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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Arvle Edgar Medlingreen1 sentence1992When the case first came before the 10th Circuit, the Court remanded for a further evidentiary hearing to explore whether the deputy sheriff had so manipulated events as to create a pretext for the search he was reluctant to pursue independently: “Because of the large number of seized items not listed in the warrant,[ 1 ] it is possible the police used this warrant as a pretext for a general search, which would taint the whole search.” United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 411 (10th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Culver v. Maryland Insurance Commissioner
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Yeagy v. State
green
2 sentences1990Yeagy, 63 Md.App. at 8 , 491 A.2d 1199 . 1990Yeagy, 63 Md.App. at 8 , 491 A.2d 1199 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Robert Lee House
green
1 sentence1985United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d at 328 ; United States v. House, 604 F.2d at 1139 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. John Martin
green
1 sentence1985United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d at 328 ; United States v. House, 604 F.2d at 1139 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
See v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 1983It would thus appear that § 551 would not serve to authorize the type of administrative search warrant contemplated by See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. Bobby Joe Chapman, Richard Melvin, Edward A. Coker, and Clark L. Darnell, Cross-Appellees
green
1 sentence1983And cf. Mr. Lucky Messenger Service v. United States, 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978) (the withholding by the Government of $65,000 in seized currency, even following a lawful seizure, for 17 months without any charges being filed was held to be a possibly unlawful retention, necessitating a further evidentiary hearing in that regard); United States v. Chapman, 559 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1977) (following dismissal of indictment, the IRS returned seized documents to the taxpayer but first made copies for itself; this was held not to have been an unlawful retention). 16 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Mr. Lucky Messenger Service, Inc. v. United States of America
green
1 sentence1983And cf. Mr. Lucky Messenger Service v. United States, 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978) (the withholding by the Government of $65,000 in seized currency, even following a lawful seizure, for 17 months without any charges being filed was held to be a possibly unlawful retention, necessitating a further evidentiary hearing in that regard); United States v. Chapman, 559 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1977) (following dismissal of indictment, the IRS returned seized documents to the taxpayer but first made copies for itself; this was held not to have been an unlawful retention). 16 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rhodes v. Warden
green
1 sentence1970App. 24 ; Rhodes v. Warden, supra. We will, therefore, remand the case for a further evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.