hypothetical injury claim (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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hypothetical injury claim in Connecticut

44 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 2003–2026 15 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tagergreen
conn · 2008 · cited in 8 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2025
2 sentences

2025See id., 87 (requiring trial court to assess whether case ‘‘present[s] a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’ (Citations omit- ted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69 , 86–87, 952 A.2d 1 (2008).

28
Francis v. Board of Pardons & Parolesgreen
conn · 2021 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2022–2026
2 sentences

2026Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021); see also Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC, 335 Conn. 586, 604, 239 A.3d 1162 (2020) (“[a] case is not ripe if it presents a hypothetical injury or a claim that is contingent on the happening of some event that has not yet and, indeed, may

2026Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347 , 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021); see also Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC, 335 Conn. 586, 604 , 239 A.3d 1162 (2020) (“[a] case is not ripe if it presents a hypothetical injury or a claim that is contingent on the happening of some event that has not yet and, indeed, ma

26
Esposito v. Specyalskigreen
conn · 2004 · cited in 5 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2004–2010
2 sentences

2010See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 436 , 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (claim presupposing trial court decision on remand not ripe for review); Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 346 , 844 A.2d 211 (2004) (to satisfy ripeness requirement of justiciability, “we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 11 The defendants and Wachovia claim that the trial court’s conclusion that Fitzsimmons had no personal knowledge of the facts regarding

2010See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 436 , 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (claim presupposing trial court decision on remand not ripe for review); Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 346 , 844 A.2d 211 (2004) (to satisfy ripeness requirement of justiciability, “we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 11 The defendants and Wachovia claim that the trial court’s conclusion that Fitzsimmons had no personal knowledge of the facts regarding

15
Cadle Co. v. D'ADDARIOgreen
connappct · 2008 · cited in 4 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2025
2 sentences

2025Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a [reviewing] court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 111 Conn. App. 80 , 82–83, 957 A.2d 536 (2008). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the ques- tion of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time. . . . [T

2025Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a [reviewing] court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 111 Conn. App. 80 , 82–83, 957 A.2d 536 (2008). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the ques- tion of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time. . . . [T

14
Saunders v. KDFBS, LLCgreen
conn · 2020 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021); see also Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC, 335 Conn. 586, 604, 239 A.3d 1162 (2020) (“[a] case is not ripe if it presents a hypothetical injury or a claim that is contingent on the happening of some event that has not yet and, indeed, may

2026Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347 , 358–59, 258 A.3d 71 (2021); see also Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC, 335 Conn. 586, 604 , 239 A.3d 1162 (2020) (“[a] case is not ripe if it presents a hypothetical injury or a claim that is contingent on the happening of some event that has not yet and, indeed, ma

11
Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.green
connappct · 2025 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C., 232 Conn. App. 393, 409 , 337 A.3d 50 (“[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudica- tion, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . . [I]n determining whether a case is ripe, a [trial] court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim Zheng v. Xia whether Whitby School had made a decision regarding the child’s upcoming school year, after which the defen- dant acknowledged that Whitby School, again, would provi

11
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Bookgreen
conn · 2009 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

11
In Re Jalyn H.green
conn · 2009 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

11
Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschkegreen
connappct · 2008 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

11
State v. Kemahgreen
conn · 2008 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 436 , 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (claim presupposing trial court decision on remand not ripe for review); Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 346 , 844 A.2d 211 (2004) (to satisfy ripeness requirement of justiciability, “we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 11 The defendants and Wachovia claim that the trial court’s conclusion that Fitzsimmons had no personal knowledge of the facts regarding

2010See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 436 , 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (claim presupposing trial court decision on remand not ripe for review); Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 346 , 844 A.2d 211 (2004) (to satisfy ripeness requirement of justiciability, “we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 11 The defendants and Wachovia claim that the trial court’s conclusion that Fitzsimmons had no personal knowledge of the facts regarding

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

CaseCitedYears
Milford Power Co v. Alstom Power, Inc. green
conn · 2003
2 sentences

2024Co., 126 Conn. App. 733 , 738–39, 12 A.3d 613 (2011); see also Practice Book § 17-55. ‘‘In light of the rationale of the ripeness requirement, to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 5 ‘‘A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358 , 258 A.3d 71 (2021). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9 Larobina v. Altice Media Solutions, LLC adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . we must be satisfied th

2024Co., 126 Conn. App. 733 , 738–39, 12 A.3d 613 (2011); see also Practice Book § 17-55. ‘‘In light of the rationale of the ripeness requirement, to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 5 ‘‘A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358 , 258 A.3d 71 (2021). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9 Larobina v. Altice Media Solutions, LLC adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . we must be satisfied th

102004–2024
Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry green
conn · 2004
2 sentences

2017Nor do we conclude that, as the plaintiff contends, the appeal is unripe. "[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... [and we therefore] must be satisfied that the case before [us] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry , 271 Conn. 540 , 570, 858 A.2d 709 (2004).

2017Nor do we conclude that, as the plaintiff contends, the appeal is unripe. "[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... [and we therefore] must be satisfied that the case before [us] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry , 271 Conn. 540 , 570, 858 A.2d 709 (2004).

32006–2017
Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission green
conn · 2002
2 sentences

2004Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 144 , 788 A.2d 1158 (2002); we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 626 , 822 A.2d 196 (2003).

2004Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 144 , 788 A.2d 1158 (2002); we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 626 , 822 A.2d 196 (2003).

22003–2004
Orlando v. Liburd green
conn · 2026
1 sentence

2026It is only upon such a deter- mination that the legal elements of ripeness for the [plaintiff’s unjust enrichment] claim . . . can be met . . . .’’ We agree with the plaintiff. ‘‘[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . . [I]n determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and January 6, 2026 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 14

12026–2026
Lewis v. Slack green
connappct · 2008
2 sentences

2025Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 643 , 955 A.2d 620 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953 , 961 A.2d 417 (2008).

