reporting requirement in Indiana

2013Weighing the factors, the Court concluded that the extension of Gonzalez’s reporting requirement was so punitive as to amount to a criminal penalty, and thus the lifetime reporting requirement violated Indiana’s ex post facto clause. *827 Turning to Healey’s circumstances, in Healey I this Court determined that the General Assembly did not act with punitive intent when it amended SORA, which resulted in extending Healey’s sex offender registration requirements for ten years. 969 N.E.2d at 613 .

2013Id. at 614 .

2023In other words, the court explained, immunity does not extend to “other improper actions taken beyond the reporting requirement,” and the Tennessee reporting statute provides immunity for physicians “only to the extent that their conduct arises from their duty to report suspicions of child abuse. . . .” Id. [54] The federal court granted the Vanderbilt Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment “for the actions taken in compliance with Defendants’ duty to report suspicions of child abuse under [the Tennessee reporting statute] . . . . 974 F. Supp. at 1148 .

2023And the court denied the Defendants’ motion “to the extent that Defendants’ actions were not taken pursuant to said legal duty or may have exceeded such duty. . . .” Id.

2018The ICPC “includes a reporting requirement that allows a receiving state to investigate the fitness of the proposed home and to determine whether the child may be placed according to a proposed plan.” Id.

2012Finally, as a matter of public policy, we agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that “[i]f petitioners for protection orders were liable for criminal prosecution, a violator of a protection order could create a real chill on the reporting of the violation by simply threatening to claim that an illegal visit was the result of an illegal invitation.” State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d at 647 .

2012Finally, as a matter of public policy, we agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that “[i]f petitioners for protection orders were liable for criminal prosecution, a violator of a protection order could create a real chill on the reporting of the violation by simply threatening to claim that an illegal visit was the result of an illegal invitation.” State v. Lucas, 795 N.E.2d at 647 .

2012“But as our Supreme Court ha[s] indicated, even where a charging instrument may lack appropriate factual detail, additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit supporting the charging instrument may be taken into account in assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges against him.” Id., citing Patterson v. State, 495 N.E.2d 714, 719 ([Ind.]1986). 10.Nowhere in the charging information[] does it allege what facts support the element that Edward Gilli-land had a reason to believe that the minor child K.T. was a victim of child abuse or neglect that would cause a repo

2009McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 449 .

2009McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 449 .

1996Even the partial dissent (which concurred as to the validity of the reporting requirement) did not take issue with the premise that, by requiring out-of-state importers to affix labels to the "items" of alcohol shipped to federal bases located within North Dakota, the State's goal of keeping liquor bound for those bases out of the State's intrastate system was served; rather, the partial dissent felt the labeling requirement was invalid only because the goal could be served through alternative means. 495 U.S. at 449-50 , 110 S.Ct. at 2002 .

1996Even the partial dissent (which concurred as to the validity of the reporting requirement) did not take issue with the premise that, by requiring out-of-state importers to affix labels to the "items" of alcohol shipped to federal bases located within North Dakota, the State's goal of keeping liquor bound for those bases out of the State's intrastate system was served; rather, the partial dissent felt the labeling requirement was invalid only because the goal could be served through alternative means. 495 U.S. at 449-50 , 110 S.Ct. at 2002 .