an insufficient basis for concluding other units of the same product contain mercury.

2022Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1549 , 1567-1568.) We turn first to the trial court’s conclusion that a laboratory test finding a high level of mercury in one unit of a skin-lightening cream is an insufficient basis for concluding other units of the same product contain mercury.

2021Indeed, our conclusion in Moore II is confirmed by our Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz, supra, 4 Cal.5th 1100 , holding the laboratory analysis and drug program fees constitute “punishment” within the meaning of section 182.

2021Indeed, our conclusion in Moore II is confirmed by our Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz, supra, 4 Cal.5th 1100 , holding the laboratory analysis and drug program fees constitute “punishment” within the meaning of section 182.

2021Conversely, a requirement that a hospital laboratory or its employees send reports directly to a patient or attempt to communicate complex, problematic test results directly to a patient, independently of the patient’s physician who ordered the test, would appear to pose a considerable risk of confusion or misunderstanding.” (Walker, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 962 .) “[W]hen a laboratory test is ordered by a patient’s physician, there is an existing patient-physician relationship with respect to the subject matter of the 17 laboratory test.

2021(Walker, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 962 .) In addition to citing regulations and statutes relevant only to clinical laboratories, Walker relied on the following reasoning for holding the hospital did not have a duty to report test results to the patient: “[T]he physician who ordered a medical test is likely to be the professional who can best explain the meaning and significance of the test results to the patient in the context of that patient’s individual circumstances.

2017In doing *100 so, we adhere to the result in the California Supreme Court's decision in Talibdeen , supra , 27 Cal.4th 1151 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 , 46 P.3d 388 , as well as a line of authority this court has previously recognized as having "settled" that the laboratory analysis statute constitutes a fine. ( Turner , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414, fn. 3 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 .) Moreover, the Legislature, which is presumed to be aware of longstanding judicial interpretations of statute ( Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411 , 431, 188 Cal.R

2017In doing *100 so, we adhere to the result in the California Supreme Court's decision in Talibdeen , supra , 27 Cal.4th 1151 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 922 , 46 P.3d 388 , as well as a line of authority this court has previously recognized as having "settled" that the laboratory analysis statute constitutes a fine. ( Turner , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414, fn. 3 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 .) Moreover, the Legislature, which is presumed to be aware of longstanding judicial interpretations of statute ( Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411 , 431, 188 Cal.R

2017The court shall increase the total fine necessary to include this increment. [¶] With respect to those offenses specified in this subdivision for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law, the court shall, upon conviction, impose a fine in an amount not to exceed fifty dollars ($50), which shall constitute the increment prescribed by this section and which shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law." Still more recently, another court has also disagreed with Watts and held that the laboratory analysis fee and the drug program fee are subject to penalty assessme

2017The court shall increase the total fine necessary to include this increment. [¶] With respect to those offenses specified in this subdivision for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law, the court shall, upon conviction, impose a fine in an amount not to exceed fifty dollars ($50), which shall constitute the increment prescribed by this section and which shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law." Still more recently, another court has also disagreed with Watts and held that the laboratory analysis fee and the drug program fee are subject to penalty assessme

2016And as to that predominant concern, it makes not a whit of difference whether, at the time of the laboratory test, the police already have a suspect.” (Id. at pp. 135-136 [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2274 ] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.), fn. omitted.) Both the concurrence and dissent also criticized the plurality’s conclusion that an emergency existed because the test was done “to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large.” (Id. at p. 53 [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2243 ] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).) The separate opinions noted the DNA testing was conducted several months after the rape.

2016And as to that predominant concern, it makes not a whit of difference whether, at the time of the laboratory test, the police already have a suspect.” (Id. at pp. 135-136 [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2274 ] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.), fn. omitted.) Both the concurrence and dissent also criticized the plurality’s conclusion that an emergency existed because the test was done “to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large.” (Id. at p. 53 [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2243 ] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).) The separate opinions noted the DNA testing was conducted several months after the rape.

2021In so holding, the court “reject[ed] Watts’s anomalous conclusion that the criminal laboratory analysis fee ‘is by its nature not punishment and therefore not a “fine” or “penalty” except,’ as the second paragraph of [Health and Safety Code] section 11372.5, subdivision (a), specifies, ‘in the case of an offense “for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law.” ’ ” ( Ruiz, supra, at p. 1113 , quoting Watts, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 235 .) The court also rejected both Vega’s “assertion . . . that ‘the main purpose’ of [Health and Safety Code] section 11372.5 ‘is not to exact re

2021In so holding, the court “reject[ed] Watts’s anomalous conclusion that the criminal laboratory analysis fee ‘is by its nature not punishment and therefore not a “fine” or “penalty” except,’ as the second paragraph of [Health and Safety Code] section 11372.5, subdivision (a), specifies, ‘in the case of an offense “for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law.” ’ ” ( Ruiz, supra, at p. 1113 , quoting Watts, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 235 .) The court also rejected both Vega’s “assertion . . . that ‘the main purpose’ of [Health and Safety Code] section 11372.5 ‘is not to exact re

2021Freitas v. Shiomoto (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 294 (Freitas) and Najera v. Shiomoto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 173 (Najera), both relied on by Gerwig, involved the same laboratory error: potential misuse of a dual chamber gas chromatography device.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035 ; Johnson, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.) IV.

2021Freitas v. Shiomoto (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 294 (Freitas) and Najera v. Shiomoto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 173 (Najera), both relied on by Gerwig, involved the same laboratory error: potential misuse of a dual chamber gas chromatography device.

2017Four years later, in People v. Moore (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10 (Moore), the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Nevada County expressly disagreed with the Sierra line of cases, and concluded that the penalty statutes did not apply to the laboratory fee statute.