White instruction in Tennessee

2022The White instruction requires a trial court to provide a jury instruction “defin[ing] the key element [of the kidnapping-related offense]--the substantial interference with the victim’s liberty--as requiring a finding by the jury that the victim’s removal or confinement was not essentially incidental to the accompanying felony offense.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 580 .

2022The White instruction requires a trial court to provide a jury instruction “defin[ing] the key element [of the kidnapping-related offense]--the substantial interference with the victim’s liberty--as requiring a finding by the jury that the victim’s removal or confinement was not essentially incidental to the accompanying felony offense.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 580 .

2024The Cecil court remanded the conviction for false imprisonment without conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis because “the proof in this case could be interpreted in different ways, [and] we cannot conclude that the absence of the White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 613 .

2024The Cecil court remanded the conviction for false imprisonment without conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis because “the proof in this case could be interpreted in different ways, [and] we cannot conclude that the absence of the White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 613 .

2022He relies upon Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 610 , and Alston, 465 S.W.3d at 565 , both of which involved plenary review, not plain error review, of the lack of the White instruction.

2017A few years after White, the supreme court determined that a “kidnapping charge accompanied by an aggravated burglary charge, standing alone, does not warrant a White instruction.” State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 564 (Tenn. 2015).

2022See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 ; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42 ; see also White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 .

2022See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 ; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42 ; see also White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 .

2018Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 610 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008)).

2015Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 610 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008)) (“The existence of a non-structural constitutional 10 We do not decide in this case whether a White instruction is required when a kidnapping charge is accompanied by a charge of especially aggravated burglary.

2022See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 ; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42 ; see also White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 .

2022See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 ; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42 ; see also White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 .

2015However, in State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 503 (Tenn. 2015), and State v. Williams, 468 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tenn. 2015), our supreme court expressly held that a White instruction is not required when the kidnapping and the accompaning offense involve different victims.

2015However, in State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 503 (Tenn. 2015), and State v. Williams, 468 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tenn. 2015), our supreme court expressly held that a White instruction is not required when the kidnapping and the accompaning offense involve different victims.

2015However, in State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 503 (Tenn. 2015), and State v. Williams, 468 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tenn. 2015), our supreme court expressly held that a White instruction is not required when the kidnapping and the accompaning offense involve different victims.

2015However, in State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495, 503 (Tenn. 2015), and State v. Williams, 468 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tenn. 2015), our supreme court expressly held that a White instruction is not required when the kidnapping and the accompaning offense involve different victims.

2014The defendant asserted that the reason that the application should be granted was to give the court “a chance to address a first impression argument of whether a defendant can be found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping by way of criminal responsibility if the intent to commit the accompanying felony was the only intent.” He further asked the court to consider the argument in the context of State v. White and to find that the White instruction should have been given and that the error of failing to charge the jury was not harmless because “the proof could be interpreted in different wa

2014The defendant asserted that the reason that the application should be granted was to give the court “a chance to address a first impression argument of whether a defendant can be found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping by way of criminal responsibility if the intent to commit the accompanying felony was the only intent.” He further asked the court to consider the argument in the context of State v. White and to find that the White instruction should have been given and that the error of failing to charge the jury was not harmless because “the proof could be interpreted in different wa

2015Id. 7 In Larry Jereller Alston, our supreme court ruled that the White instruction need not be given in cases where the kidnapping charge is accompanied by an aggravated burglary.

2015Id. 7 In Larry Jereller Alston, our supreme court ruled that the White instruction need not be given in cases where the kidnapping charge is accompanied by an aggravated burglary.

2022The State, on the other hand, relies upon the well-settled principle that when a defendant seeks relief as a matter plain error, “the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the trial court committed plain error and that the error was of sufficient magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” See State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 56 (Tenn. 2010).

2021See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim.

2021See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim.

2018Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2017); see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015).

2017State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 346 (Tenn. 2005).

2017State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 346 (Tenn. 2005).

2016In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

2016In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

2016In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

2016In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

2015Id. at *5 . 6 The court defined the “pipeline approach” as the application of “a new legal principle ‘to litigants at bar, to all actions pending on the date of the decision announcing the change becomes final[,] and to all causes of action arising thereafter.’” Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 608 (quoting Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Tenn. 1986)). -17- In State v. Jonathan Kyle Hulse, we held that the absence of a White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant raped the victim and then chased her out of his home, grabbed her by the ankles, dragged her down, and stru

2015Id. at *5 . 6 The court defined the “pipeline approach” as the application of “a new legal principle ‘to litigants at bar, to all actions pending on the date of the decision announcing the change becomes final[,] and to all causes of action arising thereafter.’” Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 608 (quoting Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379, 379 (Tenn. 1986)). -17- In State v. Jonathan Kyle Hulse, we held that the absence of a White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant raped the victim and then chased her out of his home, grabbed her by the ankles, dragged her down, and stru

2015In Cecil , we held that the absence of the White instruction, when warranted, results in constitutional error. 11 Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 610 (citing State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 60 (Tenn.2005)) (noting that the failure to properly instruct the jury pursuant to White is a “failure to instruct the jury on a material element of an offense,” resulting in constitutional error).

2015In Cecil , we held that the absence of the White instruction, when warranted, results in constitutional error. 11 Cecil, 409 S.W.3d at 610 (citing State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 60 (Tenn.2005)) (noting that the failure to properly instruct the jury pursuant to White is a “failure to instruct the jury on a material element of an offense,” resulting in constitutional error).

2014We read White as requiring the expanded kidnapping instruction only when the jury is required to determine whether the defendant committed dual offenses of kidnapping and an accompanying crime for which some measure of detention was necessary against the 7 This is particularly the case when the “incidental” crime consists of the terrifying experience of being detained in a separate location at gunpoint. 8 In State v. Franklin, this Court determined that “the proper unit of prosecution for aggravated robbery in Tennessee is the number of thefts rather than the number of victims.” 130 S.W.3d 789

2014We read White as requiring the expanded kidnapping instruction only when the jury is required to determine whether the defendant committed dual offenses of kidnapping and an accompanying crime for which some measure of detention was necessary against the 7 This is particularly the case when the “incidental” crime consists of the terrifying experience of being detained in a separate location at gunpoint. 8 In State v. Franklin, this Court determined that “the proper unit of prosecution for aggravated robbery in Tennessee is the number of thefts rather than the number of victims.” 130 S.W.3d 789

2013Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 ; Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835 ; see State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

2013State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2011-01210-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 4046608, at *10 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013); White, 362 S.W.3d at 580 n.20; State v. Robert Fusco, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2012-01068-CCA-RM-CD, 2012 WL 6062856, at *19 (Tenn. Crim.

2013State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2011-01210-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 4046608, at *10 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013); White, 362 S.W.3d at 580 n.20; State v. Robert Fusco, --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2012-01068-CCA-RM-CD, 2012 WL 6062856, at *19 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See id. at 192-93 .