Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Foxgreen2 sentences2018See also Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Fox , 346 Md. 484 , 697 A.2d 478 , 485 (1997) (declining to apply federal test of employment instead of the three-factor test adopted by the Maryland legislature). 2018See also Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Fox , 346 Md. 484 , 697 A.2d 478 , 485 (1997) (declining to apply federal test of employment instead of the three-factor test adopted by the Maryland legislature). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 171 , 368 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1977) (restating a three-factor test for determining whether, upon demand, the State has satisfied its constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring a defendant incarcerated out of state to trial). 2013Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 171 , 368 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1977) (restating a three-factor test for determining whether, upon demand, the State has satisfied its constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring a defendant incarcerated out of state to trial). | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Stategreen1 sentence2013In other words, “Indiana has long held that Criminal Rule 4 does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” *885 Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); see also Fisher, 933 N.E.2d at 529 (relying on Howard to conclude that Criminal Rule 4 did not provide a basis for Fisher’s discharge). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Stategreen1 sentence2013In other words, “Indiana has long held that Criminal Rule 4 does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” *885 Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); see also Fisher, 933 N.E.2d at 529 (relying on Howard to conclude that Criminal Rule 4 did not provide a basis for Fisher’s discharge). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Western Reserve Group/Lightning Rod Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2011Subsequent cases have articulated a three-factor test for determining residence: “(1) whether the claimant maintained a physical presence in the named insured’s home; (2) whether she possessed the subjective intent to reside therein; and (3) the nature of her access to the named insured’s home and its contents.” Jones, 699 N.E.2d at 714 (footnotes omitted). 2011In addition, “the fact finder must consider all of the evidence indicative of the claimant’s living habits.” Id. at 714-15 . | 1 | 1 |
PSI Energy, Inc. v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2011See PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943, 962 (Ind.2005) (noting and applying the Restatement elements and citing Burrell with approval); Smith, 796 N.E.2d at 244-45 . | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Pollard v. Criminal Ct. of Marion Cty.green2 sentences2000And as summarized in See v. City of Seattle (1967), 387 U.S. 541, 544 , 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1740 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 , the requirement is “that the subpoena be [ (1) ] sufficiently limited in scope, [ (2) ] relevant in purpose, and [ (3) ] specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.” Pollard, 263 Ind. at 254 , 329 N.E.2d at 586 (emphases added). 2000And as summarized in See v. City of Seattle (1967), 387 U.S. 541, 544 , 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1740 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 , the requirement is “that the subpoena be [ (1) ] sufficiently limited in scope, [ (2) ] relevant in purpose, and [ (3) ] specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.” Pollard, 263 Ind. at 254 , 329 N.E.2d at 586 (emphases added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Webb v. Jarvis
green
2 sentences2004The correct application of the foreseeability element is an issue which has plagued this court since the announcement of the three factor test in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991). 3 In Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, this court discussed the inconsistent application of the three factor test announced in Webb. 2004The correct application of the foreseeability element is an issue which has plagued this court since the announcement of the three factor test in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991). [3] In Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, this court discussed the inconsistent application of the three factor test announced in Webb . | 2 | 2001–2004 |
Goldsberry v. Grubbs
green
2 sentences2004The correct application of the foreseeability element is an issue which has plagued this court since the announcement of the three factor test in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991). 3 In Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, this court discussed the inconsistent application of the three factor test announced in Webb. 2004The correct application of the foreseeability element is an issue which has plagued this court since the announcement of the three factor test in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991). [3] In Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, this court discussed the inconsistent application of the three factor test announced in Webb . | 2 | 2001–2004 |
John Doe 1 v. Indiana Department of Child Services
green
1 sentence2025Doe #1, 81 N.E.3d at 206–07; K.G., 178 N.E.3d at 311. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Litchfield v. State
green
2 sentences2019"One factor that may render a search unreasonable is an arbitrary selection of the subject." Id. [13] The Litchfield Court laid out a three-factor test for evaluating whether, under the totality of the specific circumstances of a case, police conduct was objectively reasonable. 2019Id. at 361 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Company v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development
