44 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.green2 sentences2014In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we again turn to the three-factor test articulated in Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho at 94 , 803 P.2d at 1000 . 2014In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we again turn to the three-factor test articulated in Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho at 94 , 803 P.2d at 1000 . | 9 | 11 |
State v. Pagegreen2 sentences2018The Idaho Supreme Court has employed the three-factor test from Brown to determine attenuation: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct. 2 State v. Page , 140 Idaho 841 , 846, 103 P.3d 454 , 459 (2004). 2018The Idaho Supreme Court has employed the three-factor test from Brown to determine attenuation: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct. 2 State v. Page , 140 Idaho 841 , 846, 103 P.3d 454 , 459 (2004). | 5 | 9 |
Baxter v. Craneygreen2 sentences2005Dillon v. *695 Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617 , 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 169 , 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 , 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 2005Dillon v. *695 Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617 , 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 169 , 16 P.3d 263, 266 (2000); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 , 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). | 2 | 3 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2016The Idaho Supreme Court has employed the three-factor test from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) to determine attenuation: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct.2 Page, 140 Idaho at 846 , 103 P.3d at 459 . 2 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) indicated that the test is a totality of the circumstances test, yet focused on these three factors. 5 A. The Elapsed Time Between the Misconduct and the Discovery of the Evidence 2016The Idaho Supreme Court has employed the three-factor test from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) to determine attenuation: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct.2 Page, 140 Idaho at 846 , 103 P.3d at 459 . 2 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) indicated that the test is a totality of the circumstances test, yet focused on these three factors. 5 A. The Elapsed Time Between the Misconduct and the Discovery of the Evidence | 2 | 2 |
Fox v. Mountain West Electric, Inc.green2 sentences2016The three factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703 , 711–12, 52 P.3d 848 , 856–57 (2002). 2016The three factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703 , 711–12, 52 P.3d 848 , 856–57 (2002). | 1 | 4 |
Burns v. Baldwingreen2 sentences2015Burns, 138 Idaho at 486-87 , 65 P.3d at 508-09 . 2015Burns, 138 Idaho at 486-87 , 65 P.3d at 508-09 . | 1 | 2 |
Dillon v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2009A three factor test is used to prove an abuse of discretion: “(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. 2009A three factor test is used to prove an abuse of discretion: "(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2016A district court’s decision regarding a motion to amend the complaint once trial has begun is “necessarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of a showing of the abuse of such discretion the ruling of the trial court should not be set aside on appeal.” Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Const. Co., 91 Idaho 836, 841 , 432 P.2d 780, 785 (1967) (overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795 , 473 P.2d 937, 942 (1970))] To determine whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court uses' a three-factor test. 2016A district court’s decision regarding a motion to amend the complaint once trial has begun is “necessarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of a showing of the abuse of such discretion the ruling of the trial court should not be set aside on appeal.” Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Const. Co., 91 Idaho 836, 841 , 432 P.2d 780, 785 (1967) (overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795 , 473 P.2d 937, 942 (1970))] To determine whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court uses' a three-factor test. | 1 | 1 |
Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Construction Co.green2 sentences2016A district court’s decision regarding a motion to amend the complaint once trial has begun is “necessarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of a showing of the abuse of such discretion the ruling of the trial court should not be set aside on appeal.” Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Const. Co., 91 Idaho 836, 841 , 432 P.2d 780, 785 (1967) (overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795 , 473 P.2d 937, 942 (1970))] To determine whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court uses' a three-factor test. 2016A district court’s decision regarding a motion to amend the complaint once trial has begun is “necessarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of a showing of the abuse of such discretion the ruling of the trial court should not be set aside on appeal.” Gates v. Pickett & Nelson Const. Co., 91 Idaho 836, 841 , 432 P.2d 780, 785 (1967) (overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795 , 473 P.2d 937, 942 (1970))] To determine whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court uses' a three-factor test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Seversongreen2 sentences2015E.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 , 215 P.3d at 424 (describing that, following a timely objection, a district court must “determine whether a conflict actually exists” after a thorough and searching inquiry); Lippert II, 152 Idaho at 887 , 276 P.3d at 759 (explaining that the court “must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant’s complaints”). 9 The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. 2015E.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 , 215 P.3d at 424 (describing that, following a timely objection, a district court must “determine whether a conflict actually exists” after a thorough and searching inquiry); Lippert II, 152 Idaho at 887 , 276 P.3d at 759 (explaining that the court “must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant’s complaints”). 9 The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lippertgreen2 sentences2015E.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 , 215 P.3d at 424 (describing that, following a timely objection, a district court must “determine whether a conflict actually exists” after a thorough and searching inquiry); Lippert II, 152 Idaho at 887 , 276 P.3d at 759 (explaining that the court “must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant’s complaints”). 9 The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. 2015E.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 , 215 P.3d at 424 (describing that, following a timely objection, a district court must “determine whether a conflict actually exists” after a thorough and searching inquiry); Lippert II, 152 Idaho at 887 , 276 P.3d at 759 (explaining that the court “must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant’s complaints”). 9 The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. | 1 | 1 |
