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11 Missouri opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Insurance Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2012Co., 917 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo.App.1996) (“[bjecause the reporting requirement helps define the scope of coverage under a claims made policy, to excuse a delay in notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the insurance contract”). 4 Policy B contains the following relevant provisions: A. COVERAGE PROVISION We will pay on behalf of the Insured damages in excess of the Deductible shown in the Schedule that the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of claims made against the Insured for employment practices. 1998(Citation omitted.) Insurance Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 917 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo.App.1996). | 2 | 2 |
Esmailzadeh v. Johnson and Speakmangreen2 sentences1996See Esmailzadeh v. Johnson & Speakman, 869 F.2d 422 , 424 (8th Cir.1989); FDIC v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 1990The Eighth Circuit noted that “[bjecause the reporting requirement helps to define the scope of coverage under a claims-made policy, several courts have held that excusing a delay in notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the insurance contract.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Celis-Garciagreen1 sentence2019See id.; see also Hoeber, 488 S.W.3d at 658 -59 (citing State v. Celis—Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2011)) (finding that counsel was not insulated from advancing the arguments discussed in Celis—Garcia where the case merely reiterated established legal principles and did not substantively change the law). | 1 | 1 |
Lexington Insurance Company v. St. Louis Universitygreen1 sentence2019Co., 88 F.3d at 634 (requiring compliance with the reporting requirement for coverage). | 1 | 1 |
Wittner, Poger, Rosenblum & Spewak, P.C. v. Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2019“Because the reporting requirement helps define the scope of coverage under a claims[-]made policy, to excuse a delay in notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the insurance policy.” Wittner, 969 S.W.2d at 754 (internal quotation omitted); see also Bar Plan Mut. 2019See, e.g., Wittner, 969 S.W.2d at 753 n.2 (suggesting that even “mere notice of the entry of a default decree against a client the firm was retained to represent in a particular matter would constitute a ‘basis to believe that the insured 999 committed such an act or omission’” triggering the policy’s reporting requirement); SEMDV Holdings, Inc. v. Green Jacobson, P.C., 494 S.W.3d 537, 557 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (discussing examples of “clear and palpable” attorney errors, such as allowing a statute of limitations to run on a client’s claim or omitting a requested co | 1 | 1 |
Roedder v. Callisgreen1 sentence2019Ruiz’s argument that Decedent’s death abated a possible cause of action for legal malpractice against Steib was firmly rejected by this Court in Roedder v. Callis, 375 S.W.3d 824, 831 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Howes v. Howesgreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Wittner, 969 S.W.2d at 753 n.2 (suggesting that even “mere notice of the entry of a default decree against a client the firm was retained to represent in a particular matter would constitute a ‘basis to believe that the insured 999 committed such an act or omission’” triggering the policy’s reporting requirement); SEMDV Holdings, Inc. v. Green Jacobson, P.C., 494 S.W.3d 537, 557 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (discussing examples of “clear and palpable” attorney errors, such as allowing a statute of limitations to run on a client’s claim or omitting a requested co | 1 | 1 |
Edward L. Hoeber v. State of Missourigreen1 sentence2019See id.; see also Hoeber, 488 S.W.3d at 658 -59 (citing State v. Celis—Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2011)) (finding that counsel was not insulated from advancing the arguments discussed in Celis—Garcia where the case merely reiterated established legal principles and did not substantively change the law). | 1 | 1 |
Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc.green1 sentence1995Under § 287.800, we are to give all provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) such construction as will promote the public policy of extending its benefits to the largest possible class, Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 [2] (Mo. banc 1983), provided such construction can be given without violating fixed rules or principles of law. 4 McClintock v. Skelly Oil Co., 232 Mo.App. 1204 , 114 S.W.2d 181, 190 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
McClintock v. Skelly Oil Co.green2 sentences1995Under § 287.800, we are to give all provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) such construction as will promote the public policy of extending its benefits to the largest possible class, Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 [2] (Mo. banc 1983), provided such construction can be given without violating fixed rules or principles of law. 4 McClintock v. Skelly Oil Co., 232 Mo.App. 1204 , 114 S.W.2d 181, 190 (1938). 1995Under § 287.800, we are to give all provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) such construction as will promote the public policy of extending its benefits to the largest possible class, Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 [2] (Mo. banc 1983), provided such construction can be given without violating fixed rules or principles of law. 4 McClintock v. Skelly Oil Co., 232 Mo.App. 1204 , 114 S.W.2d 181, 190 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Doe
green
1 sentence2024Analyzing a scheme that classified offenders into a tier system based on their offenses, the United States Supreme Court noted, “broad categories … and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Goodman v. Wesley Medical Center, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020Goodman, 78 P.3d at 821 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Turcotte v. Director of Revenue
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Doe v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2011Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. banc 2006), the Missouri Supreme Court’s first decision addressing a retrospectivity challenge to Megan’s Law, also suggests that changes to the mechanisms by which registration is effected do not violate the Missouri Constitution’s bar on retrospective legislation. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Passler v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1976Finally, in Passler v. Johnson, 304 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1957), the Missouri Supreme Court had an opportunity to review a Kansas City ordinance which provided for the regular reporting of delinquent accounts and which expressly prohibited a wholesaler from selling to a retailer who was delinquent with any other wholesaler. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.