further evidentiary hearing in California

2014In light of the Supreme Court's unambiguously expressed intent to avoid an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings with respect to equal protection challenges in SVP cases (see People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 ; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864 ), the Supreme Court's denial of review in McKee II, and our conclusions regarding the asserted flaws in McKee II, we find that the equal protection arguments advanced in this appeal are without merit and do not require a remand for a further evidentiary hearing.

2013In light of the Supreme Court's clearly expressed intent to avoid an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings with respect to equal protection challenges in SVP cases (see People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 ; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864 ), the Supreme Court's denial of review in McKee II, and our conclusions regarding the asserted flaws in McKee II, we find the equal protection arguments advanced in this appeal are without merit and do not require a remand for a further evidentiary hearing. 13 DISPOSITION The November 9, 2012 order of commitment is a

2014In light of the Supreme Court's unambiguously expressed intent to avoid an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings with respect to equal protection challenges in SVP cases (see People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 ; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864 ), the Supreme Court's denial of review in McKee II, and our conclusions regarding the asserted flaws in McKee II, we find that the equal protection arguments advanced in this appeal are without merit and do not require a remand for a further evidentiary hearing.

2013In light of the Supreme Court's clearly expressed intent to avoid an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings with respect to equal protection challenges in SVP cases (see People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 ; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864 ), the Supreme Court's denial of review in McKee II, and our conclusions regarding the asserted flaws in McKee II, we find the equal protection arguments advanced in this appeal are without merit and do not require a remand for a further evidentiary hearing. 13 DISPOSITION The November 9, 2012 order of commitment is a

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2025To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 .) In this case, without a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings at the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, we cannot evaluate any evidence presented or offers of proof made to the trial court, and we do not know what arguments, objections, or concessions were made by the parties, including any discussion bearing on whether a further evidentiary hearing was necessary.

2024(See Butler, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1129 .) Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to direct the court to hold a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rosa was, at the time of her murder, acting “in the course of [her] duties” as a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); see § 830.1, subds. (a) & (c); see also People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076 , 1093 [where trial court apparently failed to consider relevant issue in denying resentencing petition, Court of Appeal remanded the case “in the interest of justice” to give the court “a meaningful opportunity to consider” the issue].) B.

2024(People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367 .) 2 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2023In Zamudio, the court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a further evidentiary hearing and deciding the motion based on the parties’ written submissions. ( Zamudio, supra, at p. 201 .) The court stated: 10.

2017Because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA must be addressed by the juvenile court in the first instance, we need not consider the Department's contention that this matter "compares favorably" with In re S.W. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1501 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 665 , in which the Court of Appeal, independently weighing the jurisdictional facts, rejected the mother's claim she was only temporarily absent from Nebraska during the time she lived in a van in California.

2017Because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA must be addressed by the juvenile court in the first instance, we need not consider the Department's contention that this matter "compares favorably" with In re S.W. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1501 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 665 , in which the Court of Appeal, independently weighing the jurisdictional facts, rejected the mother's claim she was only temporarily absent from Nebraska during the time she lived in a van in California.

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2015The determination of whether a procedure violates one’s right to due process under the federal constitution requires consideration of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the 8 official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews v.

2015The determination of whether a procedure violates one’s right to due process under the federal constitution requires consideration of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the 8 official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews v.

2014Where, as here, a plaintiff’s own pleadings contain admissions that establish the basis of an unclean hands defense, the defense may be applied without a further evidentiary hearing. [Citations.]” (Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 .) Applying Peregrine’s unclean hands defense analysis to the present case leads us to the same conclusions.

2013(Cf. In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1080-1081 .) Whether we view the court’s order as a summary denial or a denial following an 6 Father argues the juvenile court erroneously believed an order bypassing reunification services could not be modified by a petition under section 388.

2009Due to the probate court’s lack of compliance with the legal standards and purposes authorized by sections 177.5 and 575.2, the orders are legally erroneous, unsupported by the record, and a prejudicial abuse of discretion. ( Winikow, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 719 at p. 726 ; Moyal, 208 Cal.App.3d 491 at p. 501 ; Conservatorship of Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340 .) DISPOSITION The orders are reversed with directions to vacate them and enter new orders denying any award of sanctions or fees pursuant to the April 11 or 14 orders to show cause.

2009Due to the probate court’s lack of compliance with the legal standards and purposes authorized by sections 177.5 and 575.2, the orders are legally erroneous, unsupported by the record, and a prejudicial abuse of discretion. ( Winikow, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 719 at p. 726 ; Moyal, 208 Cal.App.3d 491 at p. 501 ; Conservatorship of Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340 .) DISPOSITION The orders are reversed with directions to vacate them and enter new orders denying any award of sanctions or fees pursuant to the April 11 or 14 orders to show cause.

2009Due to the probate court’s lack of compliance with the legal standards and purposes authorized by sections 177.5 and 575.2, the orders are legally erroneous, unsupported by the record, and a prejudicial abuse of discretion. ( Winikow, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 719 at p. 726 ; Moyal, 208 Cal.App.3d 491 at p. 501 ; Conservatorship of Scharles, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340 .) DISPOSITION The orders are reversed with directions to vacate them and enter new orders denying any award of sanctions or fees pursuant to the April 11 or 14 orders to show cause.

1992Although it found “the record in this case strongly suggests that a well-trained police officer would have known that the affidavit in question failed to establish probable cause” the court remanded the case for a further evidentiary hearing on the question. ( Maestas, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1221 .)

1973A majority decision of the California Court of Appeal decided (People v. MacDonald (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 508 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]) that this case should be remanded to the superior court for a further evidentiary hearing, so that findings could be made in the light of the Supreme Court’s criteria.

1973A majority decision of the California Court of Appeal decided (People v. MacDonald (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 508 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]) that this case should be remanded to the superior court for a further evidentiary hearing, so that findings could be made in the light of the Supreme Court’s criteria.