White test in California

2022It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier of fact and not t

2022It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier of fact and not t

2025(Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 919-922 .) As stated above, we do not weigh the evidence at this stage of the analysis but do consider the facts to determine whether White can establish a prima facie probability of prevailing on his claim and whether defendants have defeated White’s claim as a matter of law.

2025(Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 919-922 .) As stated above, we do not weigh the evidence at this stage of the analysis but do consider the facts to determine whether White can establish a prima facie probability of prevailing on his claim and whether defendants have defeated White’s claim as a matter of law.

2025(See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 ; Dickinson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163-1164.) The statements were also published in a Slack channel accessible by 3,000 individuals—including faculty, recent graduates, and 8 The SSI Slack post stated: “Hello everyone, in light of recent events DEI would like to make a statement about the removal of [White] from the SSI Slack: [¶] [White], former SSI copresident, has been found to have severely violated several clauses of the general membership agreement, and has gone against the ethics and general contracts of the club.

2025(See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 ; Dickinson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163-1164.) The statements were also published in a Slack channel accessible by 3,000 individuals—including faculty, recent graduates, and 8 The SSI Slack post stated: “Hello everyone, in light of recent events DEI would like to make a statement about the removal of [White] from the SSI Slack: [¶] [White], former SSI copresident, has been found to have severely violated several clauses of the general membership agreement, and has gone against the ethics and general contracts of the club.

2025The gist of the communications concern White’s violation of SSI’s membership agreement due to his unethical behavior and White’s alleged sexual harm and violence.8 (See Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 702 .) The statements consist of non-conditional and inflammatory terminology that harms White’s reputation.

2025The gist of the communications concern White’s violation of SSI’s membership agreement due to his unethical behavior and White’s alleged sexual harm and violence.8 (See Issa, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 702 .) The statements consist of non-conditional and inflammatory terminology that harms White’s reputation.

2025(See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 ; Dickinson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163-1164.) The statements were also published in a Slack channel accessible by 3,000 individuals—including faculty, recent graduates, and 8 The SSI Slack post stated: “Hello everyone, in light of recent events DEI would like to make a statement about the removal of [White] from the SSI Slack: [¶] [White], former SSI copresident, has been found to have severely violated several clauses of the general membership agreement, and has gone against the ethics and general contracts of the club.

2025(See Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 ; Dickinson, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1163-1164.) The statements were also published in a Slack channel accessible by 3,000 individuals—including faculty, recent graduates, and 8 The SSI Slack post stated: “Hello everyone, in light of recent events DEI would like to make a statement about the removal of [White] from the SSI Slack: [¶] [White], former SSI copresident, has been found to have severely violated several clauses of the general membership agreement, and has gone against the ethics and general contracts of the club.

2016It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for 34 an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567, italics added.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier

2016It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for 34 an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567, italics added.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier

2022It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier of fact and not t

2022It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier of fact and not t

2016It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for 34 an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567, italics added.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier

2016It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for 34 an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 714-715 .) “ ‘The scope of a corporate employee’s discretion and authority under our [managing agent] test is therefore a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.’ ([ White, supra, 21 Cal.4th] at p. 567, italics added.) If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier

2026(See, e.g., Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1122–1123; Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1177–1178.) In light of our reversal, we do not reach White’s challenge to the awards as “shockingly excessive for work related to an anti- SLAPP motion.” III.

2026(See, e.g., Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1122–1123; Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1177–1178.) In light of our reversal, we do not reach White’s challenge to the awards as “shockingly excessive for work related to an anti- SLAPP motion.” III.

