Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wesleygreen2 sentences2019In Kamanaʻo, this court adopted the Michigan Supreme Court’s three-factor analysis set out in People v. Wesley, 428 Mich. 14 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** 708, 411 N.W.2d 159 (1987), to ascertain whether a sentencing court erroneously relied on a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt in imposing a sentence. 2016This court then applied a three-factor analysis to determine whether the sentencing court erroneously relied upon the defendant’s refusal to admit guilt: “(1) the defendant’s maintenance of innocence after conviction, (2) the judge’s attempt to get the defendant to admit guilt, and (3) the appearance that, had the defendant affirmatively admitted guilt, his sentence would not have been so severe[.]” Kamana’o, 103 Hawai’i at 323, 82 P.3d at 409 (quoting People v. Wesley, 428 Mich. 708 , 411 N.W.2d 159, 162 (1987)) (internal brackets omitted). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kamana'ogreen2 sentences2019See Kamanaʻo, 103 Hawaiʻi at 323, 82 P.3d at 409 (citation omitted). 2016This court then applied a three-factor analysis to determine whether the sentencing court erroneously relied upon the defendant’s refusal to admit guilt: “(1) the defendant’s maintenance of innocence after conviction, (2) the judge’s attempt to get the defendant to admit guilt, and (3) the appearance that, had the defendant affirmatively admitted guilt, his sentence would not have been so severe[.]” Kamana’o, 103 Hawai’i at 323, 82 P.3d at 409 (quoting People v. Wesley, 428 Mich. 708 , 411 N.W.2d 159, 162 (1987)) (internal brackets omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Hawaii Medical Ass'n v. Hawaii Medical Service Ass'ngreen2 sentences2025Ass'n, Inc., 113 Hawai#i 77, 95, 148 P.3d 1179, 1197 (2006), could not establish standing. 2025Ass'n, Inc., 113 Hawai#i 77, 95, 148 P.3d 1179, 1197 (2006), could not establish standing. | 2 | 2 |
Okada Trucking Co. v. Board of Water Supplygreen2 sentences2009With regard to civil eases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that “the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court’s earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that “in the exercise of this descretion [sic] a 2009With regard to civil cases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9 , 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that "the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires." (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court's earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that "in the exercise of this descretion [sic] | 1 | 2 |
State v. Barrios.green1 sentence2019Kamanaʻo, 103 Hawaiʻi at 323, 82 P.3d at 409 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Barrios, 139 Hawaiʻi at 338, 389 P.3d at 933 (quoting id.). | 1 | 1 |
Fujioka Ex Rel. Fujioka v. Kamgreen2 sentences2009With regard to civil cases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9 , 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that "the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires." (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court's earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that "in the exercise of this descretion [sic] 2009With regard to civil cases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9 , 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that "the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires." (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court's earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that "in the exercise of this descretion [sic] | 1 | 1 |
Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Construction, Inc.green2 sentences2009Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Const, Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 476 , 540 P.2d 978, 985 (1975) (applying the test to issue raised for the first time on appeal from summary judgment which had been "adequately briefed and argued before this court " as in this case (emphasis added)). 2009Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Const, Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 476 , 540 P.2d 978, 985 (1975) (applying the test to issue raised for the first time on appeal from summary judgment which had been "adequately briefed and argued before this court " as in this case (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
445/86 Owners Corp. v. Haydongreen2 sentences2006In 445/86 Owners Corp. v. Haydon, 300 A.D.2d 87 , 751 N.Y.S.2d 456, 457 (2002), the mother-in-law of a tenant/shareholder living alone in a cooperative apartment subject to restrictions on who could live in the unit was considered a licensee. 2006In 445/86 Owners Corp. v. Haydon, 300 A.D.2d 87 , 751 N.Y.S.2d 456, 457 (2002), the mother-in-law of a tenant/shareholder living alone in a cooperative apartment subject to restrictions on who could live in the unit was considered a licensee. | 1 | 1 |
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Mortongreen1 sentence1978NRDC v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1911), motion for summ. reversal denied, 458 F.2d 827 , (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Estencion
green
2 sentences2017Due to pretrial delay, the circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (2012) and the three-factor analysis of State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264 , 625 P.2d 1040 (1981). 2017Due to pretrial delay, the circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (2012) and the three-factor analysis of State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264 , 625 P.2d 1040 (1981). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Montalvo v. Lapez
green
2 sentences2019Finally, eradicating this improper exercise of the circuit courts' inherent power is an issue of "great public import." See , e.g. , Montalvo v. Lopez , 77 Hawai'i 282 , 290-91, 884 P.2d 345 , 353-54 (1994) (applying the three-factor test). 2019Finally, eradicating this improper exercise of the circuit courts' inherent power is an issue of "great public import." See , e.g. , Montalvo v. Lopez , 77 Hawai'i 282 , 290-91, 884 P.2d 345 , 353-54 (1994) (applying the three-factor test). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Fox
green
2 sentences2009With regard to civil cases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9 , 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that "the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires." (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court's earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that "in the exercise of this descretion [sic] 2009With regard to civil cases, this court recognized in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 9 , 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973), that "the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court ... is not inflexible and ... an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires." (Citations omitted.) (Emphases added.) As for the standard to be applied, Fujioka , interpreting this court's earlier decisions, set forth a three-factor test, stating that "in the exercise of this descretion [sic] | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Rogers C. B. Morton, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior
green
1 sentence1978NRDC v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1911), motion for summ. reversal denied, 458 F.2d 827 , (D.C. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton
green
1 sentence1978NRDC v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1911), motion for summ. reversal denied, 458 F.2d 827 , (D.C. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.