2025Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 643 , 955 A.2d 620 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953 , 961 A.2d 417 (2008).

12025–2025
State v. Ouellette green
conn · 2008
1 sentence

2025Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 643 , 955 A.2d 620 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953 , 961 A.2d 417 (2008).

12025–2025
THERGOOD v. Commissioner of Correction green
conn · 2008
1 sentence

2025Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 643 , 955 A.2d 620 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953 , 961 A.2d 417 (2008).

12025–2025
Pringle v. Pattis neutral
connappct · 2022
1 sentence

2024Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire. . . . [I]n determin- ing whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pringle v. Pattis, 212 Conn. App. 736 , 742–43, 276 A.3d 1042 (2022).

12024–2024
Shenkman-Tyler v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. green
connappct · 2011
2 sentences

2024Co., 126 Conn. App. 733 , 738–39, 12 A.3d 613 (2011); see also Practice Book § 17-55. ‘‘In light of the rationale of the ripeness requirement, to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 5 ‘‘A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358 , 258 A.3d 71 (2021). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9 Larobina v. Altice Media Solutions, LLC adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . we must be satisfied th

2024Co., 126 Conn. App. 733 , 738–39, 12 A.3d 613 (2011); see also Practice Book § 17-55. ‘‘In light of the rationale of the ripeness requirement, to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 5 ‘‘A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 358 , 258 A.3d 71 (2021). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9 Larobina v. Altice Media Solutions, LLC adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . we must be satisfied th

12024–2024
Green v. Paz green
connappct · 2022
1 sentence

2022Generally, the exoneration rule provides that ‘‘a legal malpractice claim is not ripe for adjudication unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the relevant underlying conviction has been invalidated.’’ Green v. Paz, 211 Conn. App. 152, 153 , 271 A.3d 1138 (2022).

12022–2022
Mikucka v. St. Lucian's Residence, Inc. neutral
connappct · 2018
1 sentence

2021Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 165–66. ‘‘[B]ecause an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tavani v. Riley, supra, 676.

12021–2021
Reynolds v. Quiros green
ca2 · 2021
1 sentence

2021Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a . . . court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell, supra, 328 Conn. 463 . 96 We note that, while this appeal was pending before this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Reynolds v. Quiros, 990 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2021), which considered a variety of constitu- tional challenges to § 18-10b bro

12021–2021
Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n v. Board of Trustees green
conn · 1996
2 sentences

2020Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 814 , 967 A.2d 1 (2009) (‘‘we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 465 , 673 A.2d 484 (1996) (for association to have standing, it must allege invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical).

2020Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 814 , 967 A.2d 1 (2009) (‘‘we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 465 , 673 A.2d 484 (1996) (for association to have standing, it must allege invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical).

12020–2020
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Lone Star Industries, Inc. green
conn · 2009
2 sentences

2020Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 814 , 967 A.2d 1 (2009) (‘‘we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 465 , 673 A.2d 484 (1996) (for association to have standing, it must allege invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical).

2020Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 814 , 967 A.2d 1 (2009) (‘‘we must be satisfied that the case before the court does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 465 , 673 A.2d 484 (1996) (for association to have standing, it must allege invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical).

12020–2020
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo green
conn · 2010
2 sentences

2020The plaintiff relies on Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, 298 Conn. 748 , 6 A.3d 726 (2010), claiming that ‘‘[n]o party alleged an injury was present’’ in that case.

2020The plaintiff relies on Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, 298 Conn. 748 , 6 A.3d 726 (2010), claiming that ‘‘[n]o party alleged an injury was present’’ in that case.

12020–2020
Perez v. Commissioner of Correction green
conn · 2017
2 sentences

2019"The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 785 , 169 A.3d 851 . "[A] trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire .... [R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez

2019"The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 785 , 169 A.3d 851 . "[A] trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire .... [R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez

12019–2019
In re Pentland green
connappct · 2017
2 sentences

2019"The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 785 , 169 A.3d 851 . "[A] trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire .... [R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez

2019"The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 785 , 169 A.3d 851 . "[A] trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire .... [R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez

12019–2019
Lee v. Harlow, Adams and Friedman, PC neutral
connappct · 2009
2 sentences

2018"In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.... [T]he plaintiff typically proves that the defendant attorney's professional negligence caused injury to the plaintiff by presenting evidence of what would have happened in the underlying action had the defendant not been negligent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. , 116 Conn. App. 289 , 297, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).

2018"In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.... [T]he plaintiff typically proves that the defendant attorney's professional negligence caused injury to the plaintiff by presenting evidence of what would have happened in the underlying action had the defendant not been negligent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. , 116 Conn. App. 289 , 297, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).

12018–2018
Lost Trail, LLC v. Town of Weston green
connappct · 2013
2 sentences

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

2017"It is axiomatic that a claim is not ripe for adjudication when an injury is hypothetical, or a claim [is] contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lost Trail, LLC v. Weston , 140 Conn.App. 136 , 155, 57 A.3d 905 , cert. denied, 308 Conn. 915 , 61 A.3d 1102 (2013) ; see also Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Matschke , 111 Conn.App. 462 , 464, 959 A.2d 652 (2008) ("the rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree

12017–2017
Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill green
conn · 1998
2 sentences

2009“In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998).

2009“In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998).

12009–2009
Schwartz v. Milazzo neutral
conn · 2004
12008–2008
Lind-Larsen v. Fleet National Bank of Connecticut green
conn · 2004
12008–2008
State v. Campbell neutral
connappct · 2004
12008–2008
Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat green
conn · 1999
12004–2004

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-265a (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-29 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-307 (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-310 (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183 (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

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