further evidentiary hearing in New York

2021In any event, the Family Court properly determined that a further evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the court possessed sufficient information to render an informed decision on the child's best interests, based on petitioner's unrebutted testimony and because respondent made no further offer of proof that would have affected the outcome of the proceeding ( see Matter of Fayona C. v Christopher T. , 103 AD3d 424 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Matter of Tony R. v Stephanie D ., 146 AD3d 691 [1st Dept 2017]; compare S.L. v J.R ., 27 NY3d 558, 564 [2016]).

2021In any event, the Family Court properly determined that a further evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the court possessed sufficient information to render an informed decision on the child's best interests, based on petitioner's unrebutted testimony and because respondent made no further offer of proof that would have affected the outcome of the proceeding ( see Matter of Fayona C. v Christopher T. , 103 AD3d 424 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Matter of Tony R. v Stephanie D ., 146 AD3d 691 [1st Dept 2017]; compare S.L. v J.R ., 27 NY3d 558, 564 [2016]).

2013Contrary to appellant father’s contention, the Family Court properly determined, in the combined family offense and custody modification order appealed, that a further evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the Court possessed sufficient information to render an informed decision based on its extensive history with the parties and because the father made no further offer of proof that would have affected the outcome (see Matter of James M. v Kevin M., 99 AD3d 911, 913 [2d Dept 2012]; Rodman v Friedman, 33 AD3d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 895 [2007]).

2013Contrary to appellant father’s contention, the Family Court properly determined, in the combined family offense and custody modification order appealed, that a further evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the Court possessed sufficient information to render an informed decision based on its extensive history with the parties and because the father made no further offer of proof that would have affected the outcome (see Matter of James M. v Kevin M., 99 AD3d 911, 913 [2d Dept 2012]; Rodman v Friedman, 33 AD3d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 895 [2007]).

1977That court elected "not to grapple with the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a fullfledged arrest.” (Morales v New York, 396 US 102, 105-106 .) While the court concluded that Morales’ confession was voluntary, it vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a further evidentiary hearing.

1977Accordingly, we remit the case for a further evidentiary hearing (see Morales v New York, 396 US 102 ; People v Dunaway, 38 NY2d 812 ) at which there should be, for example, a thorough exploration of the circumstances of the continuing police confrontation with the defendant and the manner, intensity and duration of the interrogation.

2021The advantageous nature of the agreement undercuts defendant's contention that his plea was coerced, and we do not find that Supreme Court abused its discretion in declining to conduct a further evidentiary hearing following defendant's statement at sentencing ( see People v Fiumefreddo , 82 NY2d at 547-548 ).

2002Were we to address the modification, we would have found no error since Family Court “possess [ed] sufficient information to en able it to engage in an independent comprehensive review of the child Iren’s] best interest [s]” (Matter of Williams v Mullineaux, 271 AD2d 869, 870 ), without the need for a further evidentiary hearing (cf, Matter of Davies v Davies, 223 AD2d 884, 886-887 ).

2002Were we to address the modification, we would have found no error since Family Court “possess [ed] sufficient information to en able it to engage in an independent comprehensive review of the child Iren’s] best interest [s]” (Matter of Williams v Mullineaux, 271 AD2d 869, 870 ), without the need for a further evidentiary hearing (cf, Matter of Davies v Davies, 223 AD2d 884, 886-887 ).

2001Defendant’s moving papers were devoid of factual allegations to support his present claim that the seizure of certain items not listed in the warrant failed to meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine (see, People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 110 ).

1998In the meantime, petitioner appealed Family Court’s November 1995 order and this Court reversed the order and remitted the matter to Family Court for a further evidentiary hearing and a de novo determination to consider Alexander’s best interest in light of, inter alia, the death of his brother (see, 240 AD2d 865 ).

1996In the absence of "unusual” events, posttrial changes in value are generally irrelevant (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [4] [b]; McSparron v McSpar ron, 87 NY2d 275, 287-288 ; Greenwald v Greenwald, 164 AD2d 706, 721 , lv denied 78 NY2d 855 ) and given the conclusory nature of defendant’s claim that the "financial circumstances of the parties had understandably changed”, the question as to whether a further evidentiary hearing was required was a matter squarely within the trial court’s discretion (see, McSparron v McSparron, supra, at 288).