LuAnn Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Shubert, 158 Idaho at 100-01 , 343 P.3d at 1107-08 ; Harris v. Indep. 2015See Shubert, 158 Idaho at 100-01 , 343 P.3d at 1107-08 ; Harris v. Indep. | 1 | 1 |
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLCgreen2 sentences2010Indian Springs L.L.C. v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 747 , 215 P.3d 457, 467 (2009). 2010Indian Springs L.L.C. v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 747 , 215 P.3d 457, 467 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Kaysville City v. Mulcahygreen1 sentence2001See also Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (articulating a three factor test for evaluating a tip: (1) the type of tip or informant involved; (2) the details the informant conveyed concerning the criminal activity observed; (3) and the officers personal observations confirming the dispatcher’s report of the informant’s tip). 1 We note that the great majority of states addressing identified citizen reports of drunk driving, on facts similar to those in Larson and Mulcahy , have upheld routine investigatory stops based upon this kind of tip. | 1 | 1 |
City of Minnetonka v. Shepherdgreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887 (Minn.1988); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142 , 499 A.2d 761 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hedgergreen2 sentences2000State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 2000State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 , 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. State, Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2000Cook v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 296 , 985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). 2000Cook v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 296 , 985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
William v. Cenarrusa
green
2 sentences1997In Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 , 682 P.2d 524 (1984), the Court held that the trial court has discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party under the private attorney general doctrine and adopted a three-factor test to determine the right to such an award: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by the litigation; 4 (2) the necessity for private en- *724 foreement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff; and (8) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. 1997In Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 , 682 P.2d 524 (1984), the Court held that the trial court has discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party under the private attorney general doctrine and adopted a three-factor test to determine the right to such an award: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by the litigation; 4 (2) the necessity for private en- *724 foreement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff; and (8) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. | 2 | 1996–1997 |
State v. Fairchild
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Schrecengost
green
2 sentences2015Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 549 , 6 P.3d at 405 . 2015Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 549 , 6 P.3d at 405 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Schoger v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. 2 The State concedes in its brief on appeal that Stadtmiller’s contention that the district court applied an incorrect standard in deciding whether to accept his Alford plea “appears to be well-taken.” 4 Here the district court made it very clear why the court would not accept Stadtmiller’s plea: [B]ased on what you’ve said, Mr. Stadtmiller, I cannot accept your plea. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Winn v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2012“This Court uses a three factor test to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.” *562 Winn, 145 Idaho at 729 , 184 P.3d at 854 . 2012“This Court uses a three factor test to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.” *562 Winn, 145 Idaho at 729 , 184 P.3d at 854 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Utter v. Gibbins
green
1 sentence2009In considering a claim of an abuse of discretion, we apply a three-factor test that focuses upon: “(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. David Lee Green
green
1 sentence2005In Page , our Supreme Court employed a three-factor test to determine attenuation: "(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action." Page, 140 Idaho at 846 , 103 P.3d at 459 (citing Green, 111 F.3d at 521 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bouten Construction Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co.
green
1 sentence2002In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-factor test: “(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Lambert
green
2 sentences2001See, e.g., City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887 (Minn.1988); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142 , 499 A.2d 761 (1985). 2001See, e.g., City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887 (Minn.1988); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142 , 499 A.2d 761 (1985). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1980The “reasons” requirement is well supported by application of the three-factor test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 1980The “reasons” requirement is well supported by application of the three-factor test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.