8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Salt Lake City v. Streetgreen2 sentences2021And Utah courts have articulated a three-factor framework for analyzing whether an informant’s tip provides a basis for reasonable suspicion: “(1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the detail of the information, and (3) corroboration of the tip by the officer’s own observations.” Salt Lake City v. Street, 2011 UT App 111, ¶ 7 , 251 P.3d 862 ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (agreeing that “an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of” an anonymous tip (quotation simplified)). 2021And Utah courts have articulated a three-factor framework for analyzing whether an informant’s tip provides a basis for reasonable suspicion: “(1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the detail of the information, and (3) corroboration of the tip by the officer’s own observations.” Salt Lake City v. Street, 2011 UT App 111, ¶ 7 , 251 P.3d 862 ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (agreeing that “an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of” an anonymous tip (quotation simplified)). | 2 | 2 |
Kaysville City v. Mulcahygreen2 sentences2011In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct.App.1997), we articulated a three-factor framework for analyzing whether an informant's tip provides a reasonable suspicion to support a stop. 2004The three-factor test originated in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct.App.1997). | 1 | 2 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen1 sentence2021And Utah courts have articulated a three-factor framework for analyzing whether an informant’s tip provides a basis for reasonable suspicion: “(1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the detail of the information, and (3) corroboration of the tip by the officer’s own observations.” Salt Lake City v. Street, 2011 UT App 111, ¶ 7 , 251 P.3d 862 ; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (agreeing that “an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of” an anonymous tip (quotation simplified)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Delislegreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293 , 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (1994) ("adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant's due process rights because he cross-examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s "due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 , 642–43 (Vt. 1994) (“adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant’s due process rights because he cross- examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s “due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 41 Tiede | 1 | 1 |
Thorne v. Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293 , 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (1994) ("adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant's due process rights because he cross-examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s "due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 , 642–43 (Vt. 1994) (“adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant’s due process rights because he cross- examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s “due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 41 Tiede | 1 | 1 |
State v. Valenzuelagreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ¶ 15 , 37 P.3d 260 (analyzing whether informant's tip gave rise to probable cause to arrest suspected forger); City of St. 2004See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ¶ 15 , 37 P.3d 260 (analyzing whether informant's tip gave rise to probable cause to arrest suspected forger); City of St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Levin
green
2 sentences2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed 2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed | 2 | 2007–2022 |
In re E.R.
green
2 sentences2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed 2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed 2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re A.B.
green
2 sentences2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed 2022We agree with Mother that the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review because the juvenile court‘s application of the neglect statute in its neglect determination presented a law-like mixed question. ¶23 When determining the standard of review on appeal, we first categorize questions on review into one of three categories: (1) questions of law; (2) questions of fact; or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.26 We afford the factfinder no deference on questions of law, reviewing issues de novo, and the most deference on questions of fact, reviewing only for clear error.27 But mixed | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Sosa-Hurtado
green
1 sentence2019State v. Sosa-Hurtado, 2018 UT App 35, ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Tiedemann
green
2 sentences2017Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 . . 2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 , 642–43 (Vt. 1994) (“adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant’s due process rights because he cross- examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s “due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 41 Tiede | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. DeJesus
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 , 642–43 (Vt. 1994) (“adopt[ing] as the state constitutional standard” a three-factor test under the state due process clause and concluding that the loss of evidence did not violate defendant’s due process rights because he cross- examined a medical examiner who provided the defendant favorable testimony regarding the missing evidence); Thorne v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the appellant’s “due process rights at the revocation hearing were violated by the state’s failure to preserve the videotape”). 41 Tiede | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Rose
neutral
2 sentences2016State v. Rose, 2015 UT App 49, ¶ 10 ,, 345 P.3d 757 (A citizen informant’s tip "creates reasonable suspicion if the information (1) is reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of the criminal activity, and (3) is confirmed by the investigating officer.”); see also State v. Street, 2011 UT App 111, ¶ 7 , 251 P.3d 862 (applying the same test). 2016State v. Rose, 2015 UT App 49, ¶ 10 ,, 345 P.3d 757 (A citizen informant’s tip "creates reasonable suspicion if the information (1) is reliable, (2) provides sufficient detail of the criminal activity, and (3) is confirmed by the investigating officer.”); see also State v. Street, 2011 UT App 111, ¶ 7 , 251 P.3d 862 (applying the same test). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Deluna
green
2 sentences2004Shortly thereafter, in State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 , 40 P.3d 1136 , the court of appeals extended the three-factor analysis to the search warrant context, stating that where "information obtained from informants is the primary source for the search warrant, an analysis of the totality of the cireumstances requires us to consider the three factors articulated by this court in Kaysville v. Mulcahy." Id. at (emphasis added). 2004Shortly thereafter, in State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 , 40 P.3d 1136 , the court of appeals extended the three-factor analysis to the search warrant context, stating that where "information obtained from informants is the primary source for the search warrant, an analysis of the totality of the cireumstances requires us to consider the three factors articulated by this court in Kaysville v. Mulcahy." Id. at (emphasis added). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences2004In Illinois v. Gates, the Court addressed the two-pronged test that originated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and which was followed by Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 2004In Illinois v. Gates, the Court addressed the two-pronged test that originated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and which was followed by Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences2004In Illinois v. Gates, the Court addressed the two-pronged test that originated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and which was followed by Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 2004In Illinois v. Gates, the Court addressed the two-pronged test that originated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and which was followed by Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Saddler
green
2 sentences2004Saddler, 2008 UT App 82 at ¶ 9, 67 P.3d 1025 . 1 1 10 We note that the court of appeals has developed this three-factor analysis in the absence of any direction from us. 2004Saddler, 2008 UT App 82 at ¶ 9, 67 P.3d 1025 . 1 1 10 We note that the court of appeals has developed this three-factor analysis in the absence of any direction from us. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.