White standard in Indiana

2020See Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002) (“We do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.”). [9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

2014See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435 .

2007In Robertson v. State, a separate panel rejected the White analysis and, instead, held that “the advisory sentencing statute, IC 35-50-2-1.3, is clear and unambiguous and imposes a separate and distinct limitation on a trial court’s ability to deviate from the advisory sentence for any sentence running consecutively.” 860 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. grant *559 ed, 11 The Robertson court expressed concern about the result in White: Our concern with the analysis in White is that (1) it renders the language in IC 35-50-2-1.3 surplusage since the consecutive sentencing statute, IC 35

2007In Robertson v. State, a separate panel rejected the White analysis and, instead, held that “the advisory sentencing statute, IC 35-50-2-1.3, is clear and unambiguous and imposes a separate and distinct limitation on a trial court’s ability to deviate from the advisory sentence for any sentence running consecutively.” 860 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. grant *559 ed, 11 The Robertson court expressed concern about the result in White: Our concern with the analysis in White is that (1) it renders the language in IC 35-50-2-1.3 surplusage since the consecutive sentencing statute, IC 35

2026Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-959 | June 2, 2026 Page 29 of 34 ‘high degree’ of necessity[.]” Id. (first quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); and then quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 ). [61] In denying White’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial “due to the lack of jurors” and because it was “not . . . agreeable to continuing with eleven . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 163-64.

2019By “offer[ing] no convincing reason for foregoing the opportunity to fully present [her] claims in a more timely fashion,” Hilliard v. Jacobs, 927 N.E.2d 393, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), White seemingly circumvented procedure all in the name of ignorance.4 The trial court was well within its discretion to deny White’s motion.

2017Alvies v. State, 795 N.E.2d 493, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. [34] The State urges us to resolve White’s claim in reliance on the rule that a defendant may not premise a mistrial on his own misconduct.

2017See Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 394 (holding issue properly submitted to jury); see also Appellee’s Br. at 23 (“[Had it credited White’s testimony], the jury could have determined that the drug deal could have been Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A04-1610-PC-2490 | July 27, 2017 Page 13 of 21 concluded in a peaceful manner had it not been for James . . . attacking [White].”). [25] White appears to believe that, but for Epstein, the jury would have never heard anything at all about cocaine.

2017This allegation misunderstands the law of self-defense. [22] The general rule of self-defense in Indiana is that a defendant wishing to raise it “must show that he was in a place where he had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002).

2017White already anticipated the wrongfulness of his planned act, id. (“I might be in the hole by tonight.”), undermining White’s claim that he was afraid rather than angry when Hetrick approached his cell.

2014"To state a so-called ‘class-of-one’ equal protection claim, [the plaintiff] must - allege that he was ‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir.2012) (citations omitted).

2014Initially, we note that “a defendant must maintain a position reasonably consistent with his request for a speedy trial and must object, at the earliest opportunity, to a trial setting that is beyond the seventy-day time period.” Foster v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1078, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

2013Here, White’s plea agreement specifically provided that he was waiving the right to appeal his sentence, and White acknowledged to the trial court that his plea was voluntary. “[A] trial court is not required to make express findings regarding a defendant[’s] intention to waive his appellate rights.” Id. (citing Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 77 (“Acceptance of the plea agreement containing the waiver provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the trial court’s view, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver.”)).

2013Here, White’s plea agreement specifically provided that he was waiving the right to appeal his sentence, and White acknowledged to the trial court that his plea was voluntary. “[A] trial court is not required to make express findings regarding a defendant[’s] intention to waive his appellate rights.” Id. (citing Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 77 (“Acceptance of the plea agreement containing the waiver provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the trial court’s view, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver.”)).

2012See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786 (appellate court may not review proceedings before, during, or after trial to determine if trial court erred when denying motion to correct erroneous sentence); see also Jones v. State, 544 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 1989) (issues concerning how the trial court weighed factors in sentencing are not included as possible theories for relief pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 , which governs motions to correct erroneous sentences).

2012See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786 (appellate court may not review proceedings before, during, or after trial to determine if trial court erred when denying motion to correct erroneous sentence); see also Jones v. State, 544 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 1989) (issues concerning how the trial court weighed factors in sentencing are not included as possible theories for relief pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 , which governs motions to correct erroneous sentences).

2003See Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1229 .

2003See Thompson, 389 N.E.2d at 276 .

1995In affirming that judgment, we noted White's impact on Woodford, remarking "that a petitioner so situated should be entitled to file a new petition if he 'has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent." Woodford v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (quoting White, 497 N.E.2d at 906 ).

1995In affirming that judgment, we noted White's impact on Woodford, remarking "that a petitioner so situated should be entitled to file a new petition if he 'has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent." Woodford v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (quoting White, 497 N.E.2d at 906 ).

1989See, e.g., Morlan v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1084 (DeBru-ler, J., dissenting).

1989See, e.g., Morlan v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1084 (DeBru-ler, J., dissenting).

1987See Simpson v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 ; Reid v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; Merriweather v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 209 .

1987See Simpson v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 ; Reid v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; Merriweather v. State (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 209 .