1996Next, although Supreme Court appeared to consider the appropriate factors (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]), in our view the court abused its discretion in determining both the amount and the duration of maintenance (see, Weaver v Weaver, 192 AD2d 777, 778 ; Verrilli v Verrilli, 172 AD2d 990, 993 , lv denied 78 NY2d 863 ).

1996Next, although Supreme Court appeared to consider the appropriate factors (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]), in our view the court abused its discretion in determining both the amount and the duration of maintenance (see, Weaver v Weaver, 192 AD2d 777, 778 ; Verrilli v Verrilli, 172 AD2d 990, 993 , lv denied 78 NY2d 863 ).

1996In the absence of "unusual” events, posttrial changes in value are generally irrelevant (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [4] [b]; McSparron v McSpar ron, 87 NY2d 275, 287-288 ; Greenwald v Greenwald, 164 AD2d 706, 721 , lv denied 78 NY2d 855 ) and given the conclusory nature of defendant’s claim that the "financial circumstances of the parties had understandably changed”, the question as to whether a further evidentiary hearing was required was a matter squarely within the trial court’s discretion (see, McSparron v McSparron, supra, at 288).

1983When an account is established payable “to either or survivor,” a presumption is created that a joint account was intended which at the time of the death of one of the tenants, entitles the survivor to the whole thereof (Matter ofBricker [Krimer] v Krimer, 13 NY2d 22 ; Walsh v Keenan, 293 NY 573 ; Marrow v Moskowitz, 255 NY 219 ; Banking Law, § 675).

1983When an account is established payable “to either or survivor,” a presumption is created that a joint account was intended which at the time of the death of one of the tenants, entitles the survivor to the whole thereof (Matter ofBricker [Krimer] v Krimer, 13 NY2d 22 ; Walsh v Keenan, 293 NY 573 ; Marrow v Moskowitz, 255 NY 219 ; Banking Law, § 675).

1983When an account is established payable “to either or survivor,” a presumption is created that a joint account was intended which at the time of the death of one of the tenants, entitles the survivor to the whole thereof (Matter ofBricker [Krimer] v Krimer, 13 NY2d 22 ; Walsh v Keenan, 293 NY 573 ; Marrow v Moskowitz, 255 NY 219 ; Banking Law, § 675).

1983Accordingly, I would remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, for a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether the warrantless arrest herein was made under exigent circumstances and if the trial court finds that the arrest was improper, whether the defendant’s statements must be excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest or whether there was sufficient attenuation to sustain the admissibility of the statements (see People v Payton, 51 NY2d 169, 176-178 ).

1980Applying this provision in the speedy trial context, we have held that where a defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds specified in CPL 30.30 and includes in his moving papers sworn allegations that there has been an unexcused period of delay in excess of the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted summarily unless the People in some way controvert the factual basis for the motion (People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214 ; cf. People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 ; People v Dean, 45 NY2d 651 ).

1980Applying this provision in the speedy trial context, we have held that where a defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds specified in CPL 30.30 and includes in his moving papers sworn allegations that there has been an unexcused period of delay in excess of the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted summarily unless the People in some way controvert the factual basis for the motion (People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214 ; cf. People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 ; People v Dean, 45 NY2d 651 ).

1980Applying this provision in the speedy trial context, we have held that where a defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds specified in CPL 30.30 and includes in his moving papers sworn allegations that there has been an unexcused period of delay in excess of the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted summarily unless the People in some way controvert the factual basis for the motion (People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214 ; cf. People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 ; People v Dean, 45 NY2d 651 ).

1977"Given an opportunity to develop in an evidentiary hearing the circumstances leading to the detention of Morales and his confessions, the State may be able to show that there was probable cause for an arrest or that Morales’ confrontation with the police was voluntarily undertaken by him or that the confessions were not the product of illegal detention.” ( 396 US, at p 105 .) In compliance with the mandate of the Supreme Court, we remitted the case to Supreme Court, Bronx County, for further proceedings. ( 26 NY2d 844 .) After conducting a suppression hearing, the court held that the defendant

1977Accordingly, we remit the case for a further evidentiary hearing (see Morales v New York, 396 US 102 ; People v Dunaway, 38 NY2d 812 ) at which there should be, for example, a thorough exploration of the circumstances of the continuing police confrontation with the defendant and the manner, intensity and duration of the interrogation.