three-factor test in Illinois

2019Id. at 517 . ¶ 57 In Tetter, this court found, as a matter of first impression, that a proportionality challenge to the statutory scheme applicable to sex offenders is best addressed under the three-factor inquiry set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).

2019We find that the instant case, as a matter of first impression, lends itself to the three-factor inquiry set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).

2022That said, “ ‘[a]n action brought nominally against a State employee in his individual capacity will 5 be found to be a claim against the State where a judgment for the [party bringing the action] could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability.’ ” Id. (quoting Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992)). ¶ 13 As the Carmody court noted, the Illinois Supreme Court “has adopted a three-factor test to determine whether an action against a state employee is actually an action against the State.” Id. ¶ 22.

2012However, “[a]n action brought nominally against a State employee in his individual capacity will be found to be a claim against the State where a judgment for the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability.” Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 , 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (1992). ¶ 22 Our supreme court has adopted a three-factor test to determine whether an action against a state employee is actually an action against the State.

2019Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243 , ¶ 73; see also Kochevar, 2018 IL App (3d) 140660, ¶ 64 (applying the same test). - 11 - We adhere to that conclusion and adopt the same approach here.

2018Tetter , 2018 IL App (3d) 150243 , ¶ 73, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- ; see also Kochevar , 2018 IL App (3d) 140660 , ¶ 64, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- (applying the same test).

2015These four factors cover the three-factor test for determining an “equitable parent” (Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).

2015These four factors cover the three-factor test for determining an “equitable parent” (Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).

2025As stated in United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977), the federal courts apply the three-factor test in cases where “proof of personal bias requiring recusation” is absent.

2025Accord Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We need not find actual bias on the part of the district court prior to reassignment.”); United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (“With the exception of personal bias, this Court examines the [Robin three-factor test] to determine whether a case should be remanded to a different judge.”).

2025Accord Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We need not find actual bias on the part of the district court prior to reassignment.”); United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (“With the exception of personal bias, this Court examines the [Robin three-factor test] to determine whether a case should be remanded to a different judge.”).

2023See Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 50 (“a section 2-1401 petition that raises a fact-dependent challenge to a final judgment or order must be resolved by considering the particular facts, circumstances, and equities of the underlying case.”).

2022See Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 14 . ¶ 65 In the case at bar, we take the same approach the Landis court did, namely, applying the three-factor analysis to determine whether section 5-12-060 provides for a statutory penalty.

2021For the following reasons, we agree with Rob. ¶ 89 With respect to the first factor, there is no doubt that the duration of Rob’s involuntary medication order impacted a significant “private interest.” Our supreme court has held “there is no question that the private interest affected by the forced administration of psychotropic drugs is substantial.” In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 49 . “[I]nvoluntary mental health services, including the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs, involve a massive curtailment of liberty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 46 ; see also In re

2021For the following reasons, we agree with Rob. ¶ 89 With respect to the first factor, there is no doubt that the duration of Rob’s involuntary medication order impacted a significant “private interest.” Our supreme court has held “there is no question that the private interest affected by the forced administration of psychotropic drugs is substantial.” In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 49 . “[I]nvoluntary mental health services, including the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs, involve a massive curtailment of liberty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 46 ; see also In re

2019According to defendants, the three factors are: “(1) whether the other law is mandatory or directory; (2) whether the public employer subject to the other law has the unilateral ability to alter the statute that provides for the other law; and (3) whether the legislative intent demonstrates the legislature’s preference for bargaining.” However, in setting forth the test, defendants offer a general “see” citation to Nall v. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Lodge 822, Dist. 123, 307 Ill.

1994See People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (to determine whether there is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, factors for analysis include (1) focusing on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction; (2) examining the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction; and (3) whether the impeaching evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence).