reporting requirement in New York

2021The doctrine of equitable estoppel based on the representations of petitioner's supervisor four years earlier does not bar disciplinary action, given the explicit training petitioner received concerning the reporting requirement, which was in effect at all times ( compare Matter of Brady Props. v New York City Loft Bd. , 269 AD2d 137, 138-139 [1st Dept 2000] [loft board equitably estopped to deny retroactive rent increases to landlord who was not only not informed of relevant policy change but actively misled by a hearing officer about the need to apply for such increases]; Walter v City of Ne

2018Here, defendant, who was 18 years old and had no criminal history at the time of the underlying crimes, completed substance abuse counseling and was fully compliant with the reporting requirement during the nearly 2½ years between her release to probation from an initial period of incarceration and the death of her grandfather ( see Rapone , 71 AD3d at 1565 ; Patel , 64 AD3d at 1247 ; cf. People v Handley , 134 AD3d 1509 , 1510 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1151 [2016]).

2018Here, defendant, who was 18 years old and had no criminal history at the time of the underlying crimes, completed substance abuse counseling and was fully compliant with the reporting requirement during the nearly 2½ years between her release to probation from an initial period of incarceration and the death of her grandfather ( see Rapone , 71 AD3d at 1565 ; Patel , 64 AD3d at 1247 ; cf. People v Handley , 134 AD3d 1509 , 1510 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1151 [2016]).

2018The order provided that respondent could apply to this Court for termination of the reporting requirement after the expiration of two years following the date of this Court's decision ( id. ).

2018Here, defendant, who was 18 years old and had no criminal history at the time of the underlying crimes, completed substance abuse counseling and was fully compliant with the reporting requirement during the nearly 2½ years between her release to probation from an initial period of incarceration and the death of her grandfather ( see Rapone , 71 AD3d at 1565 ; Patel , 64 AD3d at 1247 ; cf. People v Handley , 134 AD3d 1509 , 1510 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1151 [2016]).

2016The motion court, after considering the Taranovich factors (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 [1975]), properly determined that although the 26-month prearrest delay was lengthy, and although defendant could have been charged sooner, the delay was not intended to obtain a tactical advantage relating to the absconding charge, but was the result of a determination, made in good faith, that a continuing homicide investigation required deferral of the absconding prosecution (see People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241 , 254 [1978]).

2015Co. v Umanzor, 74 AD3d at 1336 ; see generally Bates v Yasin, 13 AD3d 474 [2004]).

2009Under these circumstances, and affording plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, it appears that she has pleaded sufficient facts in support of, e.g., a lost right of recovery under Labor Law § 740, to withstand dismissal at this early juncture (see Gelfand v Oliver, 29 AD3d 736 [2006]).

2001In addition, we conclude that there is no rational basis for the denial of petitioner’s request for a hearing to the extent that it sought to correct an error in the nursing hours that were reported and used in allocating petitioner’s nursing administration costs for the 1983 base year. “[T]he plain language of [10 NYCRR 86-2.14 (a) (2)] * * * allows for the correction of the error in data submitted by petitioner” (Matter of Frances Schervier Home & Hosp. v Axelrod, 178 AD2d 791, 793 ).

1998School Dist. (supra) that there was no private cause of action under Education Law § 905 (see, People v Damiano, 87 NY2d 477, 489-490 [Simons, J., concurring]).

1998It is also significant that the Legislature amended Education Law § 905 (2) in 1994 (L 1994, ch 197), adding a reporting requirement in response to Bello v Board of Educ. (supra) without explicitly overruling the further holding of that case (see, id.) and of Grindle v Port Jervis Cent.

1997Thus, the court’s instruction to the jury that the People are required to prove that defendant was consciously aware that he had been involved in an accident with another vessel causing loss of life, personal injury, or property damage was all that was required (see, People v Canty, 60 NY2d 830, 831-832 ).

1992Indeed, one commentator has noted that, "[t]he reporting requirement is nothing less than essential to the survival of the profession” (Gentile, Professional Responsibility — Reporting Misconduct By Other Lawyers, NYU, Oct. 23, 1984, at 1, col 1; at 2, col 2; see also, Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not Enough, 31 Ariz L Rev 657, 658-659). 2 Moreover, as plaintiff points out, failure to comply with the reporting requirement may result in suspension or disbarment (see, e.g., Matter of Dowd, 160 AD2d 78 ).

1978As a general rule, "[t]he police power is the least limitable of the powers of government’ ” (New York State Thruway Auth. v Ashley Motor CL, 10 NY2d 151, 157 ).