reporting requirement (Virginia) · Go Syfert
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reporting requirement in Virginia

5 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Jesus Davila Bailey, III v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen
vactapp · 2019 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025This Court contrasted Code § 18.2-472.1’s requirements with the total ban in Packingham and found the statute constitutional because of the limited effect that the reporting requirement had on the appellant’s ability to access the internet. 70 Va. App. at 645 (“[T]he reporting requirements at issue do not in any meaningful way restrict his rights of speech and association.

11
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Board of County Supervisorsgreen
va · 1983 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020All of those clues strongly point toward a conjunctive reading of the reporting requirement. 9 “[C]onsidering the entire statute . . . to place its terms in context to ascertain their plain meaning does not offend the [plain language] rule because ‘it is our duty to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.’” Eberhardt v. Fairfax County Employees’ Retirement System Board of Trustees, 283 Va. 190 , 194-95 (2012) (quoting Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Board of County Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-88 (1983)).

11
Banks v. Commonwealthgreen
va · 1976 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Because the reporting requirement is no longer “in the conjunctive” and no longer “requires a report to the police and the injured party[,]” Banks, 217 Va. at 532 , 230 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis in original), Banks’ holding on this discrete issue was superseded by the change in statutory language, and therefore, it is no longer a correct statement of the law.4 Accordingly, consistent with the statutory text, we hold that, to meet the statutory command, appellant only needed to report forthwith the required information to one person described in the statutory list.

2018Because the reporting requirement is no longer “in the conjunctive” and no longer “requires a report to the police and the injured party[,]” Banks, 217 Va. at 532 , 230 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis in original), Banks’ holding on this discrete issue was superseded by the change in statutory language, and therefore, it is no longer a correct statement of the law.4 Accordingly, consistent with the statutory text, we hold that, to meet the statutory command, appellant only needed to report forthwith the required information to one person described in the statutory list.

11
Lamarr Ramon Masean Smith v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen
vactapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018See Smith v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 382 , 391 n.2, 785 S.E.2d 500 , 504 n.2 (2016), a case that did not address whether the reporting requirement was in the conjunctive or the disjunctive.

2018See Smith v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 382 , 391 n.2, 785 S.E.2d 500 , 504 n.2 (2016), a case that did not address whether the reporting requirement was in the conjunctive or the disjunctive.

11
Clarke v. Galdamezgreen
va · 2016 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Although the habeas challenge dealt with other elements of the statute, the Supreme Court summarized all of the elements, noting that to convict, “the jury or fact-finder must find [among other things] . . . that the defendant . . . failed to . . . report -5- his identification information to law enforcement or the other person involved in the accident.” Clarke v. Galdamez, 292 Va. 228, 236 , 789 S.E.2d 106, 109-10 (2016) (emphasis added); see also Medwid v. Commonwealth, No. 1382-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 334 , at *7 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (recognizing that the reporting requirement

2018Although the habeas challenge dealt with other elements of the statute, the Supreme Court summarized all of the elements, noting that to convict, “the jury or fact-finder must find [among other things] . . . that the defendant . . . failed to . . . report -5- his identification information to law enforcement or the other person involved in the accident.” Clarke v. Galdamez, 292 Va. 228, 236 , 789 S.E.2d 106, 109-10 (2016) (emphasis added); see also Medwid v. Commonwealth, No. 1382-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 334 , at *7 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2016) (recognizing that the reporting requirement

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Smith v. Doe green
scotus · 2003
2 sentences

2025Although the Registry “differentiates between individuals” depending on the severity of the offense, we agree with the Supreme Court that “[t]he broad categories . . . and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.” Id.

2007The court then applied the rational basis test and held that the Supreme Court's determination in Smith v. Doe, that the Alaska statute served a "`legitimate nonpunitive purpose,'" and that the categories of crimes and "`corresponding length of the reporting requirement'" were "`reasonably related to the danger of recidivism'" and were "`consistent with the regulatory objective,'" compelled the conclusion that the reporting requirement was valid, although the petitioners did "possess liberty interests that are indeed important." Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 -03 , 1

22007–2025
John Doe, I Jane Doe John Doe, II v. Bill Tandeske Gregg D. Renkes green
ca9 · 2004
1 sentence

2007The court then applied the rational basis test and held that the Supreme Court's determination in Smith v. Doe, that the Alaska statute served a "`legitimate nonpunitive purpose,'" and that the categories of crimes and "`corresponding length of the reporting requirement'" were "`reasonably related to the danger of recidivism'" and were "`consistent with the regulatory objective,'" compelled the conclusion that the reporting requirement was valid, although the petitioners did "possess liberty interests that are indeed important." Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 -03 , 1

12007–2007

Where else courts name it

CA 48 (1974–2026) PA 45 (1962–2026) NJ 30 (1961–2025) TX 26 (1977–2016) OH 25 (1997–2026) FL 20 (1990–2024) KS 19 (1989–2024) NY 16 (1978–2026) OR 16 (2007–2026) MI 13 (1990–2023) IL 13 (1978–2026) WA 11 (1983–2022) MO 11 (1976–2024) IN 11 (1996–2023) MA 10 (1981–2023) NM 8 (2013–2016) MD 8 (1993–2013) GA 6 (1982–2007) LA 6 (2006–2020) IA 6 (1993–2020) AZ 5 (1983–2017) KY 5 (2009–2017) VA 5 (2007–2025) DE 5 (2014–2025) TN 4 (2010–2015) NC 4 (2001–2020) NH 4 (1984–2013) WI 4 (1987–2015) AK 4 (1979–1998) CO 3 (2001–2016) ME 3 (2006–2011) SD 3 (1969–1993) MN 3 (1995–2010) CT 3 (2004–2022) NE 2 (1994–1996) AL 2 (1985–2000) ND 2 (2001–2006) MS 2 (2006–2013) DC 2 (1995–2005) WY 2 (2015–2018) RI 2 (1994–2002) NV 2 (2012–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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