green
2 sentences2018I would follow this Court’s reasoning in Company v. Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 86 N.E.3d at 209-214 , and hold Indiana Code section 22-4-8-1 is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration and Authorization Act. 2018I would follow this Court's reasoning in Company v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev. , 86 N.E.3d at 209 -214 , and hold Indiana Code section 22-4-8-1 is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration and Authorization Act. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2018The federal attenuation doctrine distills that causation evaluation to a three-factor test: (1) "[T]he temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence," in other words, "how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search[;]" (2) "[T]he presence of intervening circumstances[;]" and, most importantly, (3) "[T]he purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ). 2018The federal attenuation doctrine distills that causation evaluation to a three-factor test: (1) "[T]he temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence," in other words, "how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search[;]" (2) "[T]he presence of intervening circumstances[;]" and, most importantly, (3) "[T]he purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Suarez v. State
green
1 sentence2016In terms of the three-factor analysis set forth in Suarez [v. State,] 967 N.E.2d 552 [ (Ind.Ct.App.2012), reh’g denied, trans. denied], although the benefit conferred by the guilty plea was fairly small (three years off the maximum aggregate sentence, plus the opportunity to argue that mitigating weight should be given to the guilty plea), the strength of the State’s case appears to have been very great. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015The Walker Test for Government Speech In Walker , the Supreme Court identified a three-factor standard for identifying government speech. 185 S.Ct. at 2247, 192 L.Ed.2d at 282-83 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Burrell v. Meads
green
1 sentence2011And we have since Heck continued to analyze premises liability claims by using the three-factor test expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 and expressly approved in Burrell as describing the “duty of reasonable care from landowners” to which social guests and invitees are entitled. 569 N.E.2d at 643 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Smith v. Baxter
green
1 sentence2011See PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943, 962 (Ind.2005) (noting and applying the Restatement elements and citing Burrell with approval); Smith, 796 N.E.2d at 244-45 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
See v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences2000After identifying that a standard other than probable cause should logically apply to evaluate investigative subpoenas, 12 the Pollard Court then adopted the three-factor standard for reasonableness established by the United States Supreme Court in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); The greatest protection which the fourth amendment affords a witness subject to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is the requirement of reasonableness .... 2000After identifying that a standard other than probable cause should logically apply to evaluate investigative subpoenas, 12 the Pollard Court then adopted the three-factor standard for reasonableness established by the United States Supreme Court in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); The greatest protection which the fourth amendment affords a witness subject to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is the requirement of reasonableness .... | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Sell
green
1 sentence2000For example, in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Sell (1992) Ind.App., 597 N.E.2d 329, 334 , trans. denied, a motorist fell asleep and struck a utility pole and his passenger sued the utility company. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
CENTER MANAGEMENT CORP. CENTER CITY HOUSING v. Bowman
green
1 sentence1998Id. at 230 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1991The majority attempts to justify this inconsistency by finding Garcia non-retroactive under the three-factor test enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 . 1991The majority attempts to justify this inconsistency by finding Garcia non-retroactive under the three-factor test enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971), 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Brown v. Texas
green
2 sentences1984One of the most thorough analyses of this issue was made by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Deskins, supra, where it was stated: "In applying the balancing test of the degree of governmental or public interest against the degree of intrusion upon the individual's constitutionally protected rights, the courts have developed a three-factor test or analysis which was stated in Brown as: '... [A] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." B 1984One of the most thorough analyses of this issue was made by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Deskins, supra, where it was stated: "In applying the balancing test of the degree of governmental or public interest against the degree of intrusion upon the individual's constitutionally protected rights, the courts have developed a three-factor test or analysis which was stated in Brown as: '... [A] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." B | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.