White standard in Pennsylvania

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding defendant’s standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2025“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute[] and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding defendant’s standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2024See id. at 1289 .

2023Before reviewing the merits of White’s claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief -6- J-S39024-23 includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a

2023But 43 Id. at 132 (White, J., concurring). 44 Id. (quoting Walter, 447 U.S. at 659 n.12 (Stevens, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the Court)). [J-82-2022, 23 MAP 2022] - 17 in Jacobsen, the employees had already breached the package and observed the items directly, thereby eliminating the defendant’s expectation of privacy—an expectation that would remain in the case of a mere report. 45 In truth, I find this response at best unpersuasive, and arguably non-responsive to Justice White’s objection.

2023But 43 Id. at 132 (White, J., concurring). 44 Id. (quoting Walter, 447 U.S. at 659 n.12 (Stevens, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the Court)). [J-82-2022, 23 MAP 2022] - 17 in Jacobsen, the employees had already breached the package and observed the items directly, thereby eliminating the defendant’s expectation of privacy—an expectation that would remain in the case of a mere report. 45 In truth, I find this response at best unpersuasive, and arguably non-responsive to Justice White’s objection.

2022Trial, 9/25/17, at 29-38. 5Although he does not specify so in his argument, it appears from the “factual history” section of White’s brief that the “alibi defense” and “material evidence” referred to is the alleged missing video from the north end of the Wawa parking lot. -5- J-S17024-22 Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2021La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).

2020See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 , 68 n.4 (“The [Labron] Court's analysis proved wrong; on remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding . . . .”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2019Sexual Assault is enumerated under [the] RRRI [Act] as an offense rendering a [d]efendant per se ineligible for the RRRI program. [See 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(4) (setting forth the definition of an “eligible offender” under the RRRI Act).] Not only is Sexual Assault an offense for which SORNA registration is required, Sexual Assault is arguably a personal injury crime as described in the “Crime Victim’s Act[,]” [see 18 P.S. § 11.101 et seq.; see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(3) (providing that an RRRI- eligible offender “[h]as not been found guilty of or previously convicted of … a personal injury crime as

2019See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 279 (Pa. Super. 2000).

2019See id.

2018See Commonwealth v. Bunn, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that a substantial question is raised where it is alleged that the court imposed an aggravated-range sentence without considering mitigating circumstances).

2017See Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[A]rguments that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does present a substantial question whereas a statement that the court failed to consider facts of record, though necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721 has been rejected.”) As such, we will address White’s claim on its merits.

2016In addition, where, as here, the trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, we will presume it was “aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).7 Therefore, this claim warrants no relief. ____________________________________________ 7 Moreover, White’s claim has no merit.

2016See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 A.3d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “[i]f no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (recognizing that “[the PCRA] provides for an action by which ... persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”); see also Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that when considering what types of claims are cognizable under the PCRA, “the scope of the PCRA eligibility requirem

2016See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 A.3d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “[i]f no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (recognizing that “[the PCRA] provides for an action by which ... persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”); see also Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that when considering what types of claims are cognizable under the PCRA, “the scope of the PCRA eligibility requirem

2016See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 A.3d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “[i]f no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (recognizing that “[the PCRA] provides for an action by which ... persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”); see also Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that when considering what types of claims are cognizable under the PCRA, “the scope of the PCRA eligibility requirem

2010See Summers, 886 A.2d at 248 (OISR) (“I express no opinion on whether [the TaylorfWhite ] standard or the less stringent standard [of McCauley ] requiring only shortness of breath is the proper standard, as I conclude that the plaintiffs in the present cases have satisfied both.”). 16 An analysis under the Taylor/White test is simple: both men clearly suffer from “physical symptoms” and “functional impairments.” They have been forced into retirement, cannot walk short distances without becoming short of breath, nor can they enjoy fishing.

2010See Summers, 886 A.2d at 248 (OISR) ("I express no opinion on whether [the Taylor/White ] standard or the less stringent standard [of McCauley ] requiring only shortness of breath is the proper standard, as I conclude that the plaintiffs in the present cases have satisfied both."). [16] An analysis under the Taylor/White test is simple: both men clearly suffer from "physical symptoms" and "functional impairments." They have been forced into retirement, cannot walk short distances without becoming short of breath, nor can they enjoy fishing.

2006Since 1995 this Court has been called upon to apply the White standard in a variety of factual circumstances, the following of which are relevant to the present matter: — In Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa.Super. 616 , 662 A.2d 1131 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 605 , 674 A.2d 1070 (1996), this Court held that even though the defendant’s parole officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s trank, “[b]ecause the car was in the control and dominion of the officers, and no discernible exigency was present, the warrantless search violated Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constit

2006Since 1995 this Court has been called upon to apply the White standard in a variety of factual circumstances, the following of which are relevant to the present matter: — In Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa.Super. 616 , 662 A.2d 1131 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 605 , 674 A.2d 1070 (1996), this Court held that even though the defendant’s parole officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s trank, “[b]ecause the car was in the control and dominion of the officers, and no discernible exigency was present, the warrantless search violated Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constit

2006Since 1995 this Court has been called upon to apply the White standard in a variety of factual circumstances, the following of which are relevant to the present matter: — In Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa.Super. 616 , 662 A.2d 1131 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 605 , 674 A.2d 1070 (1996), this Court held that even though the defendant’s parole officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s trank, “[b]ecause the car was in the control and dominion of the officers, and no discernible exigency was present, the warrantless search violated Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constit

2006Since 1995 this Court has been called upon to apply the White standard in a variety of factual circumstances, the following of which are relevant to the present matter: — In Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa.Super. 616 , 662 A.2d 1131 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 605 , 674 A.2d 1070 (1996), this Court held that even though the defendant’s parole officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s trank, “[b]ecause the car was in the control and dominion of the officers, and no discernible exigency was present, the warrantless search violated Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constit