2026In articulating how animal comparisons can evoke implicit bias, the article cites the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168 , 192 and its acceptance of a death penalty summation in which the prosecutor described the defendant as an “ ‘animal’ ” who “ ‘shouldn’t be [let] out of his cell unless he has a leash on him.’ ” (Prasad, at p. 3106, fn. 141.) In short, the Legislature’s citation to these articles reveals that the prohibition of animal comparisons with implicitly racist impact is not limited to any specific discriminatory caricature — calling J

2026We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants. [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, we do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier.” (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 .) 48 “consider the significance of the resource to [the] tribe.” Dr. White’s analysis was directly relevant to the first of the two issues that section 21074(a)(2) required the Council to consider.

2025Similarly, they argue that because Ramirez admitted she was not aware of Bala’s conduct until August 2019, she “could not have experienced severe and pervasive workplace harassment over an act of which she was not aware.” 35 However, “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct [that] a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’ ” ( Rehmani, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951–952, quoting Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) The

2025Similarly, they argue that because Ramirez admitted she was not aware of Bala’s conduct until August 2019, she “could not have experienced severe and pervasive workplace harassment over an act of which she was not aware.” 35 However, “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct [that] a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’ ” ( Rehmani, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951–952, quoting Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) The

2025But the sole case White cites, Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004 (Spinks) does not support White’s claim here.

2025In Spinks, the reviewing court held a landlord’s conduct could be considered outrageous when it unlawfully evicted the plaintiff by violating a specific statute “forbidding landlords from changing locks to terminate occupancy[,]” causing the plaintiff “to leave her home without benefit of judicial process.” ( Spinks, supra, at p. 1045 .) The Spinks court also found significant that the plaintiff was left “particularly vulnerable” to the dangers of sudden eviction by a 16 recent surgery, which limited her mobility and left her unable to work.

2025Similarly, they argue that because Ramirez admitted she was not aware of Bala’s conduct until August 2019, she “could not have experienced severe and pervasive workplace harassment over an act of which she was not aware.” 35 However, “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct [that] a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’ ” ( Rehmani, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951–952, quoting Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) The

2025(See, e.g., Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th 264 [based on totality of circumstances, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude the relevant language constituted harassment directed at plaintiff because of her sex within the meaning of the FEHA, or that the “particular comments were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a work environment that was hostile or abusive to plaintiff in violation of the FEHA”]; Capitol City Foods, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 1042 [where plaintiff was raped by her supervisor outside of work hours at supervisor’s parents’ house, insufficient evidence of nexus between su

2025(See, e.g., Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th 264 [based on totality of circumstances, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude the relevant language constituted harassment directed at plaintiff because of her sex within the meaning of the FEHA, or that the “particular comments were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a work environment that was hostile or abusive to plaintiff in violation of the FEHA”]; Capitol City Foods, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 1042 [where plaintiff was raped by her supervisor outside of work hours at supervisor’s parents’ house, insufficient evidence of nexus between su

2025(See, e.g., Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th 264 [based on totality of circumstances, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude the relevant language constituted harassment directed at plaintiff because of her sex within the meaning of the FEHA, or that the “particular comments were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a work environment that was hostile or abusive to plaintiff in violation of the FEHA”]; Capitol City Foods, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 1042 [where plaintiff was raped by her supervisor outside of work hours at supervisor’s parents’ house, insufficient evidence of nexus between su

2024Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Leon, evidence about the extent of the two witnesses’ familiarity with White’s voice “went to the weight, not the admissibility, of [their] testimony.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601 .) Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled White’s objection and admitted the challenged testimony.

2021His brief argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion and disavows the assertion in White’s brief that “Appellant requests that this court independently examine the entire record on appeal.” Discussion Wende holds that, on appeal from a conviction, the constitution requires a court of appeal “to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 .) Our Supreme Court has clarified that this rule applies “[i]n an indigent criminal defendant’s first a

2021(Cf. Larsen, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 127, review granted [a credible “gateway” claim of actual innocence in a federal habeas proceeding requires “‘new reliable evidence— whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial’”].) Indeed, because it was White’s burden to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence and the Board found he failed to carry that burden, the proper formulation of the standard of review is whether “‘the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter