White motion in Ohio

2020He raises that the vehicle White was driving stopped in a legal parking space and the officers could have decided to leave the vehicle there rather than towing it. {¶ 16} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the -6- trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592 , 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist.

2013Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.’ ” Id. {¶ 12} In sustaining White’s motion to suppress, the trial court found the following relevant facts: On March 16, 2012, Officer Hammermeister observed a female1 sitting in her parked car in the rear of the Wegerzyn Garden MetroPark parking lot.

2003A claimant may opt to file within two years of treatment or within two years of diagnosis or within two years after the claimant was forced out of his job due to the affects of his occupational disease, whichever is later.” Heard v. Conrad (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 503, 509 , 741 N.E.2d 897 . {¶ 62} The majority emphasizes that White intended for its test to be only an instructional guide and the fluid nature of that test.

2003A claimant may opt to file within two years of treatment or within two years of diagnosis or within two years after the claimant was forced out of his job due to the affects of his occupational disease, whichever is later.” Heard v. Conrad (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 503, 509 , 741 N.E.2d 897 . {¶ 62} The majority emphasizes that White intended for its test to be only an instructional guide and the fluid nature of that test.

2023The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6502 , 819 N.E.2d 687 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). {¶12} White’s appellate remedies were exhausted in 1994 after this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and he did not appeal that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.

2023The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6502 , 819 N.E.2d 687 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). {¶12} White’s appellate remedies were exhausted in 1994 after this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and he did not appeal that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.

2023The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6502 , 819 N.E.2d 687 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). {¶12} White’s appellate remedies were exhausted in 1994 after this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and he did not appeal that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.

2023The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2004-Ohio-6502 , 819 N.E.2d 687 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186 , 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). {¶12} White’s appellate remedies were exhausted in 1994 after this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and he did not appeal that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.

2022White’s claim of racial bias is based solely on his assertion that he is black, Lindsey is white, and Treyshawn is biracial with light skin. {¶ 15} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” (Citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 .

2022Ames v. Pokorny, 164 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2021-Ohio-2070 , 173 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 6 . {¶ 12} The Tenth District misconstrued White’s claim.

2022Ames v. Pokorny, 164 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2021-Ohio-2070 , 173 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 6 . {¶ 12} The Tenth District misconstrued White’s claim.

2022Bank of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio App.3d 209, 210 , 444 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist.1981). {¶ 21} Because the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony was for the magistrate to determine, and because there is nothing in the record supporting White’s claim that the magistrate exhibited racial bias by choosing to credit Treyshawn and Lindsey’s testimony, White’s claim that he did not receive a fair trial lacks merit and is overruled.

2022Bank of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio App.3d 209, 210 , 444 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist.1981). {¶ 21} Because the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony was for the magistrate to determine, and because there is nothing in the record supporting White’s claim that the magistrate exhibited racial bias by choosing to credit Treyshawn and Lindsey’s testimony, White’s claim that he did not receive a fair trial lacks merit and is overruled.

2022In the trial court’s ruling on White’s motion for new trial, the trial court noted that “even if a portion of [the trace evidence expert’s] testimony was excluded it would not have changed the verdict in this case * * * due to the overwhelming evidence presented at trial.” The presumption that a trial court only considered reliable, relevant, and competent evidence remains unless “it affirmatively appears to the contrary.” Waters at ¶ 18, citing State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353 , 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992).

2022In the trial court’s ruling on White’s motion for new trial, the trial court noted that “even if a portion of [the trace evidence expert’s] testimony was excluded it would not have changed the verdict in this case * * * due to the overwhelming evidence presented at trial.” The presumption that a trial court only considered reliable, relevant, and competent evidence remains unless “it affirmatively appears to the contrary.” Waters at ¶ 18, citing State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353 , 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992).

2022Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 , at syllabus.

2022Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 , at syllabus.

2022White’s claim of racial bias is based solely on his assertion that he is black, Lindsey is white, and Treyshawn is biracial with light skin. {¶ 15} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” (Citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 .

2022White’s claim of racial bias is based solely on his assertion that he is black, Lindsey is white, and Treyshawn is biracial with light skin. {¶ 15} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” (Citations omitted.) State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 .

2022“Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2008-Ohio-545 , ¶ 12. “‘A vaguely titled motion, including a motion to correct or vacate a judgment or sentence,’ may be treated as a petition for post[-]conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) when the motion was filed after a direct appeal, alleged a denial of constitutional rights, sought to render the judgment void or voidable, and requested that the judgment and sentence be vacated.” State v. Higgins, 9

2022Id., citing State v. Bolton, 2017-Ohio-8903 , 100 N.E.3d 1275, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). {¶ 37} Grange has suggested potential assignments of error.

2022Darke No. 2014-CA-8, 2015-Ohio-198, ¶ 15 .

2020Counsel noted potential assignments of error related to the trial court’s denial of White’s motion to suppress and whether White’s conviction was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of evidence. {¶ 14} Pursuant to Anders, we must determine, “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Anders at 744 ; Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

2020Counsel noted potential assignments of error related to the trial court’s denial of White’s motion to suppress and whether White’s conviction was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of evidence. {¶ 14} Pursuant to Anders, we must determine, “after a full examination of all the proceedings,” whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Anders at 744 ; Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 346 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

2020State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2016-Ohio-2708, ¶ 24 . {¶16} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly overruled White's motion to suppress, as he voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights before giving his confession.

2020State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2016-Ohio-2708, ¶ 24 . {¶16} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly overruled White's motion to suppress, as he voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights before giving his confession.

2019No. 03AP-1039, 2004-Ohio-5062, ¶ 18 . {¶ 16} White's challenge to the trial court's denial of his June 2017 request to compel discovery is also unpersuasive.

2019Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 , 2003-Ohio-5849 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶8} Mr. White’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his argument in this Court were based solely upon Kubisen’s conclusion regarding the form of “a plea of guilty” for purposes of Crim.R. 11(C).

2019Case-Within-a-Case Standard {¶ 20} Michael next argues that the trial court erred when it applied the case-within- a-case standard, rather than the “some evidence” standard, when it granted White’s motion for summary judgment. {¶ 21} Regarding the applicable legal malpractice causation standard that applies to Michael’s claims, this court has distinguished the “some evidence” standard set forth in Vahila, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164 , from the “case-within-a-case” standard set forth in Environmental Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2008-Ohio-3833 , 89

2019Case-Within-a-Case Standard {¶ 20} Michael next argues that the trial court erred when it applied the case-within- a-case standard, rather than the “some evidence” standard, when it granted White’s motion for summary judgment. {¶ 21} Regarding the applicable legal malpractice causation standard that applies to Michael’s claims, this court has distinguished the “some evidence” standard set forth in Vahila, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164 , from the “case-within-a-case” standard set forth in Environmental Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209 , 2008-Ohio-3833 , 89

2019In re Disqualification of Fuerst , 134 Ohio St.3d 1267 , 2012-Ohio-6344 , 984 N.E.2d 1079 , ¶ 14.

2019In re Disqualification of Fuerst , 134 Ohio St.3d 1267 , 2012-Ohio-6344 , 984 N.E.2d 1079 , ¶ 14.

2017Knox No. 03 CA 12, 2003-Ohio-6799, ¶ 20 , quoting United States v. Curry, 497 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir.1974).