further evidentiary hearing in Alabama

2004Because, in the original order of the Court of Civil Appeals staying the judgment of the juvenile court and requiring it to conduct a further evidentiary hearing, the Court of Civil Appeals had ordered the juvenile court to “make a finding as to whether ‘a parent had subjected the child[ren] to sexual abuse,’ ” 899 So.2d at 265 , and because, pursuant to that mandate and that evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court had found insufficient evidence to support a finding “that the parents or either of them is in fact a perpetrator,” the ultimate reversal by the Court of Civil Appeals implicitly de

2004For this issue the Court of Civil Appeals recognized the ore tenus rule standard of review: that “[a] trial court’s judgment is presumed correct when it is based on ore tenus evidence, and its decision will be set aside only if the record reveals that decision to be plainly and palpably wrong.” 899 So.2d at 267 .

1990In accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte Gordon, 556 So.2d 363 (Ala.1988), this court reversed and remanded this cause with directions to the circuit court to conduct a further evidentiary hearing on the issue of the appellant’s mental competency to stand trial.

1990Gordon v. State, 556 So.2d 365 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).

1987This is not a retreat from our views in Willis, supra. However, if there be some inducement which operated in the mind of the appellant to cause him to enter his plea, then the appellant should be given an opportunity to bring this out.

1982Because this case, involving a noncompet-ition agreement, had been tried and was pending on appeal prior to the release of this Court’s opinion in DeVoe v. Cheatham, 413 So.2d 1141 (Ala.1982), this cause is remanded for reconsideration in light of the guidelines set forth in DeVoe, supra. Upon the trial court’s reconsideration (with or without a further evidentiary hearing, at its discretion), a report of its findings and order is due in this Court not later than 60 days from the date of the order of remand.

1982Because this case, involving a noncompet-ition agreement, had been tried and was pending on appeal prior to the release of this Court’s opinion in DeVoe v. Cheatham, 413 So.2d 1141 (Ala.1982), this cause is remanded for reconsideration in light of the guidelines set forth in DeVoe, supra. Upon the trial court’s reconsideration (with or without a further evidentiary hearing, at its discretion), a report of its findings and order is due in this Court not later than 60 days from the date of the order of remand.

1972Pertinence for the instant enquiry is found in the -grt-Miranda tried case of Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 , 22 L.Ed.2d 684 from which I excerpt (pp. 738, 739, 89 S.Ct. p. 1424): “ * * * Shortly after he [Frazier] began he again showed signs of reluctance and said, T think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more.

1972Pertinence for the instant enquiry is found in the -grt-Miranda tried case of Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 , 22 L.Ed.2d 684 from which I excerpt (pp. 738, 739, 89 S.Ct. p. 1424): “ * * * Shortly after he [Frazier] began he again showed signs of reluctance and said, T think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more.

1972We think, therefore, that justice will be best served by holding a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether Phelps voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.” Citing Pettyjohn v. United States, supra, and United States v. Thompson, supra, the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Stevens, 445 F.2d 304 , that a signed writing was not indispensable to waiving the Miranda rights.