reporting requirement in Pennsylvania

2015We distinguished Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 2004) (Benner was always subject to a reporting requirement, albeit ten years instead of a lifetime, and the record did not support Benner’s contention that he had bargained for non-registration as a term of his plea), and held that the plea agreement “appears to have been precisely structured so that Hainesworth would not be subject to a registration requirement.” Hainesworth, 82 A.3d] at 448.

2014We distinguished Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa.Super.2004) (Ben-ner was always subject to a reporting requirement, albeit ten years instead of a lifetime, and the record did not support Benner’s contention that he had bargained for non-registration as a term of his plea), and held that the plea agreement “appears to have been precisely structured so that Hainesworth would not be subjected to a registration requirement.” Hainesworth , at 448.

2017In doing so, the court noted that the ordinance in BOMA was “far more invasive [than the reporting requirement in Smaller] because it forces contractors to retain certain employees for approximately half a year.” 985 A.2d at 714-15 .

2017In doing so, the court noted that the ordinance in BOMA was “far more invasive [than the reporting requirement in Smaller] because it forces contractors to retain certain employees for approximately half a year.” 985 A.2d at 714-15 .

1974As for the reporting requirement (paragraph eight), this Court in Alto-Reste, supra, at 136-37 , 306 A.2d at 888-89 , directly approved such a remedy.

1974As for the reporting requirement (paragraph eight), this Court in Alto-Reste, supra, at 136-37 , 306 A.2d at 888-89 , directly approved such a remedy.

2026Id.

2022See generally 23 Pa.C.S. § 6319; cf. McCord, 9 A.3d at 1220 .

2022Id. (citations omitted). 6 requirement impairs his contract with South Carolina authorities removing the reporting requirement there, and the full faith and credit of the South Carolina agreement; and (4) the former SORNA registration requirement violates his fundamental right to travel.

2021“Bail is neither a form of, nor in any way synonymous with, custody or imprisonment; rather, it is a form of release from custody.” Id. (emphasis in original), citing Commonwealth v. Chiappini, 782 A.2d 490, 503 (Pa. 2001), abrogated on other grounds. “[C]ommon bail conditions (such as surrendering a passport, a stay-away order, drug testing or a reporting requirement), which defendants often welcome, and even request, [are] desirable means of avoiding (Footnote Continued Next Page) -7- J-S27003-21 Appellant pled guilty to the charged offense before the delay in sentencing.

2020Following a direct appeal, this Court found the reporting requirement constituted a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143 (Pa. Super. 2019).

2016Procyson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 4 A.3d 1124 , 1127 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 4 The agency claims examiner acknowledged the reporting error, and the referee adjusted the initial determination of the overpayment from $10,788.00 to $2,409.00.

2015The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Williams II also dismissed the defense contention that the community notification provisions of Megan’s Law II were analogous to colonial era punishments, such as public shaming, humiliation, and banishment, and instead determined that “the disclosure of factual information concerning the local presence of a potentially harmful individual is aimed, not at stigmatizing that individual, but at allowing potentially vulnerable members of the public to avoid being victimized,” such that any alleged punitive effect is “an inevitable consequence of the effectuation o

2015Finding no directly on-point authority, we turned for guidance to our Supreme Court’s review of similar circumstances in the context of Pennsylvania’s Three Strikes Statute, _______________________ (Footnote Continued) A.2d at 922 (noting that, if the opinion in support of reversal’s reasoning were not adopted, “then having a ten-year requirement under the former subsection (a) and a separate reporting requirement under the former subsection (b) is meaningless”). -8- J-S45023-15 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2),6 specifically the Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 1985).

2015We stated that, because the employer in Maxim Crane failed to act with due diligence, “hardship and prejudice to [the claimant] can be presumed as [the claimant’s] weekly workers’ compensation benefits would be reduced to zero for a period of 25.75 weeks.” Id. at 820 .

2014Since the Act’s reporting requirement furthers that interest, this court simply notes Texaco's declaration that “[t]he state surely has the power to condition the ownership of property on compliance with conditions that impose such a slight burden on the owner while providing such clear benefits to the State.” Id.

2014We distinguished Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 2004) (Benner was always subject to a reporting requirement, albeit ten years instead of a lifetime, and the record did not support -registration as a term of his plea), and held that the plea agreement Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 448 .

2013Klein explained in Schaaf, supra, “some of the jurors may know about the reporting requirement and know that an adverse verdict might affect the doctor.” Id. at 663 .

2013Klein explained in Schaaf, supra, “some of the jurors may know about the reporting requirement and know that an adverse verdict might affect the doctor.” Id. at 663 .

2003Id.

2000Finally GTE complains that the PUC does not subject wireless carriers to the USF order, citing Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.1999), in support of a claim that federal law requires states to include wireless carriers.

1992The Motion stated, inter alia, that: (1) The purpose of the MVFRL, § 1702, is to prevent fraudulent claims from being presented to insurers for first party and uninsured benefits; (2) Section 1702 applies to Hatcher’s claim under the Plan; (3) Hatcher had a duty to comply with § 1702 and report the incident to the police; (4) Hatcher had not been able to locate a copy of the police report regarding this incident, and, thus, had not provided Travelers with a copy of *228 the police report; (5) Travelers had used the services of an investigator in an effort to locate the police report, which fai

1992The Motion stated, inter alia, that: (1) The purpose of the MVFRL, § 1702, is to prevent fraudulent claims from being presented to insurers for first party and uninsured benefits; (2) Section 1702 applies to Hatcher’s claim under the Plan; (3) Hatcher had a duty to comply with § 1702 and report the incident to the police; (4) Hatcher had not been able to locate a copy of the police report regarding this incident, and, thus, had not provided Travelers with a copy of *228 the police report; (5) Travelers had used the services of an investigator in an effort to locate the police report, which fai